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ABSTRACT

It is the major thesis of this paper that American
Catholics were given recognition as a major force in society
and were raised to "a new level of association" during the
first administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In presenting

this argument, the terms Catholic Church and American
Catholics are used interchangeably.

The expressions of the

Church are derived from Catholic newspapers and periodicals,
from the statements of leading churchmen and laymen, and
from the positions taken by major Catholic organizations.
Although the decision of the Democratic party to
nominate Roosevelt instead of A1 Smith in 1932 generated some
Catholic resentment,

this did not have any effect on the

election results in November.

Roosevelt touched a sympa

thetic note during the campaign when he quoted from the Papal
encyclicals to prove that his program was no more radical
than the Pope's.

In November, Roosevelt swept to victory in

all the large urban areas of the United States.
In 1932, American Catholics faced the depression and
the new President with a concrete program of social reform.

This program was based on the past statements of the Ameri
can bishops, on the work of various individual priests, and
on the Papal encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI.
Some of the proposals embodied in this program were:

a

living wage for labor, minimum-wage laws, the right of
government to intervene in the economy for the "common good,"
old-age insurance, and government recognition of labor's
right to organize.

In many ways, American Catholics were

intellectually prepared for the type of innovation which
Roosevelt brought to the American scene.
In 1933, it became apparent that much of the enthusi
astic response generated among Catholics for Roosevelt's
program was the result of the special interpretation being
given the New Deal by many Catholic sources.

To many such

observers, the New Deal represented a significant attempt
to institutionalize the Papal economic program in the
United States.
While foreign affairs were undoubtedly secondary to
domestic legislation during the first Roosevelt administra
tion, certain issues developed which had special meaning
for American Catholics.

The President's decision to extend

diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union was opposed by

the Catholic Church as not being in the best interest of the
United States.

Roosevelt was aware of Catholic opposition

to recognition and took steps to ameliorate it.

The Presi

dent incorporated in the terms of recognition a guarantee of
religious liberty for Americans in Russia.
The second issue of foreign affairs which attracted
considerable Catholic attention revolved around the anti
clerical policies being pursued by the Mexican government in
1934 and 1935.

American Catholics were incensed by what

seemed unwarranted persecution of their brethren south of
the border.

Certain Catholic groups began a campaign to

pressure Roosevelt into intervening in Mexico to alleviate
the persecution.

While Roosevelt was not opposed to making

statements in favor of religious liberty— statements which
could reasonably be assumed to answer the demands of American
Catholics— he refused to actively intervene in the internal
affairs of a foreign country.
During the presidential election of 1936,

two of

Roosevelt's major critics were prominent Catholic figures—
Al Smith and Reverend Charles Coughlin.

While some

politicians feared lest these voices be heeded by Catholic
Democrats, others,

including the President, were reassured

by the support received from such Catholic notables as
George Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago and Reverend John A.
Ryan of Washington.

While taking no

official action against

Coughlin, a large segment of the Church exp-essed pro-Roose
velt opinions before the election.

The election results of

19J6 indicated that American Catholics had remained faithiul
to the Democratic ^arty.

vii

INTRODUCTION

In 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President
of the United States.

Few Roman Catholics realized it at

the time, but this event was to initiate a new era in their
Church's place in American society.

Disturbed and made

insecure by the campaign of 1928,^ the Church, represented
by the hierarchy and by individual members, was to reach a
degree of recognition and intimacy under Roosevelt that would
have astounded their forefathers.
the result of two forces:

This state of affairs was

the political acumen of Franklin

Roosevelt and the largely fortuitous similarity between much

^Writing in 1955, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of
Reform (New York, 1955), p. 300, said that Roman Catholics
in the United States never really recovered from the 1928
"trauma" and that this had made impossible their "effort at
assimilation" and attempts "at the achievement of full
American identity."
Lowell Dyson, "The Quest for Power:
Father Coughlin and the Election of 1936," (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Columbia University, 1937), p. 66, speaks of the
Roman Catholic's need "to belong" after the 1928 election
and of how Father Coughlin fitted into the picture because
he translated the social encyclicals of the Popes into
Populist or native American terms.
Oscar Handlin, A1 Smith
and His America (Boston, 1958), p. 188, recognizes the
frustration of American Catholics after 1928, but he feels
that this sense of alienation was never removed but only sub
merged by the economic crisis of the 1930's.
1

2
of the New Deal's reform legislation and the social and
economic teachings of the Church.
If, as one observer has remarked,

"the Depression and

Roosevelt years . . . were a providential opportunity for
Catholics

...

to make their voices heard in changing the

nation's social situation,"

2

it was no less a time when the

President recognized the power and influence which could be
exerted by American Catholics.
that it was A1 Smith who,
largely Roman Catholic,

Samuel Lubell has stated

in 1928, awakened the urban masses,

to a political consciousness and a

sympathy for the Democratic party.

It should also be pointed

out that subsequently it was FDR who maintained the allegiance
of American Catholics toward the party by the recognition he
extended them and the finesse with which he treated them.
It is also clear that the New Deal provoked a true
social consciousness among many Catholics.

Lubell has stated:

The quickened pace of social change touched off
by the depression and New Deal forced the Church
leaders to become articulate on all sorts of
questions which had lain dormant during the 1 9 2 0 ’s
like the expanding role of the government, the
sharpened class cleavage which the Roosevelt
Revolution brought and the dramatic extension of
trade unionism into the mass production industries

^Francis J. Lally, The Catholic Church in a Changing
America (Boston, 1962), p. 48.

3
where Catholic workers were so heavily concen
trated .^
But this opportunity to contribute to the economic dialogue
was only one facet of the sense of belonging achieved by
American Catholics under President Roosevelt.

Unfortunately,

the story of how Roosevelt exploited this frustration has to
be gained from indirect sources,

since the President himself

very seldom spoke from this point of view.

Yet enough

evidence exists to show that he was aware of American
Catholics as a political force of no small consequence.
This essay, however,

attempts primarily to tell the

story from the point of view of American Catholics and how
they reacted to the New Deal in domestic and foreign affairs
from 1932 to 1936.^

Events of the 1930's in many cases

evoked the same response from Catholics as they did from
every other American citizen.

This essay attempts to discuss

Catholic reaction to the major events of the period and the

3Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics
(2nd e d . , rev.; New York, 1956), p. 236.
^The term "American Catholics" is used interchangeably
with the term "the Catholic Church."
My use of both terms
will be defended later.
Generally they imply the public
opinions of the Church hierarchy, the Catholic press, promi
nent Catholic spokesmen, and various Church-affiliated groups
such as the Knights of Colombus.
The analysis is largely
limited to these sources, since most Church archives for this
period are still closed.

4
reasons for their particular response.
My major thesis is that it was under Franklin Roosevelt
and the New Deal that American Catholics were given recogni
tion as a major force in society and were raised to "a new
level of association . . . indicating a change in the
'official' American attitude toward the Church, and equally
important,
ment."^

in the Church's disposition toward the govern

But this major thesis involves many subsidiary

5
This statement is made by Lally, The Catholic Church
in a Changing Ame r i c a , p. 48, but he does little to support
it with historical evidence.
It is my hope that this dis
sertation will add the support of historical scholarship to
what I consider a correct and penetrating observation.
Other authors who have struck a similar theme include
William V. Shannon, The American Irish (New York, 1964), p.
327, who speaks of new opportunity under Roosevelt but limits
his analysis to American Irish.
Allen Guttmann, The Wound
in the Heart:
America and the Spanish Civil War (New York,
1962), p. 45, says that members of the Catholic hierarchy
had been trying to "accommodate themselves to American
Society" for years, but only succeeded in the New Deal.
At
this time, the Church gained an importance it had "never
enjoyed in any other administration."
The appointments of
Farley and Kennedy, for example, made Catholics forget the
bigotry of 1928. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D .
Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), p. 332, recog
nizes that many new groups received recognition under FDR but,
significantly, he says:
"equal representation for religious
groups became so well accepted that, as one priest wryly
complained, one never saw a picture of a priest in a news
paper unless he was flanked on either side by a minister and
a rabbi."
It might be added that for Catholics this equal
time represented a gain in status.

findings which will unfold with the story.

For example, much

New Deal reform legislation was accepted eagerly by American
Catholics because it was presented to ther, by their leaders,
as an American version of the Papal encyclicals.

In this

sense the New Deal liberalized American Catholics by showing
them how radical were the Church's teaching on social
p r o b lems.
I fully realize that there are weighty problems to
encounter in any such study as proposed in the foregoing
paragraphs.

Perhaps some criticism can be eliminated if it

is stated at the outset that this paper does not attempt to
discuss the theoretical, and largely philosophical, problem
of the proper relationship between church and state.

This

particular problem has been debated through the ages from
Augustine to John Courtney Murray.

It seems, however,

that

we can recognize at least the fundamental connection between
church and state without getting into the knotty problem of
the proper order of this relationship.

Taking the liberty

of defining the terms of my own argument, I propose to sur
mount the difficulty of church-state relations by simply
pointing out that both institutions operate through temporal
forces and on the same group of people.

This congruence

necessarily involves infringement by both church and state

on each other's interest,

for the spiritual and temporal

concerns of man are not easily divided.
Two prominent Catholic voices of the 1930's discussed
this problem of church and state in terms that may well have
reflected the attitude of the majority of their co-religionist
about the issue.

Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., pointed

out in true scholastic fashion that, since politics is con
cerned with the art of governing, which is concerned with
ethics, and since ethics is really the science of morals,
which is the concern of the Church,
is interested in politics,
Faith and Morals."

therefore,

"the Church

since she is the guardian of

If the political problems involved con

cern only secular things and not "fundamental moral issues,
the Church not only leaves you free to cooperate with your
party, but makes no claim to intervene in political issues."
The difficulty here, of course,

is that the Church reserves

to itself the right to decide when fundamental moral issues
are involved.6

Another major Catholic figure of the 1 9 3 0 's,

Reverend James Gillis, editor of The Catholic W o r l d , was
heard to say that it is both impossible and undesirable to
completely eliminate religion from political conduct,
£

for it

Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, S . J . , "Some Things New and
Old," The Catholic M i n d , XXXVIII (December 8, 1940), 518.

should serve as a purifying element.7

These two opinions

probably reflected the thinking of many Catholic priests on
the problem of the Church and politics.

The opinions might

be condemned by the more sophisticated as being inadequate
for such a profound subject, but they appear adequate enough
for most Catholics.
Another tricky problem in a study of this kind, which
might lead to criticism,

is the use of group terms.

It is

important to note that when I speak of "the Catholic Church,"
I am referring to that institution on a purely secular
0
level.

Some critics would deny any use of the term "American

Catholic Church," because there is no one central controlling
body in America and because each bishop is largely autonomous
in his diocese.

Furthermore, argue these critics, the

bishoprics differ widely in problems, affluence, and ethnic
make-up.^

Yet it seems clear that there is enough central

ization and enough community of attitude to permit one the

7The Boston P i l o t , November 10, 1932, p. 5.
Q

See Will Herberg, Protestant. Catholic, Jew (Anchor
e d . , 1960), p. 4, for the same distinction.
^Reverend Thomas McAvoy, "The Catholic Church in the
United States," in The Catholic Church in World Affairs, eds.
Waldemar Gurian and M. A. Fitzsimmons (Notre Dame, Indiana,
1954), p. 361.

8
license of the term "American Catholic Church."

We see the

statements of the National Catholic Welfare Conference

(NCWC),

which the bishops of the United States often use to publicize
their collegiate attitude toward a problem.

We see the

Catholic press, which depends largely on the news service of
the NCWC, as another source permitting an isolation of
Catholic opinion.

Furthermore, my research for this study

revealed a high degree of unanimity among the Catholic press
and lay groups toward public questions such as American
recognition of Russia and the effectiveness of New Deal
legislation.

Certainly I make no claim of unanimous opinion

for American Catholics.

There does seem to be, however, a

great similarity in the opinions expressed by the "public
mind" of the Church, as seen in the public statements of the
hierarchy, of prominent prelates and laymen, the editorial
opinion of the Catholic press, and the resolutions passed by
various Catholic societies on key issues during the 1930's;
there is enough to make such a study as this worthwhile.
There is also a problem in labeling individuals as
spokesmen for one group when they may not be acting for that
group at all.^®

Church membership is only one of many

^ R . M. Darrow, "Catholic Political Power:
A Study
of the Activities of the American Catholic Church on behalf

9
memberships claiming an individual's allegiance.

The plural

ism of American society makes difficult the delineation of
one overriding motive for an individual action, and the much
maligned American "individualism" has permeated the Catholic's
relationship with his Church and made blind obedience as out
dated as the I n q u i s i t i o n . ^

In fact, certain studies have

shown that among Protestants, at least, those who are deeply
committed to their church are those who feel most strongly
that the church should stay out of politics.

Conversely this

means that those members who find the voice of their church
most meaningful are those who would most vigorously deny the
church a voice on political issues.

12

Another term in this study certain to cause difficulty
is "the Catholic vote."

This particular phrase has proved

of Franco. . . . " (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1953), p. iii, admits the distinction of individ
ual churchmen and the Church but remarks:
"this delicate
problem of judgment hardly calls for refusing to recognize
that the Church acts as an organized institution through
denying its temporal existence."
^ R . M. Darrow, "The Church and Techniques of Political
Action," in Religion in American L i f e , eds. James W. Smith
and A. L. Jamison (4 vols.; Princeton, 1961), II, 170-71.
•^Charles Glock, "The Political Role of the Church as
Defined by Its Parishioners," Public Opinion Quarterly,
XVIII (1954-1955), 337.
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very offensive to many Catholic prelates, one of whom has
called it "one of the greatest myths of American politics."^
Usually an offense is taken because such a concept indicates
a captive and precommitted segment of the public, and impugns
the intelligence of the individual Catholic.

Furthermore,

some political scientists would deny historians the ability
to even interpret voting in such terms because of insufficient
data and weak conceptual tools.

14

Others say that the Church

can no more influence its members to vote one way than can
labor unions, and that much of the Church's political power
is based on bluff.
Yet the fact remains that practically all political

^ P e t e r H. Odegard, "Catholicism and Elections in the
United States," in Religion and Politics, ed. Peter H.
Odegard (Rutgers University, 1960), p. 125, where Rev. Thomas
McAvoy is quoted.
See also the following:
Elmer Roper, "The
Myth of the Catholic Vote," in Religion and Politics , p. 152,
who says Catholics are "just as free . . . unfettered and
just as divided . . . as any other group"; Reverend George B.
Ford, Interview in Columbia University Oral History Project,
p. 105, who says there is no Catholic vote because Catholics
owe allegiance to the Church only on matters of faith and
morals.
14

Lee Benson, "Research Problems in American Political
Historiography," in Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences,
ed. Mirra Komarovsky (Glencoe, Illinois, 1958), p. 114.
^ H e r b e r t C. Pell, Interview in Columbia University
Oral History Project, pp. 358, 360.

11
analysts talk in terms of a "Catholic v o t e . " ^

It is also

clear that Roosevelt was only one of many politicians who
believed there was such a vote and acted accordingly.
Finally,

17

there is no disputing the fact that many prominent

Catholic figures spoke in terms of influencing their co
religionists to vote a certain way.
Perhaps some of the difficulty and offensiveness of
the term can be eliminated if we dispel the idea that the
Catholic vote is "captive" and "pre-committed."

To say that

FDR received the Catholic vote implies neither of the above
traits.

One does not have to propose that priests dictated

to the laity on public matters, but merely that acceptance
and advocacy by priests of a certain attitude might be
"filtered through to their religious communities."

18

^ S a m u e l Lubell is only one of many who use the term.
Of interest here is a recent issue of Newsweek {November 2,
1964) which carried an article by Lou Harris, public opinion
analyst, which indicated that President Johnson would get as
much of "the Catholic vote" as had President Kennedy.
17

James Farley and Thomas Corcoran are two others who
accept the term. James Farley, Interview with author,
March 20, 1965, Washington, D. C.; Thomas Corcoran, Interview
with author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D. C.
-*-®Odegard, "Catholicism and Elections," p. 120, says,
"It is not unlikely that some parishioners . . . simply
follow the lead of their priest as an expression of group
solidarity so frequently found among Catholics."

12
Roosevelt,

in particular,

realized the freedom of this vote

to shift allegiance, because he was constantly on guard lest
he offend the Church and lose Catholic support.

19

Perhaps

he had too simplified a view of the Church's ability to shift
votes, but his belief that respect for the Church could only
help him among Catholics seems well grounded.
When I speak of Catholics supporting FDR, I mean
that, during the period 1932 to 1936, they generally felt
that their place in American society was more secure under
his guidance than under what his opponents offered.

But this

interpretation might provoke the question, Why then dis
tinguish the voters' religious affiliation at all?

I feel

that religious affiliation was important because the public
mind of the Catholic Church did involve itself with public
issues during this period.

The Catholic press,

20

the

hierarchy, and various lay organizations did take stands on

■^Jim Farley remarked that FDR had great respect for
the power of the American hierarchy.
Farley interview.
20

Darrow, "Catholic Political Power," p. 21, says in
1936 the Catholic press consisted of 134 newspapers, with a
circulation of 2.3 million; 198 magazines, with a circula
tion of 4.6 million; and various other publications for a
total circulation of 8.9 million.
All of these organs
depended largely upon the NCWC news service for national
coverage at this time according to Rev. George Higgins, NCWC,
Interview with author, April 29, 1965, Washington, D. C.

13
issues of national consequence.

While this public pressure

was not always decisive for the individual Catholic,

it was

one of the forces affecting his opinion and consequent
political behavior toward an issue, and as such should be
examined.
It should be made clear at this point that no
criticism is implied regarding the Church's interest in public
questions.

Indeed it is impossible for the Church to remain

isolated from the currents of the times.

When one considers

that politicians are aware of the Church's strength in
changing public opinion,

it becomes obvious that they should

"give churches their due as part of the ordinary political
process of adjustment."

21

The Church does not have to

deliberately call for political action with regard to a
certain issue.

The attitudes of the Church form part of the

climate of opinion in which politicians operate, and reactions
are often on an indirect pressure basis.
ual clergyman,

As for the individ

if he is pastor to a flock which comprises

the majority of a voting element in a city or district, he
will automatically find that he shares political power with

21

Darrow,
Action," p. 165.

"The Church and Techniques of Political

14
the politicians simply by virtue of his position as interpreter of the commonweal.
Finally,

22

it should be made clear that the Church often

refuses to cooperate with politicians who directly seek her
support.

It may be said that politicians try to use the

Church for political ends more than the Church tries to use
politicians for religious ends.

23

22ibid., pp. 164, 165.
23Darrow,

"Catholic Political Power," p. 34.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

Franklin Roosevelt came to the Presidency eminently
suited to accept and appreciate the growing political
maturity of American Catholics.

His own religious con

victions were amorphous enough to allow him a tolerance for
doctrinal differences, yet formal enough to generate an
appreciation for the hierarchical structure of the Catholic
Church.

Equally persuasive was his political experience with

the Church in the state of New York as Senator, as supporter
of A1 Smith in 1928, and as Governor.
It is difficult enough to assess any man's personal
religious convictions.

When that man is as complex and as

much of an enigma as Franklin Roosevelt,
especially foolhardy.

the task becomes

We can easily set down the formal fact

that Roosevelt was an Episcopalian, but what especially does
this mean?

He once admitted to Harold Ickes, his Secretary

of the Interior, that this allegiance had developed primarily
because his father had found it more convenient to attend the

15

16
Episcopal Church than a more remote Dutch Reformed Church.
He boasted of being "low-church" and of preferring a Baptist
sermon to that of an Episcopalian.^"
his own wardenship in the Church.

Yet he was very proud of
Furthermore, he liked to

draw attention to the fact that one of his relatives was a
prince of the Catholic Church.

Archbishop James Roosevelt

Bayley of Baltimore was a cousin and known as "Rosey" Bayley
among the Roosevelts.

FDR also boasted of his close personal

relationship with James Cardinal Gibbons, another prince of
the Catholic hierarchy.

2

It is difficult to gauge Roosevelt's religious
sincerity.

He was a man who could insist that his Cabinet

meet for prayer before assuming public office, who could look
after the spiritual conversion of his own household staff,
and who could contribute financially to his own and other
3

churches in the Hyde

Park area.

Yet he was also

a man who

could joke about the

relative political strength of each

^"Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes
(3 v o l s .; New York, 1954), II, 290.
2

Frank Freidel, "Roosevelt's Father," The Franklin D .
Roosevelt Collector, V (November,
1952), 5.
^Grace Tully, F. D. R . , My Boss (New York,1949),
pp. 112, 354; Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New
York, 1946), p. 140.
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religious group and how to balance them.

He once remarked

to James Farley, his Postmaster General , that clergymen be
appointed to a government committee on the basis of their
total political strength.

4

The answer to this seemingly paradoxical attitude
toward religion may be found in FDR's personal theology and
religious convictions.
speaking,

It seems clear that, theologically

"in matters of the soul Mr. Roosevelt was a con-

servative."

He accepted the basic tenets of Christianity

with the certitude of a fundamentalist.

Frances Perkins,

Secretary of Labor during the New Deal, has written most
perceptively on this side of Roosevelt.

She points out that

the major problems of Higher Criticism of the Bible and
"scientific discoveries
least."

£

. . . bothered him not in the

It might be added that this lack of intellectual

and theological background may have permitted FDR the flexi
bility and receptiveness to al . faiths which made his
presidency congenial to Catholics .nd others.

Years

Roosevelt

^James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, the Roosevelt
(New York, 1948), p. 59.

^George N. Shuster,
April 25, 1945, p. 38.

"Mr. Roosevelt," Commonweal,

Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, p. 140.

18
himself gave some insight into his view on religion in a
reply he made in March,

1935, to a query regarding the

religious affiliation of his ancestors.
past," he said,
Protestants.

"In the dim distant

"they may have been Jews or Catholics or

What I am more interested in is whether they

were good citizens and believers in God.

I hope they were

both."7
Franklin Roosevelt's political awareness of the
Catholic Church started early in his career.

When, as a

member of the State Senate of New York in 1911, he attempted
to lead a revolt against Tammany control of the Democratic
nomination to the United States Senate, he felt the barbs of
the Catholic hierarchy.

William F. Sheeham, the Tammany

candidate, was an Irish Catholic.

This, however, had little

to do with Roosevelt's and the other Insurgent's opposition
to him.

They simply felt that he war not the best man for

7Samuel Rosenman, e d . , The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (13 vols.; New York, 1938-1950), IV,
96. This democratic approach to religion, however, was not
the only factor in FDR's receptiveness to the Catholic Church,
but must be viewed with the rising political consciousness of
the Church.
Roosevelt's views on religion seem to fit a
pattern brilliantly outlined in Herberg, Protestant, p. 75,
where the author observes that Americans have become dedicated
not to one religion but to the idea that religion itself is
good for society and that the most popular religion is the
"American Way of Life."

19
the job.

Yet, Bishop Patrick A. Ludden of Syracuse, New

York, condemned FDR and his friends as being motivated by
Q

"bigotry and the old spirit of Knownothingism."
quickly replied to this outburst,
unnecessary and unfortunate."

Roosevelt

terming it "uncalled for,

He denied that the controversy

had any religious overtonas and admonished that the Bishop
did not know what he was talking about.

Q

It was, of course, during the 1928 presidential
campaign that Roosevelt really became intimate with the
problem of the Catholic Church's relationship to American
public life.

As an early and strenuous supporter of A1

Smith, Roosevelt was squarely in the middle of the religious
question.

Before the campaign started, FDR did not think

that Smith's Catholicism or his humble origins would hurt
his chances for election.^®

When the religious issue did

crop up during the campaign, Roosevelt gave Smith political
advice on how to answer some of the more sophisticated

Q

t

,

°Vlastimil Kybal, "Senator Franklin D. Roosevelt,
1910-1913," The Franklin D. Roosevelt Collector, IV (November,
1951), 13.
9Ibid., 14.
l°Harold F. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner:
D. Roosevelt (New York, 1952), p. 75.

Franklin

Protestant charges.11

Informally, Roosevelt combatted

religious bigotry while vacationing at Warm Springs, Georgia
shortly before the election.

Here he was astounded at how

ignorant the Southern rural dweller was of Catholicism.1^
His private correspondence during this period

(before 1928)

was filled with letters answering charges that a Catholic
should not be President.1"1
Roosevelt also took formal steps against the bigotry
he saw developing in the campaign of 1928.

Speaking at

Binghamton, New York, on October 17, 1928, he made light of
the issue by joking that some people were not opposed to
Irish Catholics, only Roman Catholics.1^

Yet a few days

later, on October 20, at Buffalo, New York, he spoke with an
extremely serious tone on the question.

Calling upon his

experiences in Europe during World War I, he reminded his
audience that no religious question was raised when American

11Edmund A. Moore, A Catholic Runs for President:
The Campaign of 1928 (New York, 1956), pp. 72-73.
^Eleanor

Roosevelt, This I Remember

(New York,

1949), p. 40.
^ B e r n a r d Bellush, "Apprenticeship for the Presidency
Franklin D. Roosevelt as Governor of New York" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia, 1950), II, 22.
14Rosenman, Public P a p e r s , I, 20-21.
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"doughboys" went to defend freedom, and those of all creeds
died side by side.
forgotten.

He hoped this great lesson would not be

But if any man could remember the war experiences

and still "cast his ballot in the interest of intolerance and
of a violation of the spirit of the Constitution of the U.S.,"
then, concluded Roosevelt,
woman,

"I say solemnly to that man or

'May God have mercy on your miserable soul; ",i5
With the thought of presenting a formal complaint to

a Congressional committee at some time in the future, Louis
Howe, FDR's personal secretary, systematically collected
letters and documents which contained bigoted information
against Smith,

traced them to their source, and prepared a

substantial file of evidence.

Howe was assisted by Roose

velt's private secretary Grace Tully, an Irish Catholic and
former secretary to Patrick Cardinal Hayes of New York.

This

file was eventually forwarded to Washington but no use was
ever made of i t . ^
Ironically, it seems that while Smith's Catholicism
hurt his chances for the Presidency, at the same time "FDR's
defense of Smith and attacks on religious bigotry won for
*

15Ibid., I, 36-38.
1 f.

__

Grace Tully, F D R , p. 34; Eleanor Roosevelt, This I
Remember, p. 40.

h i m the sympathy of many New York Catholics.

While it is

true that Louis Howe was worried because Roosevelt's defense
of Smith and attacks on bigotry was being interpreted as
attacks against Protestantism in general,

it is also true

that FDR received a plurality of 406,505 in New York City
which was only 32,000 less than the Smith vote.

This support

in New York City, combined with some upstate backing, was
enough to elect Roosevelt Governor,

succeeding Smith.

Roosevelt as Governor continued to receive the support
of New York's Catholic element.

One of the more outstanding

instances where Catholics noted his favorable attitude was
his signing of the Love-Hayes bill in 1932.

This bill made

it unlawful to inquire into the religious beliefs of anyone
seeking a teaching position in the public schools.

The bill

had sprung from a complaint by a Catholic woman who said she
had been discriminated against in applying for a teaching
position because of her religion.

All of the Catholic news

papers in the state had supported the bill in their editorials
and rejoiced at FDR's favorable action.

18

17Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, p. 90; Bellush,
"Apprenticeship," III, 39.
Needless to say, religion was not
an issue in Roosevelt's campaign, but his defense of Smith
certainly made h i m more attractive to New York Catholics.
^ The Brooklyn T a b l e t , March 26, 1932, p. 1.
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In June, 1929, Roosevelt spoke at Fordham University,
a Jesuit institution in New York City.

In his address he

praised those men and women who turned their backs on
materialistic careers to devote their life to charity and
the service of God.

More important than FDR's theme, however,

was the fact that when the Jesuit president of Fordham, upon
giving Roosevelt an honorary degree, commented that here was
a man who might someday be President,

the ten thousand in

attendance cheered enthusiastically.

It seemed that some

American Catholics could look upon the presidential candidacy
of Franklin Roosevelt with favor, an attitude that his own
understanding and sympathy for them had generated.

19

^

l^Frank B. Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt (3 vols.;
Boston, 1952), III, 72.
Thomas Corcoran noted that it
was impossible for Roosevelt not to be aware of the Church
because of his political roots in New York.
Interview with
author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D. C.

CHAPTER II

THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE

As the election year of 1932 dawned,

it became clear

that the Democrats had their best chance of winning the
Presidency since Woodrow Wilson's triumph in 1916.

This

fact was probably the main reason for A1 Smith's decision to
contest the nomination with Roosevelt.

This put the Roose

velt forces in the embarrassing position of courting the
support of those sections of the country that had rejected
Smith in 1928.

The ensuing fight for the nomination produced

a bitter reaction among many Eastern Catholics, and after the
convention Roosevelt devoted a major effort to woo them back
into the Democratic fold.
Catholic reaction to the news that Smith had decided
to seek the nomination in 1932 was ambiguous.

It was true

that some Catholic political analysts felt that his entrance
on the scene would stop the "Roosevelt Express," and that
Smith had a good chance to win both the nomination and the

25
election.^

Furthermore, Jim Farley had found spotty support

for Smith in his tour of the country.

Smith's strong showing

in the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania primaries indicated
that to many easterners he was still a hero.

But Farley noted

that the Smith sentiment "comes mostly from ardent Catholic
admirers and in some instances from strong wet advocates."2
All Catholics were not in favor of Smith's running
again in 1932.

Father John A. Ryan, a leading Catholic

social thinker throughout the 1930's, remembered the vicious
bigotry of 1928 and was reluctant to do anything to revive
this spirit.

3

The editor of The Catholic W o r l d , Reverend
/

James Gillis, worried about the constitutional crisis which
might result from another Smith campaign.

After all, if

Smith should be rejected again on the basis of his religion,
the constitutional clause that no religious test be required

1C. W. Thompson, "Today and Next November," Commonweal,
June 1, 1932, p. 119; Extension, XXVII (June, 1932), 24-25.
2James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York, 1938),
p. 84; Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 7; J. Joseph
Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933
(Cambridge, 1959), p. 237.
3
Reverend John A. Ryan to Thomas R. Lynch, February 5,
1930, John A. Ryan Papers, Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.
The Ryan Papers are arranged chronologi
cally by date of correspondence.

26
for office would prove meaningless.

This editor did not feel

the nation could stand another display like that of 1928.
Yet on second thought he felt it might be better to clarify
the issue once and for all.4
Another indication of the division of Catholic senti
ment toward the Democratic nomination was the fact that a
number of prominent Catholic laymen worked actively for
Roosevelt.

Frank P. Walsh, a well-known New York attorney

and Catholic layman, supported FDR before and at the conven
tion.

Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana,

later selected to

be Roosevelt's Attorney General, also worked to secure the
nomination for FDR at Chicago.^

Irish Catholic politicians,

4The Catholic W o r l d . CXXXIV (March, 1932), 734. A
few years after the election, a story was published which
indicated that the American hierarchy had not supported Smith
in 1932.
Seeking a reconciliation with American society, the
Bishops were embarrassed by Smith's tendency to remind his
audience of 1928.
Indications were that Smith's preconvention
campaign of 1932 was promoting and reviving the same atmos
phere that had existed in 1928.
The Bishops felt the time
was not ripe for a Catholic President and that more harm
than good would result from the attempt.
This story, the
authenticity of which is unsubstantiated, appeared in The
Monitor of San Francisco, April 21, 1934, p. 1.
^Frank P. Walsh to Ewing Y. Mitchell, January 19, 1932,
Box 134, Frank P. Walsh Papers, New York Public Library;
Clipping of "National FDR League for President," Box 405,
Thomas J. Walsh Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of
Congress.
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such as Parley and Ed Flynn of the Bronx and James M. Curley
of Boston, were also behind the Roosevelt machine.

Colonel

P. H. Callahan, a Kentucky businessman and influential
Catholic layman, had urged Roosevelt to make the race long
before 1932.

Callahan was of the opinion that Smith had

received a pro-Catholic vote in 1928 and had no cause to
£
complain about the results.
The Commonweal, a national Catholic magazine edited
by laymen, pledged neutrality in the race for the Democratic
nomination, but it could not refrain from speaking of Roose
velt as a man whose "strength may be said to lie in a happy
blend of skill and knowledge."

The editor also played up

the Governor's great familiarity with the problems of
agriculture and taxation.

7

Yet it was also clear that Roosevelt was taking a
calculated risk by basing his nomination on the support of
the Southern wing of the party.

Of course, he could do little

else while Smith maintained the allegiance of the East.

But

when Roosevelt's antiprohibition speech of 1932 was accepted

^FDR to Callahan, December 5, 1929, in F.D.R.;
His
Personal Letters, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (3 vols.; New York,
1947-1950), III, 93.

7

Commonweal, May 4, 1932, p. 3.
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without a protest in the South, the New York Times could
editorialize that this proved the South's opposition to
Smith in 1928 had been on religious grounds.
people who rejected a

"The same

'wet' Smith have now accepted a

'wet'

g
Roosevelt, because the latter is not a Catholic."
Roosevelt was soon labeled the candidate of the
Southern bigots by certain Catholic sources, who pointed out
that the anti-eastern wing of the party was behind him.

o

One of Smith's more reckless supporters even tried to docu
ment this accusation by forwarding to the delegates at Chicago
copies of letters purporting to show that the Ku Klux Klan
was supporting PDR in the South.

F. B. Summers and C. W.

Jones were named as two Klansmen who had solicited other
Klansmen to support FDR in Georgia.

Both Roosevelt and

Farley dismissed these charges as ridiculous.^
These scattered attacks seemed to have little effect
on the Governor's drive for the nomination.

It was true that

FDR was counting on the support of those elements in the
Democratic party which had rejected Smith at the polls in

^New York T i m e s ,
9C. W. Thompson,
w e a l , July 13, 1932, p.
10New York Times,

February 23, 1932, p.

16.

"The New Portent at Chicago," Common
282.
June 21, 1932, p. 8.

1928.

But this support did not require extensive proselyt

izing by FDR.

Many southern delegates were antagonized by

S m i t h 's and by National Chairman R a s k o b 1s attempts to pre
commit the party to an antiprohibition stand before the
convention met.

Raskob's antiprohibition and high tariff

philosophy pushed many southern conservatives into the Roose
velt camp.1!

It was also true that FDR had a reputation of

tolerance among Catholics in New York, had defended
Catholicism in 1928, and had considerable support from Irish
Catholics in the East.

12

The Roosevelt forces could assume

that the attitude of The Catholic World did not represent
that of American Catholics:
. . . the Democratic party should show its hand. . . .
If the democratic delegates reject Smith without
giving some bona fide reason for his "unavaila
bility," all the world will know that they have
rejected him because of his religion.
In that
jase the party writes itself down a coward and an
enemy to religious liberty and it deserves all the
beatings it has ever had or will ever g e t . 1^
During the convention,

some of Roosevelt's advisers

realized that something would have to be done to overcome

11Frank Freidel, F. D. R. and the South (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 1964), p. 30.
!^Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 230-39.
13The Catholic World, CXXXIV (March,

1932),

737.
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the bitterness aroused among many eastern Catholics by the
rejection of Smith.

Furthermore, Roosevelt himself realized

that although the South and West might give him the nomina
tion, the big electoral votes of the East would be needed to
win the Presidency.
friends,

Ed Flynn, one of Roosevelt's closest

suggested that the vice-presidential nomination go

to someone who would appease the northeastern Catholics.
This proposal was rejected, and John Nance Garner, who was
described by The Catholic Mirror as "a representative of
perhaps bigotry's banner state," was picked because Roosevelt
needed the Texas delegation for the nomination.

14

Evidence of Catholic bitterness over the convention
results mounted as the delegates left Chicago to return home.
Members of the Massachusetts delegation were heard to mutter
they would not vote for the "Klan candidate."

15

The Cutholic

press also gave indications of displeasure with the Roosevelt
nomination.

The Ave M a r i a , published at Notre Dame, said

that William G. McAdoo deserved the boos he received from
the Chicago galleries when he helped put Roosevelt across at

l40scar Handlin, A1 Smith and His A m e r i c a , p. 166.
See The Michigan Catholic, July 14, 1932, p. 4, for the sug
gestion that Senator Walsh of Montana be chosen as vicepresidential nominee.
l^Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 239.
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the convention.^6

The Chicago diocesan paper, The New W o r l d ,

wondered why the Democrats made "a concerted effort to shut
out of the convention even mention of a Catholic candidate?"
But then why bother, mused the editor, when they already
have the Catholic vote "in their pocket"?^7

The Catholic

Mirror of Springfield, Massachusetts, announced that bigotry
was "a steamroller in 1932" and that the Democrats had less
excuse for it than the Republicans.

The party had denied

Smith the nomination simply because of his religion and had
compounded its offense by choosing as vice-presidential
nominee a man from one of the most bigoted states in the
Union.

18

The Italian News commented that the Democratic

party of A1 Smith had nothing in common with the forces
which nominated Franklin Roosevelt in Chicago.

19

The spirit of resentment building up in segments of
the Catholic population was apparent to neutral observers.
The New York Times editorialized on the bitterness and

^ C i t e d approvingly by The Michigan Catholic, July 28,
1932, p. 4.
17The New W o r l d , July 22, 1932, p. 4.
^ New York T i m e s , October 25, 1932, p. 10; Huthmacher,
Massachusetts, p. 242.

19Ibid., p. 239.
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spirit of rebellion which was evident among Catholic voters
of Connecticut and Massachusetts.
political analyst for the paper,

Arthur Krock, noted
said,

"Something will have

to be done if FDR expects to carry Massachusetts this
,.20
year."
One of the most surprising manifestations of this
Catholic bitterness was the development of a movement to vote
for Norman Thomas,

the Socialist candidate, as a protest.

The movement first came to public attention when C. W.
Thompson wrote an article for the Commonweal, in which he
debated the propriety of a Catholic voting for Thomas.

He

concluded that since the Democrats were ruled by southern
bigots, Catholics might well vote for Thomas "with a clear
conscience."

Thompson portrayed Thomas as a defender of

religious liberty and no tool of

Russia.

21

Anthony J. Beck,

editor of The Michigan Catholic, wrote from Detroit that
there was strong sentiment in that section of the country
for Thomas from both laymen and clergy.

22

Father John Ryan,

^ N e w York T i m e s , September 5, 1932, p. 10; October
25, 1932, p. 10.
21C. W. Thompson, "Will Catholics Vote for Thomas?"
Commonweal, August 31, 1932, pp. 422-24.

a. j . Beck

22

1932, Ryan Papers.

to Rev. John

A. Ryan,September

25,
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when asked for advice, was reluctant to deny a Catholic's
right to vote for Thomas or even to doubt the wisdom of
doing so.

23

An indication of the proportions of the Catholic
movement for Thomas is the storm of opposition it called
forth.

Ryan's reluctance was not shared by other Catholic

sources, who were quick to condemn what they saw as a
dangerous movement.

The editors of Commonweal could not

even agree with the position taken by their contributor,
C. W. Thompson.

They pointed out that the Socialist offered

"an all embracing philosophy which was entirely natural
istic."

A vote for Thomas might not mean acceptance of

socialism but it was a dangerous flirtation.24

Another

national Catholic magazine, America, published by the
Jesuits, was even more vigorous in its opposition.

The

socialist view of the world was, it declared, totally alien
to the Catholic view.

Furthermore, Thomas was in favor of

recognizing the Soviet Union, a move that should be strenu
ously opposed.

The editor of America thought that Catholics

2^Rev. John A. Ryan to Rev. Francis J. Martin,
February, 1933, Ryan Papers.
^^Commonwea1, September 7, 1932, pp. 437-38.
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were forbidden to vote for Thomas "even in the phantom form
of a

'protest vote.'"
On a more local level, several diocesan papers came

out against what they considered growing sympathy for Norman
Thomas in their midst.

The geographic locations of these

papers give some indication that this was not an isolated
movement.

The Boston Pilot said that the great interest in

Thomas exhibited by Catholics could only be an indication of
"lack of enthusiasm"

for either Roosevelt or Hoover.

Yet

the editor felt that a Socialist vote would be dangerous and
unwise.

The Denver Register commented that the mail it

received indicated a growing preference for Thomas among its
readers;

the editor, however,

felt that it would be best for

his readers to vote for one of the major candidates,
"especially in view of the stand taken by Alfred E. Smith,
whose admirers were responsible for the letters about which
t

we are writing."

A vote for Thomas would be a wasted one.

The Michigan Catholic, published in Detroit, admitted that a
number of intelligent Catholics had expressed a desire to
vote for Thomas, but the editor cautioned them against such

^5Rev. Gerard B. Donnelly, S . J . , "Can Catholics Vote
Socialist?" Ame r i c a , October 15, 1932, p. 32; America,
September 10, 1932, p. 536.
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a move.

The Socialists had a cosmology, he explained, which

would replace religion, and it would be dangerous to support
them at the polls.

The-Catholic Messenger of Davenport,

was even more blunt about the matter:

Iowa,

Socialists were anti-

Christian, and a "vote for the Socialist ticket is a vote
for the recognition and approval of the actions of the
Russian Soviet. "2^
If the protest vote for Thomas was not enough to
worry Democratic leaders, they also had to contend with
Republican attempts to exploit the dissatisfaction of
Catholic voters over the rejection of Smith.

Paul Y.

Anderson, writing in The N a t i o n , August 3, 1932, suggested
that Eastern Republicans were busy telling Smith supporters
in New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts that FDR workers
had used anti-Catholic propaganda in the South and West to
gain the nomination over Smith.

One Catholic editor observed

that this campaign was not limited to the East and was
proving surprisingly effective among Catholics.27

Apparently

the campaign was serious enough to cause Jim Farley to speak

The Boston P i l o t , November 5, 1932, p. 4; The Denver
Register, November 6, 1932, p. 1; The Michigan Catholic,
September 29, 1932, p. 4; The Catholic Messenger, August 18,
1932, p. 2.
27Extension, XXVII

(October,

1932), 23.
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out against it before the State Democratic Convention of
Rhode Island on October 7, 1932.

He accused Republicans of

reviving the religious issue with a new angle and pleaded
with Catholics not to let Republicans put them in the same
position as the bigots of 1928.

28

The fact was that very few Catholic publications put
stock in this attempt to label Roosevelt as anti-Catholic.
Some called the evidence supporting the claim so meager that
only an idiot would fall for it.

Others resented the fact

that the party which benefited most from bigotry four years
ago would attempt to do so again, only this time in reverse.
The attempt to use vice-presidential nominee Garner as a
scapegoat for southern bigotry of 1928 was described as
"detestable business."

Finally,

this campaign's assumption

that Catholics voted for religious reasons was especially
irksome to some Catholics.

29

The actions of A1 Smith were also important in cutting
the ground out from under the attempts to deprive Roosevelt
of Catholic support in 1932.

Roosevelt realized that the

2^New York T i m e s , October 8, 1932, p. 2.
29The Cleveland Universe Bulletin, September 1, 1932;
Extension, XXVII (October, 1932), 23; The Catholic Transcript,
August 18, 1932, p. 4; America, August 13, 1932, p. 439.

South and West could nominate him but that to be elected he
would need the big electoral support of the East.

And it

was in the East that Smith had his most loyal supporters.
After the Chicago convention, Smith had mumbled something
about being a party man but had done nothing publicly to
support the ticket.
Frankfurter,

Roosevelt's advisers, among them Felix

tried to promote a reconciliation between the

two New Y o r k e r s . I n

August, vice-presidential candidate

Garner visited Smith in New York.

Their conversation was

private, but in a speech immediately following the meeting
Garner,

"with tears in his eyes," took an apologetic attitude

about the defection of Texas in 1928 and condemned religious
bigotry in general.

In the meantime,

Senator David I. Walsh

of Massachusetts, a close friend of Smith, was trying to
persuade the ex-Governor to support FDR for the sake of the
party.

Whatever the consequences of these actions, Roosevelt

and Smith did join forces to support the nomination of
Herbert Lehman for Governor of New York.

The newspapers

30See Bellush, "Apprenticeship," II, 24, where it is
noted that back in 1928 FDR had confided to a friend that
failure to nominate Smith would cause great defections in
the East from the Democratic party because of the "blind,
hero-worshipping following" he had.
33FDR to Felix Frankfurter,
Personal Letters, III, 301.

September 14, 1932, in
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carried pictures of them shaking hands.

Such camaraderie

was a source of elation to Parley and Howe.

They felt it

would eliminate the possibility of any Irish Catholic defec
tion from the ticket in November.3^
Smith campaigned for Roosevelt in the East.

After

the ex-Governor's first speech in Newark, New Jersey,

some

newspapermen complained because he brought up the religious
issue of the 1928 campaign.

But there was no question that

the crowds still appreciated him.

Although slow warming up,

Smith eventually came around to full support for FDR.

33

The

apogee of his efforts for the party was reached in Boston on
October 27.

There,

speaking to fifteen thousand people, he

closed his address with a remark interpreted as a rebuttal
to the anti-Catholic rumors being used against Roosevelt.
"There can be," Smith said,

"no bigotry and there can be no

resentment in the Catholic heart.

It cannot be there."3^

3^Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (New
York, 1957), p. 245; Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 241-42;
Clipping of The Boston Advertiser, July 2, 1932, in Scrapbook
No. 48, David I. Walsh Manuscripts, Holy Cross College,
Worcester, Massachusetts; The Catholic Transcript, November
10, 1932, p. 4, in which the editor insists that it was
Garner who won Smith over to campaign for FDR.
33New York T i m e s , October 28, 1932, p. 1.
■^Quoted by Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 248.
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The New York Times called Smith's tour of Massachusetts a
triumph and pointed out that "priests were in the forefront
of every crowd eager to clasp his hand and state their
approval of his speech."

35

It is difficult to say how much effect Smith's efforts
really had on Catholic voters.

It seems clear that after

Maine went Democratic in its mid-September election, most
political professionals in the East saw a walk-away for
Roosevelt in November, with or without Smith's help.

In

Massachusetts, after some initial hesitation, Senator David
Walsh came out strongly for the ticket, and he seems to have
played an important role in swinging the Bay State into the
Democratic c o l u m n . ^
Yet it is also clear that Smith's support of Roosevelt
was looked upon by some Catholic sources as a final bene
diction to the candidate.

The Commonweal remarked in

September that "the show is in jeopardy until A1 Smith makes

^ New York T i m e s , October 29, 1932, p. 1.
36

Huthmacher, Massachusetts, p. 245; Clipping of
Boston Advertiser, July 2, 1932, Scrapbook No. 48, David
Walsh Papers; Jim Farley says Smith did help in the East
but that the Roosevelt camp was not overly concerned with
the possibility of Irish Catholics defecting, interview
with author, March 20, 1965.

up his mind to join."

The Michigan Catholic and The Catholic

Herald felt that reconciliation of Smith and Roosevelt would
deal a death blow to the whispering campaign which was
attempting to exploit religious feeling.

37

Father John Ryan

had been approached early in the campaign about endorsing
Roosevelt and thereby undercutting the anti-Catholic campaign
being waged in the East.
Catholic sources,

Ryan was now told, by these same

that the issue was no longer in doubt

because of the splendid reaction to Smith's New England
campaign.

John McHugh Stuart wrote that Smith's endeavor

"makes doubly sure that we will have in the White House . . .
a knowledgeful friend and intelligent champion of the social
and economic doctrines recommended to us by Authority and
experience.'

3ft

In spite of these indications,

it appears certain that

Roosevelt would have received considerable Catholic support
regardless of the actions of A1 Smith.
things working in his favor.

First,

FDR had a number of

there was a natural

tendency to view Hoover as the man who had profited by the

3^The Michigan Catholic, October 13, 1932, p. 4; The
Catholic Herald of Milwaukee, October 13, 1932, p. 4.
38

John McHugh Stuart to Rev. John A. Ryan, October 29,
1932, Ryan Papers.
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anti-Catholicism of 1928.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, had

defended Smith and presented a posture of tolerance in 1928.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was intimate with many prominent
Catholics; and two of his chief advisers, Farley and Flynn,
were Catholics.

39

Perhaps the most attractive thing Roosevelt did during
the 1932 campaign,

from the Church's point of view, was to

quote from the Papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of Pius XI,
in a speech at Detroit, October 2, 1932.

Roosevelt called

the encyclical "just as radical as I a m , " and "one of the
greatest documents of modern t i m e s . T h e

fact that a

39

Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, p. 131; The New W o r l d ,
July 15, 1932, p. 1, reminded its public that Roosevelt was a
distant relative of Mother Elizabeth Ann Seaton, foundress of
the Sisters of Charity and a "distinguished figure in Catholic
Church history in this country."
^ R o s e n m a n , Public P a p e r s , I, 778.
The section of the
encyclical quoted is as follows:
"It is patent in our days
that not alone is wealth accumulated, but immense power and
despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands
of a few, and that those few are frequently not the owners
but only the trustees and directors of invested funds which
they administer at their good pleasure. . . .
"This accumulation of power, the characteristic note
of the modern economic order, is a natural result of limit
less free competition, which permits the survival of those
only who are the strongest, which often means those who fight
most relentlessly, who pay least heed to the dictates of con
science.
"This concentration of power has led to a threefold
struggle for domination:
First, there is the struggle for
dictatorship in the economic sphere itself; then the fierce
battle to acquire control of the government, so that its

42
presidential candidate had quoted approvingly from an
encyclical by the Pope had an immediate effect on American
Catholics.

To one editor,

this demonstrated that at last

Catholic social teaching was having an effect in this
country.

41

Another felt that Roosevelt could not be accused

of radicalism by his opponents,
than the Pope.

42

since he was no more radical

To some, his actions,

implying "endorse

ment of some fundamental principles of Christian social
reform," required great courage.

This public service would,

suggested one editor, go down as the most important remark
of the entire campaign.

His condemnation of laissez-faire

capitalism gave hope that perhaps here was a man really con
cerned with social j u s t i c e . ^
The obvious significance of FDR's Detroit remarks for
American Catholics was seen by John M. Stuart, a politically
active N e w Yorker and friend of Father John Ryan.

Stuart

resources and authority may be abused in the economic
struggle, and finally, the clash between the Governments
themselves."
^ The Catholic H e r a l d , December 15, 1932, p. 4.
^ America, October 15, 1932, p. 31.
4^The Michigan Catholic, October 6, 1932, p. 4;
Commonweal, October 12, 1932, p. 545; Denver Catholic
Register, November 20, 1932, p. 1.
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wrote Ryan asking the priest to comment on the Detroit speech
and promising to publicize his remarks in New England,

"where

I fear there is likely to be a recognizable defection of our
people through tribal pride."

Ryan had received a similar

query from Reverend Bryan J. McEntegart of Omaha.44 Further
more, Roosevelt himself had written Ryan asking that the
priest give some professional advice to Raymond Moley to be
used in the campaign.

Despite this contact, Ryan had not at

first viewed Roosevelt's candidacy with exuberance.

The

priest had preferred Newton Baker for the Democratic nomina
tion.

But by September he was writing the Honorable W. F.

Connolly of Detroit, who had published an article on why
Catholics should support Roosevelt, on how much he admired
the latter's views.

Ryan suggested they be given wide

publicity by the Democratic National Committee.

45

Yet Ryan

refused to help the Democratic cause directly by writing on
the similarity of Roosevelt's views with the Papal encyclicals.
The priest admitted that FDR was obviously familiar with the
Catholic documents and had accepted "important parts of its

44John M. Stuart to Ryan, October 3, 1932; Ryan to
Stuart, October 5, 1932, Ryan Papers.
45Francis L. Broderick, The Right Reverend New D e a l e r ;
John A. Ryan (New York, 1963), p. 208; Father Ryan to W. F.
Connolly, September 17, 1932, Ryan Papers.
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fQuadraqesimo A n n o l philosophy."

He also felt that Roose

velt's Commonwealth Club address in San Francisco was in
harmony with Catholic teaching, but he did not wish to con
tribute an article on these conclusions.

Instead, Stuart

was sent copies of old articles by Ryan in which H o o v e r ’s
policies were criticized.
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Ryan was not the only prominent Catholic who con
sidered Roosevelt the best choice in 1932.
Mayor of Detroit and later Attorney General,

Frank Murphy,
supported FDR

long before the Chicago convention and worked actively for
his nomination.

47

Frank P. Walsh of New York had been

appointed by Governor Roosevelt to the New York Power
Authority and had supported the Governor for the nomination
in 1932.
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The already famous radio priest of Detroit,

Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, came out early in support of
Roosevelt.

On a visit to New York City with Frank Murphy in

^ R e v . John Ryan to John M. Stuart, October 13, 1932,
and October 18, 1932, Ryan Papers.
^ R i c h a r d D. Lunt, "The High Ministry of Government:
The Political Career of Frank Murphy" (unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of New Mexico, 1962), p. 63.
48

Frank P. Walsh to Lewis Howe, December 9, 1931, Box
134, F. P. Walsh Papers.
Archbishop Glennon of Omaha had
remarked that Walsh presented an "impressive speech" for FDR.
William P. Harvey to Walsh, August, 1932, Box 134, F. P.
Walsh Papers.
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the spring of 1932, the priest offered his services to
support FDR's theory of government.
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When the votes were finally counted in November,

the

fears of the Roosevelt camp seemed largely exaggerated.
Franklin Roosevelt was the overwhelming victor.

He received

27,821,857 votes to 15,761,841 for Hoover and carried fortytwo states with 472 electoral votes.

Of the seventy-seven

northern counties with large Catholic populations, which
Smith swung out of the Republican camp in 1928, the vast
majority supported Roosevelt in 1 9 3 2 . ^

In Boston, Roosevelt

did better among Irish and Italian voters than had Smith.

51

The new President showed impressive strength in the
twelve largest urban areas in the United States, areas with
big Catholic populations.

Among others, he carried Boston,

Massachusetts; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; Orleans
Parish (New Orleans) , Louisiana; Wayne County (Detroit),
Michigan;

St. Louis, Missouri; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and New

^Freidel,

Roosevelt, III, 285.

50Lubell, Future of American Politics, p. 37.
Lubell
also points out that fifty-seven of these counties remained
Democratic in every presidential election from 1928 to
1948.
5-*-Huthmacher, Massachusetts, pp. 250-51.
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York City by impressive majorities.

CO

It seems clear that the vast majority of American
Catholics supported FDR at the polls in 1932.
for this support is more elusive.

The reason

One author attributes it

to no more than "a reasonable expectation of future favors."'^
This interpretation seems inadequate.

Clearly the crisis of

the depression and the desire for change affected Catholics
as it did most other Americans.

Although there was much in

Roosevelt's program that appealed to Catholic leaders, and
the candidate himself was conscious of Catholic political
strength,

it seems impossible to isolate a "Catholic vote"

in the Democratic mandate.
After the election, however, American Catholics went
about interpreting the results in their own fashion.

Some

considered the entire campaign a disappointment and felt sure
the depression would continue.
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Others felt that FDR had

proved himself during the campaign and that, while "1

is

52Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt
(Stanford University, 1947), pp. 20, 82, 103, 110, 120, 130,
149, 180.
CO

Daniel F. Cleary, "Catholics and Politics," in
Catholicism in America:
A Series of Articles from the
Commonweal (New York, 1954), p. 98.
5^The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati,
1932, p. 4.

November 10,
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not so able a man as Alfred E. Smith,

...

unquestionably make a splendid President."

he will
The name of A1

Smith continued to appear, in Catholic analyses of the elec
tion.

One publication felt that Smith was solely responsible

for Roosevelt's victory in New England.

Another theme put

forth was that Roosevelt's victory was "poetic retribution"
for Smith and American Catholics.
it,

"A1 Smith has had his day now."

As one editor expressed
57

While some Catholics

praised the lack of religious bigotry in the campaign,
others noted that the bigotry that did exist was directed
against Roosevelt and Garner for their pro-Catholicism.
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^ Denver Catholic Register, November 10, 1932, p. 1.
^ The M o n i t o r , December 10, 1932, p. 8, quotes favor
ably this opinion expressed by The Ave M a r i a .
57The Michigan Catholic, November 10, 1932, p. 4;
America, November 19, 1932, p. 149.
W. Shields, "Bigotry in the Last Election,"
A m e r i c a , December 3, 1932, p. 203; The Catholic W o r l d , CXVI
(December, 1932), 365.

CHAPTER III

CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT,

1932

When Franklin Roosevelt entered office in 1932,
American Catholics had a social philosophy with which to
interpret the measures of the New Deal.

The state and

content of this social thought was the cumulative result of
three elements forged in the preceding fifteen years:

the

"Bishops Program for Social Reconstruction of 1919," the
Papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno of 1931, and the work of
Church liberals such as John A. Ryan, Charles Coughlin, and
Dorothy Day.

It was these elements which Catholics drew

upon when they faced the depression of the 1930's.

This is

not to say that Catholic priests and laymen had not been
concerned with social problems before 1929.

Rather,

the

depression acted as a catalyst to their views and they became
bolder in espousing them.^

^•Aaron Abell, "The Catholic Church and the American
Social Question," in The Catholic Church in World A f f a i r s ,
p. 396.
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Before attributing too much importance to the
depression and the New Deal as well-springs of Catholic
social consciousness, we should recall that in the 19th
century the Knights of Labor drew support from James Cardinal
Gibbons.

In 1906, Reverend John A. Ryan wrote a book calling

for a "living wage."

Furthermore, many other priests and

organizations within the Church had taken radical social
positions long before the great depression.2
In 1919, the bishops of the United States published a
document which spelled out a program of "Social Reconstruc
tion."

The program was so radical that one prominent busi

nessman wrote that socialism had found a home in the
Catholic Church.

Specifically,

the bishops called for

minimum-wage laws and governmental intervention in the
economy to crush monopolies.

For labor they advocated unem

ployment, health, and old-age insurance and government
recognition of labor's right to organize.

Other measures

that they sponsored included public housing developments,
legal safeguards relating to women and child labor, and a

2Edward Marciniak, "Catholics and Social Reform," in
Catholicism in A m e r i c a , pp. 123-24.
^Reverend John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism
(Chicago, 1956), pp. 142-43.
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share by labor in management and ownership.

4

The impact of this document can be seen in retrospect.
By 1945, John T. McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati, was
eulogizing Archbishop Schrembs,

late Bishop of Cleveland, by

stressing that the latter had signed the B i s h o p s ' Program of
1919.

Archbishop McNicholas pointed out that of the twelve

major proposals offered in 1919, all but one had become
federal law.^

A member of the Roosevelt administration,

Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson,

remarked in 1939 that

. . . liberal political thinking in America has
been profoundly influenced by the "Bishops1
Program of Social Reconstruction." . . . What
suffering might have been spared to men had
the voice of the Bishops been heeded by those
who came to power in 1920 instead of having to
wait for the disaster-born administration of
1933.6
Another document to which Catholics had reference
during the depression and the New Deal was the Papal ency
clical Quadragesimo Anno by Pope Pius XI, written in 1931.^

4Broderick, Right Reverend, pp.
American Catholicism, p. 142.

104-106; Ellis,

^Ellis, American Catholicism, p. 143.
^Quoted in Shannon, American Irish, p. 326.
^The document's real title was "On Reconstructing the
Social Order," and was a supplement to the famous encyclical
Rerum novarum of Leo XIII (1891).
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Because of the pivotal role that this document played in
Catholic interpretation of the New Deal, an analysis of its
major points is in order.
The general theme of the encyclical was a condemnation
of laissez-faire capitalism.

Pius XI reiterated certain

thoughts in the earlier document by Leo XIII.

Leo had

rejected the old watch-dog concept of the state and had
called on government to "put forth every effort so that
through the entire scheme of laws and institutions . . . both
public and individual well being may develop spontaneously
out of the very structure and administration of the State."

Q

He had also encouraged the organization of unions to protect
the rights of the laborer.

Pius reaffirmed these ideas, but

he also developed new principles of his own.

He began by

distinguishing the "twofold character of ownership of goods."
The right of private ownership he defended, but he dis
tinguished this from the use of ownership, declaring that
the latter should be manifested with due regard for the common
good as defined by the State.

g

While denying the claims of

O
Quoted in Quadragesimo Anno (National Catholic Wel
fare Conference edition, 1942), p. 12, hereafter cited as
Q. A.
9I b i d ., pp. 19-20.
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both Manchester Liberal and Socialist,

the Pope did agree

that
. . . the riches that economic-social develop
ments constantly increase ought to be so
distributed among individual persons and
classes that the common advantage of all . . .
will be safeguarded.10
He called for a wage for labor sufficient to support both
the worker and his family.

"Opportunity to work [should] be

provided to those who are able and willing to w o r k . " ^
The Pope rejected capitalism as the answer to man's
ills.

He denied the value of unlimited and free economic

competition because,
of this system.

in truth, a dictatorship had grown out

"It is obvious that not only is wealth con

centrated in our times, but an immense power and despotic
economic dictatorship is consolidated in the hands of a
few.

..."

Furthermore,

these few did not really own the—

property but were only the "managing directors," who never
theless were all but unlimited in their disposition of this
power.
Free competition has destroyed itself; economic
dictatorship has supplanted the free market; un
bridled ambition for power has likewise succeeded
greed for gain; all economic life has become

10I b i d ., p. 23.

11Ibid., p. 28.
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tragically hard,

inexorable, and cruel.12

As a substitute for this jungle-like system, the Pope called
for industrial partnership:

the cooperation of both labor

and capital in the formation of vocational guilds.
broad in concept,

Although

this goal of vocational groupings was to be

the criterion by which many Catholics estimated the worth of
the New Deal.13
Whatever the source of their information, one thing
is clear:

by 1932 many American Catholics, both lay and

clergy, were generally appalled at the economic situation
which existed and were calling vigorously for radical reform
of the economic and social structure of the country.

This

concern was reflected in a joint statement by the American
hierarchy, published on November 12, 1931, under the auspices
of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.

The bishops

expressed sympathy for those suffering from the depression,
blamed unrestricted individualism for the economic disloca
tions, and offered detailed cures for the situation.

For one

thing, they called for the study and application of the Papal

12Q. A ., pp. 37-38.
13
Action:

Aaron I. Abell, American Catholicism and Social
A Search for Social Justice, 1865-1950 (New York,

1960), p. 263.
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encyclical Quadragesimp Anno by all elements of society. For
another,

they insisted that "the wealthy are obligated in con

science to contribute for the relief of those who suffer and
the more so because the system under which they suffer has
yielded wealth to others."

Specifically this meant a living

wage for labor and a more equal sharing of profits.

The

bishops also expressed their conviction that "federal and
state appropriations for relief in some form will become
necessary."

They proposed a "joint conference" of labor,

business, and the government to deal with the d e p r e s s i o n . ^
The National Catholic Welfare Conference, which had
sponsored the Bishops' remarks, was a ten-year old organiza
tion which had sprung from the National Catholic War Council.
This latter group had been formed during World War I to
enable the Catholic hierarchy to more effectively support
the United S t a t e s ' involvement in the European conflict
after 1917.

In essence the group was a national council for

Catholic affairs.

It was directed by the bishops of the

United States through a council which met frequently each
year.

Between meetings,

the work of the NCWC was carried on

by a permanent staff of priests and laymen.

Located in

^ R a p h a e l M. Huber, ed., Our Bishops Speak. . .,
1919-1951 (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1952), pp. 194-96.

Washington, D. C . , and influenced by such Catholic liberals
as Reverend John A. Ryan and Reverend John J. Burke,

the

NCWC played a large role in the discussion of public affairs.
One month after the Bishops issued their statement,
other evidence appeared of growing Catholic dissatisfaction
with Hoover's method for solving the depression.

Father

Ryan of Catholic University and the Social Action Department
of NCWC made an appearance before a Senate Committee.

As a

first step in combating the depression, Father Ryan called
for five billion dollars in federal public works to provide
relief from unemployment.^-6

In the meantime, Ryan's

assistant in NCWC, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan,

issued a

joint statement with Reverend James Myers of the Federal
Council of Churches of Christ in America, and Rabbi Edward
L. Israel of the Central Conference of American Rabbis.
Echoing the Bishops'

statement, these men called for a more

equal distribution of wealth and income.

They deplored the

practice of some businesses to cut wages during the economic
crisis.

"It is now time," read their statement,

"that the

^ D a n i e l Callahan, The Mind of the Catholic Layman
(New York, 1963), pp. 86-87; Broderick, Right Reverend, pp.
235-36.
NCWC continues to be active today with headquarters
on Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D. C.
^6The Catholic World, CXXXIV (December,

1931),

366.
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engineering principle of planning

. . . should be extended

to the control of entire industries and of industry in
general." ^
Over and over, prominent Catholics were heard
demanding more positive action by the Federal government in
combating the depression.

Father Charles Coughlin of Detroit

called for a rejection of the idea that the state should
interfere with its citizens as little as possible.

18

Reverend Dr. Francis J. Haas, Director of the National
Catholic Conference of Social Work, while addressing his
students on July 1, 1932,

in Philadelphia, called for an end

to cliches such as "balanced budget" and "no dole."

He

suggested instead an emergency program of massive Federal
spending and a high surtax on large incomes and inherit
ances.^

In an Independence Day address to the American

Legion of Washington, D. C . , Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vicepresident of Georgetown University, called for a new concept

^ Q u o t e d in The Catholic W o r l d , CXXIV (December,
1931), 623.
Shannon, American Irish, p. 296, calls Coughlin "a
path breaker and propagandist for the radicalism of the sub
sequent New Deal" and says the priest prepared Irish
Catholics for an intellectual acceptance of the New Deal as
being in the tradition of the Church.
^-9The Brooklyn T a b l e t , July 9, 1932, p. 1.
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of capital.

He pointed out that the best way of preventing

the advance of Communism in this country was to give the
laborer a wage above his immediate worth to provide insurance
against unemployment and old age.

"The few people who

control all the money in the country," said Walsh,

"have a

choice of giving up some of it or having the government con
script it, or [seeing] a mob rob them."20

Reverend Joseph

A. Cashen of Duluth, Minnesota, speaking on the radio under
the sponsorship of the Federated Trades Assembly, March 4,
1932, called for "active,

adequate, and effective inter

vention by the United States Government"

to end unemployment

and decentralize the wealth of the Nation.

21

The 18th annual convention of the National Conference
of Catholic Charities, held September 25 through 28 at Omaha,
Nebraska, provided an opportunity for Catholics to speak out
on the emergency facing the country.

Very Reverend A. J.

Muench of St. Francis, Wisconsin, rejected the rugged individ
ualism concept of business and the laissez-faire philosophy
of government.
a broader base.

He called for a redistribution of wealth on
Furthermore,

the Sherman Act needed

20The Brooklyn T a b l e t , July 16, 1932, p. 2.
2^Ibid., March 12, 1932, p. 1.
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revision,

for "only on the basis of cooperation can rational

planning of production and distribution be made a reality."
Muench was quick to make clear that the planning he called
for should come not from the state, but from the "industrial
and trade units themselves."

22

Catholic laymen at the conference also spoke out on
the situation.

Frank P. Walsh,

State Power Commission,

chairman of the New York

said that the efforts of credit

extension and public works being pursued by President Hoover
were wholly inadequate to meet the demands of relief.
time measures were called for,

insisted Walsh.

War

He also

called for a rejection of the theories of the English
classical economists with their iron laws and suggested a
return to the guild system of the Middle Ages as a way out
of the depression.^
James Fitzgerald, another layman at the conference and
an official of the St. Vincent de Paul Society from Detroit,
took this occasion to castigate Hoover's relief policies as
inadequate.

Fitzgerald felt that the assumption by Hoover

22

^National Conference of Catholic Charities, Proceed
ings , 1932-1941 (9 v o l s .; Omaha, Nebraska, 1932-1941), 18th
annual convention, 1932, p. 204, hereafter cited as NCCC
Proceedings.
2^Ibid., p. 11.
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that local initiative should be the major source of relief
was erroneous.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was

supposed to provide funds in an emergency.
gerald commented,

In fact, Fitz

few funds were being distributed.

He felt

the administration should realize that Federal relief funds
were needed now and that "necessity knows no law."2^
James F. Murphy of Detroit, president of the NCCC
Omaha Conference, rejected the idea that "blind economic
forces" were the cause of the depression.

On the one hand

he condemned the "ruthless free competition which ends
inevitably in economic dictatorship," and the procrastination
of the government in "mobilizing the resources of the nation
for relief.

..."

Yet Murphy insisted that he was also

against excessive centralization and bureaucracy of govern
ment .
While the foregoing statements indicate that a growing
segment of American Catholics advocated more radical measures
in combating the depression, not all shared this feeling.
Indeed, Father John Ryan had to admit that by the end of 1932
most of the Catholic clergy in America was still illiterate

2^NCCC Proceedings, 1932, pp. 28-33.
2 ^I b i d ., pp. 4-6.

60
regarding economics.

26

Reverend M. DeMunnynck, writing in

The Catholic M i n d , stressed the fact that private ownership
was "an indisputable natural r i g h t . A n o t h e r writer,
Reverend Lewis Watt, also came to the defense of private
property.

While admitting that economic relations could not

be left to "the free play of competition," Watt did not feel
that abolishment of private property would help cure the
depression.

But he did feel that state action was "absolutely

necessary."
Among the Catholic hierarchy,
Cincinnati, John T. McNicholas,

the Archbishop of

felt that one of the main

causes of the depression was the reckless spending of the
Federal government.

He remarked that "probably the expenses

of government administration could be reduced fifty per cent,
if fads and frills were eliminated."

He also called for an

end to "useless bureaus and endless commissions."

26

2Q

Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 201.

27

Rev. M. DeMunnynck, "Right of Private Ownership,"
The Catholic M i n d , XXX (January 22, 1932), 40.
2®Rev. Lewis Watt, S.J., "Economic Principles and
Social Practice," The Catholic M i n d , XXX (March 22, 1932),
124.
29Quoted by The Brooklyn T a b l e t , April 2, 1932,

p. 1.
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Some sort of low point in prophecy was reached by the
Milwaukee Catholic Herald when, after the November election,
the editor announced that any effort by the new administra
tion "to launch the government upon new enterprises will run
counter to the insistent demand for public economy."
public," insisted the editor,

"The

"will not stand for more

government spending."^0
Most Catholic spokesmen took a more radical reading
of the depression and of the action needed to combat it.

In

their interpretation they were influenced by the belief that
the ideas expressed in the encyclical of Pius XI held the
answer to the American dilemma.

For example,

the National

Catholic Alumni Federation undertook the sponsorship of
regional meetings to promote social justice.

In New York

City on November 20, 1932, a call went out for a crusade
based on the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.
of these meetings were twofold:

The goals

to educate American indus

trialists to the fact that "modern capitalism has already
failed," and to promote the "embodiment of papal principles
into the governmental framework of the nation."

The three

main speakers at the New York meeting were Reverend James M.

■^Milwaukee Catholic Herald, November 10, 1932, p. 4.
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Gillis, editor of The Catholic W o r l d , Reverend Wilfrid
Parsons,

S . J . , editor of America,

and Reverend John A. Ryan.

Father Gillis predicted a vast social upheaval in America if
capitalism did not reform.

Father Parsons condemned laissez-

faire economics, and Father Ryan said American capitalism was
—

Ol

committing suicide by stressing production over consumption.
Father Ryan had been an early exponent of the idea
that the papal encyclicals could help solve the economic
crisis.

He pointed out "that the public authorities are

obliged to promote the welfare of the people by many kinds
of positive measures" and that the state should care for the
poor and provide relief.

He condemned the Hoover administra-

tion for not recognizing these facts.

32

Ryan stressed the

fact that national planning was advocated by Pope Pius XI
and that individualism was "a blind alley."

33

Father Parsons was another propagator of the ency
clicals.

He lamented how few American Catholics realized

33New York T i m e s , November 21, 1932, p. 19.
3^Rev. John A. Ryan, "National Responsibility in the
Present Crisis," The Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVI (November, 1932),
169.
33

Rev. John A. Ryan, "After the Depression," Catholic
A c t i o n , January, 1932, p. 5; also NCCC Proceedings, 1932,
p. 20.

that the Pope had condemned concentration of wealth and
rugged individualism— phrases that Parsons associated with
the Hoover regime.

The priest felt that the P o p e ’s call for

an abolition of antitrust laws and the rejection of the free
competition philosophy behind such laws was especially timely
O A

for American consideration.

Parsons' magazine, Am e r i c a ,

had called the Democratic platform of 1932 "a hodge-podge of
economic theory," and had boasted that only Pius XI was bold
enough to go to the root of the depression— laissez-faire
economics.

The editors proudly remarked that "Pius XI

remains the most radical in social economics among all the
public men of our age."

35

Other voices joined the chorus stressing the relevance
of the Pope's encyclical to the depression.

Mayor Frank

Murphy of Detroit spoke before the International Federation
of Catholic Alumni at a meeting in New York City in November,
1932,

The Mayor chose the Papal encyclicals as his topic and

emphasized their applicability to the current economic
crisis.

36

The Catholic Central Verein of America, at its

3^Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "The Pope and the
Depression," The Catholic M i n d , XXX (June 22, 1932), 244.
3^Ame r i c a , July 9, 1932, pp. 320-21.
3^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , November 26, 1932, p. 1.
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77th general convention in St. Louis, August 19-24, 1932,
passed a resolution calling for the reconstruction of society
along the lines of vocational groups as laid down by
37
Quadragesimo A n n o .
Another theme in the growing Catholic demand for
economic reform was a bitter criticism of American capitalism.
Already some of this has been made evident in the remarks of
Ryan and Parsons.
criticism.
anything,

Catholic editors soon joined in this

One editor said that if the depression proved
it proved "that the enormously wealthy men of the

world are not its wise men."'*®

Father Gillis used the

editorial pages of The Catholic World to publicly disasso
ciate the Catholic Church from capitalism, although he
admitted the right of private property.

Gillis felt that

the depression should certainly make clear to all that
"injustices" and "mad incongruities" were "inherent in the
capitalistic system."

To dismiss all attempts at reform as

"communistic" was folly and revealed an inordinate fear
complex.^9

3?The Central-Blatt and Social Justice Review
(Official Journal of the Catholic Central Verein), September,
1932, pp. 173-75.
3**Penver Catholic Register, August 14, 1932, p. 1.
39«rhe Catholic Wo r l d , CXXXIII
(July, 1931), 487-88.

(May, 1931),

231-32;
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The speakers at the Catholic Alumni Federation meeting
of 1932 took the occasion to attack American capitalism.
Father Gillis continued his criticism and accepted the fact
that a social revolution was beginning in the United States.
His only question was how much violence would accompany the
revolution.

According to Gillis, capitalists had treated

labor "worse than . . .

an animal."

Father Parsons pointed

out that the existing economic structure "actually has pro
duced nothing but unlimited competition and unlimited
opportunity for avarice and greed."

Father Ryan remarked

that capitalism had committed suicide by its narrow policies.
He branded the attempt to blame the depression on the normal
cycles of business as a delusion.

Joseph A. Porcelli of

Fordham University took the opportunity to call for laws to
force industrialists to practice social justice.40
During the early 1930's Catholics were offered more
than one forum for expressing their social views.
Detroit,

In

Father Coughlin was developing the base for his

Union for Social Justice with an emphasis on Federal control
of finance.

For those who found the program of Father

Coughlin either too vague or too hysterical,

there was the

40" a Warning to Capitalist," 1932 clipping in Ryan
Papers; The Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVI (December, 1932), 367.
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Catholic League for Social Justice.

This group was the out

come of a meeting early in 1932 of Catholic teachers,

indus

trialists, and economists, held under the auspices of the
National Catholic Convert's League,

to study the depression.

It was announced at the meeting that the Calvert Associates,
publishers of Commonweal, were forming a League of Social
Justice to promote the "study and application of the teachings
of Pius XI."

The leading spirit in this movement was Michael

O 'Shaughnessy, an oil executive and journalist.

In October,

1932, the League received the endorsement of Cardinal Hayes
of New York.4 "*"
0 ' Shaughnessy set the tone and goals of the new
organization soon after he began publication of the Social
Justice Bull e t i n , the League's official monthly organ.

He

outlined a plan to bring the United States out of the depres
sion.

O 'Shaughnessy envisioned the formation of trade

associations of all industrial units, which would provide
health and accident insurance for members.

These associations

would also work for stabilization of production and prices.
All trade associations would be under a directorate composed
of management,

labor, and the consumer.

A government

41Abell, American Catholicism, p. 242.
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tribunal would be set up to decide labor-management disputes
and would have veto power over the directorate.42
It is impossible to estimate the influence of
O 'Shaughnessy and his group.
had little publicity.

They were small in number and

It is known that his plan was circu

lated among the members of Roosevelt's new cabinet.
more,

Further

the National Catholic Alumni Federation adopted some

of 0 1Shaughnessy's ideas and during the 1 9 3 0 *s called for
trade associations as a means of promoting economic
stability ,4 ^
After Roosevelt's victory in November,

1932, Catholics

became still more radical in their approach to the economic
crisis.

Father John Ryan wrote Raymond Moley that things

were looking up because Hoover was getting out.

He expressed

hope that Roosevelt would be what he appeared— a man who knew
the importance of restoring the purchasing power of the
people and who would concentrate on redistribution rather
than expansion of production.44

Meanwhile, Richard Dana

4 2 Ibid., pp. 245, 246.
4 ^Abell, American Catholicism, p. 245; The Brooklyn
T a b l e t , February 20, 1932, p. 1.
44Rev. John A. Ryan to Raymond Moley, November 29,
1932, Ryan Papers.
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Skinner, associate editor of Commonweal, addressed the
Knights of Columbus in New York and said that antitrust laws
must be repealed because they promoted ruthless competition,
a prime cause of the depression.
Father Frederick Siedenburg,

S.J., Dean of Detroit

University, gave a presidential address before the Illinois
Conference of Social Work in which he called for an "economy
of abundance" to replace the "economy of scarcity" under
which the United States was now operating.

The common good

must replace the selfishness of the capitalist.

Socializa

tion of production and distribution should come about by
evolution rather than revolution.

Old age insurance,

minimum wage laws, and workmen's compensation were only a
few things needed.

Siedenburg concluded,

was shared by many American Catholics,

in a tone which

that

. . i f need

be, the Government must pour out its billions for relief and
for Government work."46
By early 1933,

it appeared that a large segment of

American Catholics were favorably disposed toward the vigor
ous type of leadership Roosevelt would soon offer them.

4 5The Brooklyn Ta b l e t , December 10, 1932, p. 3.
46Quoted in NCWC News Service, Urbana, Illinois,
December 5, 1932; The Brooklyn T a b l e t , December 10, 1932,
p. 1.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW DEAL AS CATHOLIC TEACHING

As the character of the New Deal unfolded during
1933, it met enthusiastic response from many American
Catholics.

On a more general and superficial level this

support seemed to be generated because Catholic spokesmen
and the Catholic press presented the reform legislation of
the New Deal as being based on, and embodying, Catholic
social teaching,
encyclicals.

in particular the ideas of the Papal

Such being the case, Catholics were urged to

give their wholehearted support to Roosevelt's policies.
During 1933, the Catholic press constantly presented
the New Deal as an American version of the Papal encyclicals.
This campaign began with an interpretation of Roosevelt1s
inaugural address.

As one editor remarked, the great

similarity of FDR's speech to Quadragesimo Anno made it clear
that "the new President has really grasped, the spirit of that
document."

His program "is merely a practical application of
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the Papal principles for social reconstruction."'1' Both the
Pope and the President assigned blame for the present crisis
to the same cause— the unscrupulous practices of business.2
The Catholic Times of London even went so far as to arrange
the remarks of President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XI in
parallel columns, to demonstrate that both men condemned
capitalism.

The similarities,

felt the author,

showed that

FDR had not merely quoted the Papal encyclical in the
campaign as would a shallow politician, but had done so as a
sincere student of its principles.

He concluded:

"the

Roosevelt plan of social reconstruction is the Catholic
p l a n . "3
After Roosevelt had been in office for one month, a
few Catholic editors felt that their first impressions of
the President had been confirmed.

The goals of Leo XIII and

Pius XI were being sought by business,
ment.

labor, and the govern

"The close similarity [of the New Deal] to the recom

mendations of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI" was, wrote a

^Denver Catholic Register, March 12, 1933, p.
2The Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVII

(April, 1933),

1.

107.

^Quoted by The Catholic Herald, March 30, 1933, p. 4;
Denver Catholic Register, March 23, 1933, p. 4.
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Cincinnati newspaper, especially apparent in the call for
the abolition of child labor, and for the establishment of
minimum hours and wages for labor.^

This similarity called

for enthusiastic support of the President's program by
American Catholics.

“The New Deal," claimed a Milwaukee

paper, embodied "principles for which Catholic leaders have
been making propaganda for years, principles set forth in
Papal encyclicals.

. . .

Indeed,

the Christian social

justice which seemed to be behind the New Deal could only be
traced to the encyclicals of the Popes.

The recognition by

FDR that labor deserved more consideration in our society
£
was rooted in Papal thinking.
Some prominent Catholic sources even insisted that
without the groundwork laid by the Catholic Church,

the New

Deal would not have been received so well by the people.
Commenting on a speech by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes,
in which he rejected rugged individualism, one editor

^The Catholic He r a l d , April 20, 1933, p. 4? The
Brooklyn T a b l e t , April 22, 1933, p. 3; Cincinnati Catholic
Telegraph, July 27, 1933, p. 4.
~*The Catholic H e r a l d , July 27, 1933, p. 4.
^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , July 29, 1933, p. 1; Ame r i c a ,
August 5, 1933, p. 411; The Michigan Catholic, August 3,
1933, p. 4.
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remarked that "the seed sown by Leo XIII is beginning to
grow into a mighty tree."7

Reverend A. J. Hogan,

President of Fordham University,

S.J . ,

felt that Catholic social

thinking had made for "the ready acceptance of the New Deal."
He thought it obvious that the administration was familiar
with the Papal plan.

Such men as Father John Ryan, Michael

0 1Shaughnessy, and Father Charles Coughlin,

said Hogan, had

"prepared the way for acceptance of the New Deal by
Catholics" by familiarizing them with the Papal ency
clicals.®

Reverend John F. O'Hara, Vice-President of Notre

Dame University, echoed the sentiments expressed by Father
Hogan.

O'Hara, too,

felt that FDR was expounding the social

teaching of the Church.

Speaking to the Knights of Columbus

in Waterbury, Connecticut, Father O'Hara remarked that
President Roosevelt "discovered Catholic economics for us,"
and that he had used the encyclicals constantly.

The priest

speculated that perhaps some rich Catholics would now
finally learn from the President of the United States the
Church's teaching on wealth.

g

7America, November 18, 1933, pp.

146-47.

®NCCC Proceedings, October 1-4, 1933, pp. 50-52.
9NCWC News Service, January 22, 1934; Father John Ryan
to Father George M. Sanvage, January 29, 1934, Ryan Papers.
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Leaders of Catholic lay organizations contributed
their support to the thesis that the New Deal was based on
Catholic teaching.

Edmond B. Butler, President of the

National Catholic Alumni Federation, wrote a letter to the
heads of alumni groups of Catholic colleges in the United
States, urging them to support the New Deal.

The reason

why they should support the program was obvious.

"The

principles for which we have argued," wrote Butler,

"and

which were laid down for us in the encyclicals, Rerum Novarum
and Quadragesimo A n n o , seem for the first time in the history
of our country,

to be guiding the National Administration

during this formative period."
success of this experiment.
educated Catholic
Butler.^

...

October,

Indeed,

"it is the duty of every

to take an active part," argued

He was supported in this line of reasoning by

William J. McGinley,
Columbus.

Catholics must ensure the

Supreme Secretary of the Knights of

McGinley was received by Pope Pius XI in Rome in
1933.

Upon leaving the Papal apartments,

the Knight

expressed the thesis that President Roosevelt was being
inspired in his deeds by Christian teaching,

foremost of

^■°NCWC News Service, July 17, 1933; New York T i m e s ,
July 14, 1933, p. 8.
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which was the encyclical of Pius X I . 11
The views of Butler and McGinley found support in the
statements of the American hierarchy.

The Most Reverend

John Mark Gannon, Bishop of Erie, Pennsylvania,

urged the

Catholic Daughters of America, at their convention in
Colorado Springs, to help President Roosevelt put through
his program.

The Bishop felt that the President was

"thoroughly acquainted with the principles laid down by our
Holy Father in his many encyclicals."

Furthermore, the

President was "attempting to follow these principles in the
New Deal."
practice.

12

Sioux City,

In fact, the New Deal was the Papal program in
Another bishop, Most Reverend Edmond Heelan of
Iowa, wrote the priests of his diocese that they

should find a certain satisfaction in the fact that President
Roosevelt was using the Papal teachings as the basis of his
program of recovery.

Bishops John A. Duffy of Syracuse, New

York, and Michael J. Gallagher of Detroit, Michigan, were two
more members of the hierarchy who praised Roosevelt's program
and felt that it was based on the encyclicals.

Gallagher*

^ N C W C News Service, October 6, 1933; the editorials
of the N C W C , carried over their News Service, also reiterated
this theme, see April 17, 1933.
^ I b i d . , "News Letter," July 10, 193 3.
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even went so far as to say that Catholics had "a solemn
obligation" to support the New D e a l . ^
The question naturally arises as to how much of this
comment was simply wishful thinking on the part of American
Catholics.

Were they simply projecting their desires or was

there solid evidence that the New Deal embodied ideas
similar to those of the Church?

An answer to these questions

can only come from a detailed analysis of the major pieces of
New Deal legislation.

Preceding such an analysis, however,

it might be well to make a few preliminary remarks on the
administration's familiarity with the Papal encyclicals.
Evidence does exist which demonstrates that Roosevelt
was familiar with the Church's social program.

During the

campaign of 1932, he had quoted from Quadragesimo A n n o .
Furthermore, he had received a letter from R. Dana Skinner
of New York, with whom he appears to have been on a firstname b a s i s , in which Skinner commented on the wisdom of
quoting from the Papal document.

Skinner sent FDR an

article on Quadragesimo Anno by Father Wilfrid Parsons, and
suggested that a study of it be made as a basis for social
action against the depression.

Roosevelt replied by

^ N C W C News Service, February 19, 1934; The Brooklyn
T a b l e t , August 19, 1933, p. 2.
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referring Skinner to brain truster Raymond Moley, but
admitted that he was interested in the ideas projected by
the encyclical.^

After the election, Skinner wrote to the

President-elect again on the subject of the encyclicals.
This time he spoke of winning Catholics'

support to the

"industries control idea" by convincing them that FDR's pro
gram was identical with the plan of Pope Pius XI.

This was

a tempting suggestion, but there is no evidence that Roose
velt personally pursued such a policy.1"*
There are other signs that Roosevelt was at least
cognizant of the message of the encyclical.

Reverend

Charles Coughlin boasted in the pages of The Catholic Uni
verse Bulletin of Cleveland, that he had "sat down with Mr.
Roosevelt and read the encyclical over to him page by
page."

16

Michael O 1Shaughnessy, founder of the Catholic

League for Social Justice, received a letter from Henry

Dana Skinner to FDR, August 3, 1932, and
FDR to Skinner, December 27, 1932, President's Personal File,
Box 229, The Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, N. Y.
•

^

R

i

c

h

a

r

d

^ R i c h a r d Dana Skinner to Louis Howe, June 13, 1933,
Official File, 76-B, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
Thomas
Corcoran says that members of the administration were all
aware of the encyclical, interview with author, July 15,
1965.
16

Quoted in NCWC News Service, August 14, 1933.
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Wallace,

Secretary of Agriculture,

in which the latter spoke

of having read Quadragesimo Anno and of being very impressed
with it.

Wallace said that he had discussed the encyclical

with others in the administration.

17

The editor of A m e r i c a ,

Father Wilfrid Parsons, wrote of also having discussed
Quadragesimo Anno with President Roosevelt.

At the time,

according to Parsons, Roosevelt had said that the encyclical
was "too radical for him."

18

Donald Rich b e r g , legal counsel

of the National Reconstruction Administration in 1932, had
also made a study of the program outlined by Pius XI.

19

On a number of occasions, members of the President's
official family publicly associated the New Deal with the
Papal encyclicals.

Henry Wallace was the most prominent

and persistent exponent of the idea that Roosevelt was only
putting into practice the age-old social ideas of the
Church.^

In a speech before the World Alliance for

^ Ame r i c a , July 1, 1933, p. 292.
Wallace admitted a
familiarity with the encyclical in a letter to the author,
January 23, 1964.
^ Amer i c a , June 2, 1934, pp.

174-76.

19

Leo J. Hassenauer to Rev. John A. Ryan, April 11,
1934, Ryan Papers.
Hassenauer was a business associate of
R i c h b e r g 's .
^ T h e Brooklyn T a b l e t , June 2, 1934, p. 10.
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International Friendship in New York City, in 1934, Wallace
made a point of the identity between the New Deal's attempt
to balance agricultural and industrial prices and the ideas
expressed by Pius XI.

21

The Secretary reiterated this theme

in a speech to the National Conference of Catholic Charities
in Cincinnati, October,

1934.

He remarked that the New

Dealers "are traversing ground in detail which has been
described in more general terms in certain of the Papal
e ncyclicals."22
Despite all this public notice and comment, not all
American Catholics subscribed to the idea that the New Deal
was merely the Papal encyclicals in native terms.

It was

pointed out that the New Deal was the program of one politi
cal party, but that the Church could never be found on only
one side of the political fence.

Furthermore, before anyone

committed the Church to an endorsement of the New Deal, it
¥
should be considered that Roosevelt's plans may very well
fail.

Where,

suggested some observers, would this leave the

Church?23

2^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , December 15, 1934, p. 3; The
M o n i t o r , December 22, 1934, p. 1.
2^NCCC Proceedings, October 7-10,
23The Monitor, May 5, 1934, p. 1.

1934, p. 66.
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The most persistent and sophisticated critic of the
New Deal encyclical analogy was F. P. Kenkel, editor of
Central-Blatt and Social J u s t i c e , the official journal of
the Catholic Central Verein.

Kenkel pointed out that the

resemblance of the New Deal to the Pope's plan was "only
superficial."

Both plans called for control of industry,

but the question of how this was to be executed, and who was
to exercise control,
Furthermore,

remained unclear in the encyclical.

the Pope called for self-government by the

economic groups and rejected over-centralization.

These con

cepts hardly seemed to be reflected in the National Industrial
Recovery Act.

Kenkel also felt that the New Deal and the

Pope had different ideas on the protection of the consumer,
with the former being little concerned with this aspect of
the economic problem.

These reflections led Kenkel to con

clude that the tendencies in the New Deal were leading, not
to the Christian utopia of the encyclical, but to "the bitter
end of State Socialism."24

It must be said, however,

that

Kenkel's views were those of a decided minority of Catholic
editors in 1933.

^4Central-Blatt and Social Just i c e , XXVI
80-81; and XXVIII (June, 1935), 78.

(June, 1933),

CHAPTER V

CATHOLIC REACTION TO ROOSEVELT,

1933

During 1933 there was a spirit of cooperation and
support exhibited by American Catholics for the New Deal
which went beyond platitudes on the supposed similarity of
the movement with the teaching of the Church.

Priests and

laymen appraised the President and his program and found
both praiseworthy.

On his part, Roosevelt demonstrated an

acute awareness of his Catholic backers and managed to
solidify this support through his cordial relationship with
the American hierarchy, his availability to the Church, and
his patronage policies.
Significant elements of the American Catholic hierarchy
welcomed Roosevelt's ascent to office in glowing terms, and
before he even had an opportunity to merit such praise.
William Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, dean of the hierarchy,
praised the President in a speech to the local St. Vincent de
Paul Society in April,

1933.

After remarking on the great

intelligence and deep religious outlook of Roosevelt,

the
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Cardinal asked his congregation to pray for their new leader.
Afterwards, at a public news conference, O'Connell called
FDR a "God-sent" man who was willing to sacrifice all for the
good of the country.

By November,

1933,

the Cardinal was

writing of the "wonderful degree of success" Roosevelt had
achieved in restoring confidence to the American people.^
Patrick Cardinal Hayes of New York was an old
acquaintance of the new President.

Before the inaugural the

Cardinal had dined with the Roosevelts as a guest of James
Farley and had discussed the problems of Mexican Catholicism,
the spread of communism, and the independence of the Philip
pines.

After the inauguration Hayes spoke glowingly of FDR

as "crystallizing the sentiments of the country in meeting
the grave problems

[of the depression]."

Roosevelt's radio

address on the banking crisis left the Cardinal deeply
"moved."

The following year, Hayes,

speaking at the

Manhattan College Commencement in James Farley's honor,

^-William Cardinal O'Connell, Recollections of Seventy
Years (Boston, 1934), p. 370; The Boston P i l o t , May 6, 1933,
p. 1; The Brooklyn T a b l e t , April 8, 1933, p. 2.
^James Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 34; New York
Times, March 22, 1933, p. 19; Farley says that Hayes also
probably wanted to reassure the President on the Church's
cooperation, even though Smith had lost out.
Interview
with author, March 20, 1965, Washington, D. C.
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lauded the work of the Postmaster General and praised the
President for his "spirit" and "vision."

The Cardinal con

cluded that "we ought to rejoice that everything he [Roose
velt] tries to do . . . will come to a happy success."'*
George Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago, one of the few
American bishops with the "red hat," was an early and
enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt.

The President made

contact with Mundelein in characteristic fashion.

Senator

David I. Walsh of Massachusetts had remarked to Roosevelt
that Mundelein was an avid autograph hunter and would
greatly prize adding the President's to his collection.
Roosevelt took the occasion of the C a r d i n a l ’s feast day to
send him a short note of congratulations.

Mundelein was

truly touched by this bit of thoughtfulness by "the busiest
man in the land" and called the note "the finest gift I could
possibly receive."

He requested a private visit with the

President to pay his respects for the fine achievements
already made during FDR's first month in office.^

The

~*New York T i m e s , June 13, 1934, p. 19.
^FDR to George Cardinal Mundelein, April 22, 1933,
and Mundelein to FDR, April 26, 1933, Selected Materials
from the Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt Concerning Roman
Catholic Church M a t t e r s , microfilmed at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N . Y . , June, 1955, 3 reels,
Louisiana State University; hereafter cited as Sel. M a t .
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Catholic press duly reported the fact that the Cardinal did
visit the White House in May.^
Cardinal Mundelein's role as an apologist for the New
Deal was to expand throughout the 1930's, and he came to play
an important role in soliciting support for the international
diplomacy of Roosevelt before World War II.

In 1933, however,

the Cardinal concentrated upon urging cooperation with the
President's domestic program.

In an address delivered before

the Chicago Council of Catholic Women on October 12, 1933,
the Cardinal praised FDR for showing "more friendly sympathy
to the Church and its institutions than any occupant of the
g
White House in half a century."

This type of sentiment

seemed to be shared by the Vatican.

Bishop J. M. Gannon of

Erie, Pennsylvania, reported that in a private conversation
the Pope had expressed to him high praise for President
Roosevelt and his deeds.

7

Archbishop Edward J. Hanna of San Francisco, chairman

5The Brooklyn T a b l e t , May 20, 1933, p. 2.
^Quoted in NCWC News Service, October 13, 1933; see
also The Brooklyn T a b l e t , October 21, 1933, p. 4; Rosenman,
Public Papers, II, 22-23. Thomas Corcoran admitted being a
courier from FDR to Mundelein in the period preceding World
War II, Interview with author, July 15, 1965, Washington, D.C.
7New York Times, August 12, 1933, p. 12.
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of the B i s h o p s 1 Administrative Committee of the NCWC found
great satisfaction in the spiritual tone of Roosevelt's
inaugural address.

Speaking for the Catholic hierarchy of

the United States, Bishop Hanna proclaimed Catholic support
for the President's recovery efforts.

Q

Roosevelt acknowl

edged the statement by Hanna, which had been forwarded to
the White House through Reverend Michael J. Ready of NCWC,
and thanked the Bishop for his sentiments of support.

Q

To Bishop Karl J. Alter of Toledo, Ohio, Roosevelt's
inaugural address was "one of the great moments in American
history."

Not only did the Bishop agree with Roosevelt's

interpretation of the causes of the depression--namely the
moral corruptness of industrialists— but he found much to
praise in the President's "moral tone."

According to this

Bishop, Roosevelt's statement "breathes the spirit of Our
Holy Father's recent encyclical

'Quadragesimo Anno.'"

This,

said the Bishop, augured the acceptance by America of
Catholic social teaching.1^

^Clipping of The Echo (Buffalo, New York), [n.d.]
Reel 3, Sel. M a t .; Colonel P. H. Callahan to Louis Howe,
March 20, 1933, Reel 2, Sel. M a t .
^Catholic A c t i o n , April,

in

1933, p. 17.

lOprinted statement of Bishop Karl J. Alter, March 7,
1933, Toledo, Ohio, in Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
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In September, 1933, over the national facilities of
the Columbia Broadcasting System, American Catholics heard
Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney of Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
praise the New Deal.

The Bishop, pointing to Roosevelt's

preinaugural visit to Church with his cabinet, concluded
that "Christ will not fail one who made such a conspicuous
profession of faith.

. . ."1^‘ At the same time, the Most

Reverend William A. Hickey, Bishop of Providence, Rhode
Island,
Deal.

told the Catholics of his diocese to help the New
He added:

"I have been profoundly impressed with the

evidence of God's hand in the unfolding and execution of our
President's economic program."

The Bishop gladly offered

whatever influence he had to solicit support for the adminis
tration because its policies were "absolutely in harmony with
the best economic and religious and patriotic principles."
William Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia,

19

late in

1933, also had occasion to express his regard for President
Roosevelt.

Dougherty's sentiments, however, grew more out

of concrete political matters than from general principles.

^ Q u o t e d in NCWC News Service, Chicago,

September 11,

1933.
17

Quoted in NCWC News Service, Providence, Rhode
Island, September 8, 1933.
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The Cardinal was concerned over what he considered a dis
criminatory clause in the administration's new revenue act.
The bill would, according to the Cardinal,
religious congregations for taxation.

single out certain

He wrote Roosevelt of

his displeasure and warned that "Catholics will resent" such
a clause.

FDR replied by suggesting that Dougherty forward

his objections to the chairman of the Ways and Means Com
mittee of the House.

The objectionable clause was eventually

eliminated and the Cardinal attributed this to FDR's inter
vention .13
Throughout the United States, the hierarchy commented
favorably on the new President.

Archbishop MaNicholas of

Cincinnati called upon his parishioners to pray for Roosevelt.
Archbishop Michael J. Curley of Baltimore said the people
were looking forward to the New Deal.

Bishop Henry P.

Robiman of Davenport, Iowa, commenting on his visit with Pope
Pius XI, said that the Pontiff had praised the President's
efforts on behalf of the poor and unemployed in the United
States.14

^ W i l l i a m Cardinal Dougherty to FDR, telegram,
December 23, 1933; FDR to Dougherty, January 11, 1934;
Dougherty to FDR, March 2, 1934, Official File, 137-A Income
Taxes, Box 19, Roosevelt Papers.

14The Brooklyn Tablet, March 11, 1933, p. 1; March 16,
1933, p. 8; The Catholic Herald, April 3, 1934, p. 1.
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Various elements of the Catholic population reiterated
the hierarchy's support for President Roosevelt.

Reverend

John A. Ryan remarked that the actions of FDR were "epochal,"
and that the inaugural address was inspiring.’*-5

Reverend

Wilfrid Parsons, editor of America, wrote that President
Roosevelt was pursuing a noble goal in trying to convince
business to organize for the common g o o d . ^

Reverend James

I. Corrigan, speaking on the Boston radio network, said that
FDR's prayers had been heard and that "we are well on our
way to national recovery."1^

William C. Murphy, writing in

Commonweal, pictured Roosevelt as a conservative politician.
Rather than being the image-breaker pictured by his enemies,
the President was fighting to prove the ability of democracy
to face "any emergency."^®

Perhaps the highest individual

tribute to President Roosevelt was rendered by the Most
Reverend W. D. O'Brien, who pointed out that the United

^ R e v . John A. Ryan, Social Doctrine in Action; A
Personal History (New York, 1941), p. 247; Broderick, Right
Reverend, p. 213.
16

Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "The Church and the Modern
World," The Catholic M i n d , XXXI (June 8, 1933), 206.
^ The Boston P i l o t , October 21, 1933, p. 1.
^®William C. Murphy, "The New Deal in Action,"
Commonweal, May 5, 1933, pp. 11-13.
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States always received God's help in time of crisis.
in 1933,

Thus,

"Almighty God raised up FDR— the Apostle of the New

D e a l . 1,19
Major Catholic organizations were also enthusiastic
in their support of the new President.

The president of the

International Catholic Truth Society, Reverend Edward L.
Curran, wrote to Roosevelt praising his leadership and "high
moral determination."
Federation,

20

When the National Catholic Alumni

representing fifty Catholic colleges and univer

sities in the United States, held its national convention in
New York City from June 20th to 24th, Edward Dare, a highranking member,

transmitted to President Roosevelt copies of

a resolution which praised and endorsed the New Deal.
Catholic Daughters of America,
Mary C. Duffy,

21

The

through their Supreme Regent,

sent copies of their resolutions pledging

assistance to the President and expressing their confidence
in him.

These resolutions were passed at the national

^9Rev. W. D. O'Brien,
E xtension, May, 1934, p. 7.
^Rev.
Sel. M a t .

"The New Deal in Religion,"

E. L. Curran to FDR, April 19, 1933, Reel 1,

^ E d w a r d Dare to FDR, July 21, 1933, Reel 3, S e l .
Mat.
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convention in Colorado Springs, July 7, 1933, by a group
which claimed a membership of 200,000.

op

The list of Catholic groups supporting Roosevelt in
1933 is extensive.

The Social Justice Bulletin, organ of the

Catholic League for Social Justice, spoke of the obvious
influence of Pius XI on the President in the actions undertaken by the New Deal.

23

The Polish Roman Catholic Union

expressed faith in FDR's attempt to improve the country.
Supporting remarks were made at the Union's triennial convention held in Springfield, Massachusetts.
Columbus of Ironwood, Michigan,

94-

The Knights of

telegraphed to the President,

praising his "determined and decisive action in the present
financial emergency."

25

The Catholic press was almost unanimous in its approval
of Roosevelt's first hundred days in office.

Commonweal

expressed the predominant feeling when it said:

22Mary c. Duffy to FDR, telegram, July 7, 1933,
Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
^ Social Justice Bulletin, No. 8, August 16, 193 3, in
Reel 1, Sel. M a t .
2^ New York T i m e s , September 15, 1934, p. 18.
25k . of C. Council to FDR, telegram, March 8, 1933,
Official File, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
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. . .all Catholics who desire to give practical
effect to the principles of social justice laid
down by Pope Pius XI will see that . . . Roosevelt's
opportunity to lead . . . is likewise the Catholic
opportunity to make the teachings
of
Christ apply
to the benefit of all. . . ,26
The Denver Catholic Register had much
the New Deal.

to

say insupport of

The editor pointed out that the alternatives

to Roosevelt's program were communism and chaos.

The New

Deal should be supported because it had sprung from Catholic
sources.

"The Register and other powerful mouthpieces of

the Catholic Church in this country," commented this editor,
"have made the NCWC social action program so insistent that
the government is now going to try it out, as the only real
cure."^

The Brooklyn Tablet called FDR's every action

"motivated by a Christian philosophy which moves forward in
the right direction."

2ft

Extension magazine said that the

new President had done more in his brief tenure than had
most of his predecessors during their entire time in office. 29

26commonweal, November 16, 1932, p. 58.
^ Denver Catholic Register, June 29, 1933, p. 4;
March 9, 1933, p. 4.
2^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , May 13,

1933, p. 9.

^ Extension, XXVII (May, 1933), 13-14.
These same
optimistic notes were also struck by the following Catholic
newspapers:
The Catholic H e r a l d , March 23, 1933, p. 4; The
Boston P i l o t , June 24, 1933, p. 4; The Catholic Transcript
of Hartford, Connecticut, May 25, 1933, p. 4.
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Yet in the praise lavished upon President Roosevelt
by the Catholic press,

there were certain features which

indicate that some editors had only a superficial awareness
of the principles of the New Deal.

The editor of America

praised FDR's inaugural address but at the same time called
for frugality in government,
in the campaign.

something Roosevelt had mentioned

The editor of the Davenport Catholic Mes

senger , who supported the New Deal, was most attracted by
the President's plan to balance the budget.

The NCWC News

Service sent out cryptic stories indicating that the Demo
cratic program giving great power to the President was "fore
shadowing the curtailment of a number of Federal activities
which have shown an unprecedented growth in the past two
decades."

The News Service pointed to FDR's governorship of

New York as an indication that he was a strong believer in
"the protection of S t a t e s ’ rights against Federal encroach
ment."

The Denver Catholic Register had perhaps the most

farfetched interpretation of events.

Its editor said that

if the country was saved from economic disaster it would be
because the Catholic Church had succeeded in "putting over
her economic program."
history under Roosevelt.
chance"

The Church had her best chance in
Furthermore, there was now "a real

for a large Federal spending program for relief
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because "A1 Smith is the power behind the throne and A1 has
the Catholic slant.
Not all Catholic papers looked with favor on the New
Deal.

The Monitor of San Francisco,

major critic of the administration.

in particular, was a
Its editor referred to

the Brain Trust as communistic or fascistic in philosophy
and described the "Hundred Days" as "cynically designed . . .
to exploit the American people and make them the slaves of a
proud and conceited clique of psuedo-intellectuals."

Yet

such opinions were a minority.
Most Catholic spokesmen, as has been shown, were
lavish in their praise of the New Deal and of President
Roosevelt.
apparent.

The reasons for this praise are not readily
The spokesmen themselves often pointed to contra

dictory tendencies in the New Deal when finding things to
praise.

Certainly the similarity— imagined or real— between

the economic measures of the New Deal and Catholic teaching
played a part.

But there were more concrete political

^ A m e r i c a , March 18, 1933, p. 565; The Catholic
Messenger, March 30, 1933, p. 2; NCWC News Service, February
13, 1933; The Catholic H e r a l d , March 16, 1933, p. 4; Denver
Catholic Register, March 2, 1933, p. 4.
^ The M o n i t o r , September 16, 1933, p. 10; November 11,
1933, p. 10.
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considerations involved in Catholic motivation.
For one thing there was the appointment policy adopted
by the new administration.

Many American Catholics were

hungry for recognition by appointment to a high post in the
Federal government.

One month before Roosevelt was elected,

Catholics attending St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City
heard the Reverend Henry F. Hammer complain that there was a
conspiracy afoot to "keep Catholic men and women out of high
national office."

Father Hammer complained bitterly that a

man could not "be a good Catholic and be a bad citizen."
December,

In

1932, one Catholic author had lamented the fact

that there had been so few Catholics in past cabinets.

But

he was optimistic because he felt the bitter experience of
1928 should have purged everyone of bigotry.

32

There was some justice in this charge of discrimi
nation.

To most Catholics,

it seemed impossible that only

four of their co-religionists had been qualified to serve in
all Presidential cabinets from 1789 to 1932.

Furthermore,

only six Catholics had ever served on the Supreme Court.
During the Republican role of the 1 9 2 0 's, only one lower

^ New York T i m e s , October 17, 1932, p. 13; Richard J.
Purcell, "Catholics in the President's Cabinet," A m e r i c a ,
December 17, 1932, pp. 252-53.
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judicial appointment out of every twenty-five had gone to a
C atholic.33
Under Franklin Roosevelt these trends were to be
sharply reversed.

Two Catholics, James A. Farley and Thomas

J. Walsh, were appointed to the cabinet.

Catholics were

given an average of one out of every four judicial appoint
ments during FDR's entire term in office.

As one historian

has stated, under Roosevelt the Irish Catholic was given a
chance to ascend from his vulgar role as local party boss to
more glamorous positions with the Federal government.3^
The appointment of Farley as Postmaster General and
Walsh as Attorney General was a source of pride to many
Catholics.

Of course, many expected Farley to receive an

appointment because of his fine work during the nomination
race and presidential campaign.35

Others speculated that

■^Ellis, American Catholicism, p. 149; Odegard,
"Catholicism and Elections," p. 121; Lubell, Future of
American Politics, p. 83.
Shannon, American Irish, p. 331.
Shannon points to
such men as Thomas G. Corcoran, John McCormick, Joseph E.
Casey, James Farley, Edward J. Flynn, Joseph P. Kennedy, and
Frank Murphy as representing a young generation of Irishmen
who were brought to national prominence by Roosevelt.
James
Farley admitted a certain satisfaction in being the first
Catholic in a Presidential cabinet in the 20th Century.
Interview with author, March 20, 1965.
^ s h a n n o n , American Irish, p. 372, says that Roosevelt
started the tradition of giving the post of National Chairman
of the Democratic party to an Irish Catholic.
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there might.even be more Catholics appointed to the cabinet.
When Roosevelt named Walsh as Attorney General, it was noted
that although he was a Catholic,

there "was every reason

that he should be appointed" because of his progressive
record as a Senator and because of his prosecutor's role in
the Teapot Dome Scandal.

36

The announcement of the Farley and Walsh appointments
provoked a favorable response from the Catholic press.

The

NCWC wire service sent out a story by Thomas E. Kissling,

in

which he pointed out that now, for the first time in the
history of the United States,

two Catholics would serve

simultaneously in a Presidential cabinet.

37

Pictures of the

two men were splattered all over the diocesan press. Colonel
P. H. Callahan of Louisville, Kentucky, a prominent Catholic
layman with a sharp political sense, made a survey of Catholic
press reaction to the story.

He forwarded to Louis Howe,

presidential secretary, the news that most Catholic papers
in the United States gave very favorable notice to the
appointments.

36Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 267.
■^NCWC News Service, March 4, 1932.
This unique event
failed to materialize when Walsh died unexpectedly before
taking office.
38P. H. Callahan to Louis Howe, March 10, 1933, Reel
2, Sel. M a t .; The Brooklyn T a b l e t , March 4, 1933, and The
Boston P i l o t , March 11, 1933, both carried front page
stories.
After Walsh's death, The Boston Pilot gave major
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The cabinet appointments were only one sign of
increased Catholic recognition from Roosevelt.

Equally

satisfying to American Catholics were the diplomatic positions
handed out.

Two appointments were particularly important:

that of Frank Murphy, Mayor of Detroit, as Governor-General
of the Philippines, and that of Robert H. Gore as Governor of
Puerto Rico.

The Murphy appointment was a combination of

diplomatic need and political reward.

The Philippines were

largely Catholic in population, which made the appointment of
Murphy especially suitable.

Furthermore, Murphy had worked

long and hard for Roosevelt during the campaign.

Roosevelt's

brother-in-law, G. Hall Roosevelt, wrote to the President
about M u r p h y ’s loyalty, pointing out that apart from the
Mayor's many qualifications, he also had "tremendous Catholic
influence."

Murphy's personal desire for the Philippine

position was also a factor m

his selection.

The reaction of the Catholic press to the appointment
was characteristic.

Murphy's picture was printed on many

front pages, and it was noted that he was the first Catholic

emphasis to the significance of a Catholic funeral being
held in the State Chambers with prominent churchmen and the
President being present.
March 11, 1933, p. 1.
^9Lunt,

"Frank Murphy," p. 66.

to hold the position.
one editor,

With the Murphy appointment, wrote

"President Roosevelt has added another Catholic

to the list of those already occupying conspicuous places in
his administrative family."4("* The appointment of Robert
Hayes Gore as Governor of Puerto Rico met a similar response
Gore was a product of Catholic schools and had nine children
This last fact was a source of ironic amusement to some
Catholics, as the previous Puerto Rican Governor had been
sympathetic to the planned parenthood group on the Island.
Altogether,

41

the editor of The Brooklyn Tablet felt that the

Murphy and Gore appointments indicated that "days of fairnes
as well as intelligence, are being inaugurated at Washing
ton."42
Besides these appointments of prominent lay Catholics
to public office,

there was also the fact that a number of

priests had been enlisted in support of New Deal projects.
Most prominent of these were Reverend John A. Ryan and
Reverend Francis J. Haas.

Ryan was on the Advisory Council

40Quoted in NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933; The
Brooklyn T a b l e t . April 15, 1933, p. 1.
4 ^America, May 20, 1933, p. 146; The Boston P i l o t ,
May 20, 1933, p. 11.
42The Brooklyn T a b l e t , May 13, 1933, p. 9.
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of the United States Employment Service,

the Advisory Com

mittee of the Subsistence Homestead Division in the Interior
Department, and the Industrial Appeals Board in the National
Reconstruction Administration.

43

Haas received a telegram

from Roosevelt on October 7, 1933, appointing him a member
of the National Labor Board.

The priest had previously been

a member of the Labor Advisory Committee under the National
Industrial Relations Act.

Later, Haas would serve as labor

representative on the General Code Authority, as a member of
the National Committee on Business and Labor Standards, and
as one of the three members of the Labor Policies Board of
the Works Progress Administration.
Across the country,

44

in the summer of 1933, the Catholic

clergy swung their support behind the NRA.

A number of

priests served as members of regional boards of the NRA.
Archbishop Edward J. Hana of San Francisco was chairman of a
presidential committee to deal with longshoremen's strikes.
This role of the clergy in the early days of the New Deal

^ B r o d e r i c k , Right Reverend, p. 213; Hon. Frances
Perkins to Rev. John A. Ryan, August 5, 1933, Ryan Papers.
^ R o o s e v e l t to Haas, telegram, October 7, 193 3, and
Roosevelt to Haas, December 18, 1935, Correspondence-personal,
1932, and Miscellaneous, Haas Papers at Catholic University,
Washington, D.C.; Reverend Michael J. Ready to Stephen Early,
December 17, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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justified Father Ryan's statement in late 1934 that "there
are more Catholics in public positions, high and low,

in the

Federal Government today than ever before in the history of
the country."

45

Whether Roosevelt made these appointments with an eye
on the Catholic vote is really not the main consideration.
The important thing is that Roosevelt did begin a trend
toward using Catholics at high levels of government and this
trend was recognized by prominent Catholic spokesmen.

It is

not insignificant that Colonel P. H. Callahan could send to
Louis Howe numerous clippings of diocesan papers praising
Catholic appointments,

that the Knights of Columbus of New

York City and of New Hampshire should send congratulatory
telegrams on the cabinet appointments of Farley and Walsh.
The NCWC News Service denied that there was any "substantial
basis"

for the assumption that religion played a part in

FDR's appointments, but they also pointed out that "President
Roosevelt has gone further than most,

if not all, his

^ R e v . John A. Ryan to James Moran,
1934, Ryan Papers.

September 28,

^ W i l l i a m Flynn to President Roosevelt, March 17,
1933, and Charles Doherty to Roosevelt, telegram [n.d.],
Official File, Box 28, Roosevelt Papers; Col. P. H. Callahan
to Louis Howe, March 10, 1933, Box 4, Official File, 76-B,
Roosevelt Papers.
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predecessors in nominating Catholics for important posts."47
The Brooklyn Tablet expressed pride in the fact that they
had predicted that Roosevelt would show more "regard1* for
Catholics and that the old policy of nonrecognition would be
discarded.

48

A more hard-headed line was taken by The Michi

gan Catholic, whose editor felt that Catholics should not
act like children because they gained recognition in the
presidential cabinet appointments.

The new recognition was

no more than just for a group representing one-sixth of the
country's population.

Yet this editor could not deny that

FDR "deserves much credit"

for changing the former policy of

exclusion.4 ^
If President Roosevelt's appointment policy helped
his image among American Catholics in 1933, of added signifi
cance were the direct contacts he sought with the Church
during his first year in office.

His two most notable public

contacts were his acceptance of an honorary degree from
Catholic University in June and his speech at the annual
meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Charities in
O c tober.

4?NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933; April 17, 1933.
4^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , December 30, 1933, p. 7.
4 ^The Michigan Catholic, ^March 2, 1933, p. 4.
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Roosevelt received his honorary degree on June 14, in
Washington, D. C.

50

The major speech of the occasion was

made by Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Archbishop of New York.

The

Cardinal prefaced his remarks with congratulations to a
President who was "moving forward with courage and intelli
gence" to combat the crisis of the depression.
the Cardinal continued,

"spring from but one motive,

the advancement of the Common Good."
Cardinal Hayes'

"Your actions,"
namely,

The remainder of

speech was an elaboration on this theme of

the "Common Good."

He pointed out that while private associ

ations might do much to curtail unfair competition and ruth
less business practices,

this was not enough.

Something was

needed which would represent the interest of all the people,
and this was where the Federal government entered the picture.
The government should protect individual rights and promote
human welfare,

for these were "activities which cannot

adequately be carried on by private efforts."

The extension

of the government into many areas of society should be viewed

50This honor had been arranged by Reverend Maurice
Sheehy and James Farley.
Sheehy had approached Farley with
the idea and the latter had urged FDR to accept the honor.
Farley, interview with author, March 20, 1965.
Later Sheehy
and Archbishop James H. Ryan called on FDR and made a formal
invitation.
Sheehy letter to author, November 16, 1963.
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as a good trend,

just as laissez-faire was a bad trend.

Certain individual rights might be curtailed by this action,
but such restrictions could be justified on the basis of the
common good.

Furthermore,

in time of crisis, citizens should

not expect the government to be bound by precedents,
should expect bold strokes of experimentation.

but

Centraliza

tion of power may be necessary, and "one clear, confident
voice can save hundreds from panic."

51

President Roosevelt, who had not planned to speak,
was moved by the auspicious occasion to offer a few impromptu
remarks.

He referred to the Cardinal as "my old friend and

neighbor from New York," and commented that his own presence
among the "great dignitaries of the Church, and the added
fact that it was Flag Day made a "happy combination."

52

What appears as a rather dull academic gathering was,
instead, for the Catholics who viewed the event,
pride.

a moment of

FDR had been impressed with Cardinal Hayes' address

and requested a copy.

The Cardinal obliged two days later,

and, in an accompaning letter,

thanked the President for "the

wonderful tribute you paid to the Catholic people of America

^ A d d r e s s on "The Common Good," by Patrick Cardinal
Hayes at Washington, June 14, 1933, copy in Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
52The Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVII

(July, 1933), 493.
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by your distinguished presence and kindly words."53
Catholic press was quick to echo these sentiments.

The
Even the

banal remarks made by the President were recorded with
scriptual care.

One editor remarked that Cardinal Hayes'

endorsement of the New Deal was seconded by all American
Catholics.

S4

To some, PDR's appearance indicated "a change

for the better in the public mind toward the Church."

The

President himself manifested "a splendid feeling of good
will" toward the Church, in contrast to the isolation
suffered from the last four presidents.

CC

One Catholic

priest in Detroit felt that giving Roosevelt an honorary
degree was inadequate.

Reverend Charles E. Coughlin wrote

the President that "a thousand such honors could never mani
fest the gratitude which the American people owe you for what
you have already accomplished."

EC

The second public manifestation of Roosevelt's rapport

53Patrick Cardinal Hayes to President Roosevelt,
June 16, 1933, Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
54

P a x , official organ of Benedictine Missionary
Fathers, July, 1933, pp. 126-27; Commonweal, June 30, 1933,
p. 227.
55The Brooklyn T a b l e t , June 24, 1933, p. 9.

Deal"
p. 24.

5^Quoted in Peter Morris, "Father Coughlin and the New
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1958),

with the Church was in connection with the annual meeting
of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, held in
New York City during October,

1933.

At the opening session

of the meeting, Harry Hopkins addressed the gathering on
"National Trends in Relief."

More important, however, was

the appearance of President Roosevelt to give the main
address at the final dinner of the convention.

Patrick

Cardinal Hayes was again the first speaker of the evening
and again he praised Roosevelt's leadership.

Hayes called

for a new social order of justice with a wider distribution
of ownership, higher wages, and lower hours.

The Cardinal

declared the formation of trade associations to be a "major
step forward," and commented that if these groups were just
in their actions,
oversee them.

the Federal government would not have to

But in any case, such justice must prevail.

The Cardinal concluded his remarks with a strong statement
on the responsibility of the government for the public w e l 
fare :
In fact, the claims of the common welfare on owner
ship are so strong that the State, though it enjoys
no right to abolish the private ownership of property,
is justified, with due regard to the natural and
divine law, in adjusting this ownership and control
ling its use so as to bring it into harmony with the
interests of the public good.^7

5^Address of Patrick Cardinal Hayes, October 4, 1933,
in Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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After this speech, which seemed to endorse much of
Roosevelt's efforts, Monsignor Robert Keegan,
Cardinal Hayes and a leader in the NCCC,
President.

Secretary to

introduced the

Keegan spoke of FDR's "clear vision" and "accu

rate appreciation" of the evils of laissez-faire capitalism.
He ended his introduction by declaring,
velt]

"we love him [Roose

for the man and friend he is."58
As Roosevelt spoke, he must have been aware that the

speeches preceding his own indicated strong support for him
from the NCCC.

His speech stressed the need for continued

relief work by private agencies; the Federal government
could not carry the load alone.

Furthermore, the success

of relief work depended to a large degree on personal con
tacts which were better achieved by small private associa
tions.

Private church relief was also important, because,

said the President,

the people believe "spiritual values

count in the long run more than material values."
another theme,

Pursuing

the President remarked that all attempts by

governments to interfere with the right of religious worship
had failed and would continue to fail, because such inter
ference contradicted a basic human need.

58Ibid.

In conclusion, FDR
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expressed optimism about the ability of the United States to
overcome its current difficulties.

In terms undoubtedly

selected for his Catholic audience, Roosevelt remarked:
With every passing year I become more confident
that humanity is moving forward to the practical
application of the teachings of Christianity as
they affect the individual lives of men and
women everywhere.59
The President's speech was received enthusiastically
by many Catholics.

Monsignor Keegan later wrote to FDR

thanking him for the "inspiration and encouragement" he had
given the NCCC.

Father Keegan spoke of the great love that

Catholics had for the President.

60

Reverend Aloysius J.

Hogan, S.J., the President of Fordham University,

felt that

there was growing evidence that "Catholics had given a soul
to the New Deal."

61

One editor considered FDR's mere pres

ence at the NCCC meeting "a stirring tribute to the Church's
efforts to help our fellowmen."

62

Before a Council of

Catholic Women meeting in Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein referred
to Roosevelt's appearance at the NCCC in glowing terms.

The

^Rosen m a n , Public Papers, II, 379-81.
^°Msgr. Robert Keegan to President Roosevelt, October
9, 1933, President's Personal File, 628, Roosevelt Papers.
^ Q u o t e d in Columbia, November,

1933, p. 7.

6^The Brooklyn Tablet, October 7, 1933, p. 9.
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Cardinal called the President a physician who had prevented
an uprising in the United States and who would cure the
n a t i o n ’s ills.

Even Osservatore Ro m a n o , the Vatican news

paper, praised Roosevelt's remarks on the necessity of
religion in all social works.
As Roosevelt spoke in New York City, other members of
the administration were also addressing Catholic groups on
the New Deal.

Brooks Hays,

Stanley Reed, and Arthur J.

Altmeyer of the Social Security Board addressed a gathering
of Catholics in Peoria,
the New Deal.

64

Illinois, and asked for support of

As 1933 drew to a close,

it was obvious

that Roosevelt had the support of a large segment of the
leaders of the Church.

It remains now to examine the

specific measures of the New Deal and to determine the way
these measures were interpreted by the Church.

^ C i t e d by The Catholic H e r a l d , October 25, 1933,
p. 1. The New World of Chicago was even more enthusiastic.
In an editorial entitled "Coming Into Our Own," the paper
stressed the fact that FDR's appearance at the NCCC meeting
was one more bit of evidence that Roman Catholics were no
longer considered outsiders.
The old idea of the Catholic
Church as the prime defender of the status quo was being
rejected.
Roosevelt's appearance had indicated that "Cath
olic social teaching is making headway far beyond what is
commonly thought."
The New W o r l d , October 13, 1933, p. 4.
^ The Brooklyn T a b l e t , October 12, 1933, p. 9.

CHAPTER VI

FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE

In their reaction to Roosevelt's approach to fiscal
and agricultural problems, American Catholics exhibited at
once a sense of radicalism and of nostalgia.

Most Catholics

welcomed the attempts by the administration to curtail the
power of Wall Street and to regulate the currency.

They

showed a similar response to agricultural reforms, but for
unique reasons.
American Catholics shared the relief experienced by
their fellow citizens when Franklin Roosevelt began his term
of office by closing the banks of the nation to prevent their
internal collapse.

They hoped that Roosevelt would have the

courage to withstand the assault which,

they felt, would soon

be launched upon his policies by the "money powers."^

While

the Banking Holiday and the subsequent Reform Act were viewed
by some Catholics as authoritarian in tone, others praised
the measures as steps necessary to curb the greed of wealth.

^Denver Catholic Register, March 9, 1933, p. 1.
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This was, wrote The Catholic H e r a l d , a "New Deal in which
the cards are not stacked by greed and power against the
people and their government."

2

When FDR attempted to relieve the depression by manip
ulating the amount of gold content in the dollar, Catholics
shared the confusion of most citizens.
ever,

Some of them, how

felt that Roosevelt's measures of calling in gold and

restricting the importing of it were mere "common sense."3
A1 Smith condemned the currency manipulation as producing
"baloney dollars," but Smith,

for several reasons,

swing Catholic opinion against FDR's dollar policy.
begin with,

failed to
To

Smith's defection on this issue was more than

compensated for by the support the President received from
Father Coughlin, the radio priest of Detroit.

Coughlin

wrote to FDR in October, approving the stabilization of gold
at $31.7 5 an ounce and the dollar at 65 cents.
supported FDR's attempts at manipulation.

4

He fully

This support led

^The Catholic H e r a l d , March 23, 1933, p. 4; Commonweal,
March 22, 1933, p. 563; The Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVIII
(December, 1933), 257-59.
3Extension, XXVIII

(July, 1933), 21.

4Rev. Charles Coughlin to President Roosevelt, tele
gram, October 4, 1933, Official File 229, Box 3, Roosevelt
Papers.

no
Coughlin to attack the ideas of A1 Smith.

The priest chose

a November 27 rally in New York City to defend the President's
policy against the Smith charges.

While expressing regret at

having to correct such a gentleman as Smith, Coughlin felt
that it was "Roosevelt or ruin" and that he had to take a
stand.

In his public address, Coughlin implied that Smith

was attacking Roosevelt's monetary policies because the exGovernor wanted a loan from J. P. Morgan for the Empire State
Building.

5

While many Catholics shared Coughlin's doubts about
the validity of S m i t h ’s criticism,
attack on the 1928 standard bearer.
period has noted,

few liked his personal
As one student of the

"a situation which disclosed the n a t i o n ’s

leading Catholic layman and its most widely known clergyman
calling each other names was discomforting to many
Catholics."^

Yet it was evident that Roosevelt's measures

had support from others besides Coughlin.

Some Catholics

admitted that FDR's formula for recovery might be ineffective

^Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 20; Morris, "Father
Coughlin," p. 42; Commonweal. December 8, 1933, p. 144.
6Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 20.
See also
Denver Catholic Register, November 30, 1933, p. 1; The
Brooklyn T a b l e t , December 9, 1933, p. 11.
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but they quickly pointed out that "his objective is ethically
sound, and sound in common sense."7

Father John Ryan thought

the fears by some of excessive inflation were exaggerated.
Although he did not mention Smith by name, Ryan announced
that he was opposed to direct inflation but that he saw
little in Roosevelt's program to indicate that this policy
Q
had any backing in the administration.
tion was shared by Reverend John Burke,

This fear of infla
Secretary of the

NCWC, who praised Roosevelt's decision to veto the Patman
Veteran's Bonus Bill because it was inflationary.

Q

One popular reaction to Roosevelt's fiscal policy was
expressed by Commonweal magazine.

After praising FDR's

decision not to abide by the findings of the London Economic
Conference, the editors announced that the central thesis of
the New Deal's monetary policy was that there is to be
"public control, through the government, of money and credit,
rather than the system of banker's control."
policy, the editors continued,

This particular

is "in line with the

7Commonweal, December 15, 1935, p. 170.
^Father Ryan to Ray E. Jones, February 17, 1933, Box
3; Ryan to Dr. G. P. McEntee, December 13, 1933, Box 4,
Ryan Papers.
®Rev. John Burke to President Roosevelt, May 27, 1935,
Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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assumptions of Pope Pius XI, expressed in Quadragesimo
A n n o ."10
Interesting, for the light it throws on Catholic
thought, are the comments provoked by the Senate investiga
tion of Wall Street pursuant to passage of legislation to
regulate the stock market.

The Securities Act, passed in

May, 1933, gave the Federal Trade Commission more control
over the issuing of new securities, required more information
on the solvency of new stock, and made liability for mis
representation more specific.

The passage of this law was

made easy by the public support engendered as a result of a
Senate investigation of Wall Street which had been started
by Hoover, and which was carried on with great zeal in 1933
by its chief counsul, Ferdinand Pecora of New York.
The Administrative Committee of the NCWC, representing
the views of the American hierarchy,

supported the Pecora

investigations and FDR's policy of policing Wall S t r e e t . ^
The official organ of the Knights of Columbus also came out
in support of the investigation and of Roosevelt's stand.
The magazine Columbia felt that the American press was trying

-1-QCommonwea 1 , July 21, 1933, p. 297.
^ T h e Catholic W o r l d , CXXXVIII

(December,

1933), 3.
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to "white wash" Wall Street.

The editor expressed a note of

class feeling when he pointed out that J. P. Morgan got a
better press because of his wealth.

12

Elements of the Catholic press joined the call for a
correction of the evils revealed by the Pecora investigation.
A cure was needed.

Whether this cure took the form of infla

tion, rejection of the gold standard, or a dose of "baloney
dollars," was considered beside the point.

13

When Congress

finally passed the Federal Securities Act, to control some
of theproblems, one editor t h o u g h t it would stand
timebecause

it was based on "sound morality."

for some

By tnis he

meant that tne law put both the buyer and seller of securities on common ground.

14

Finance, however, was only one of the major problems
facing the New Dealers in 1933.

Equally significant were

the difficulties of the American farmer.

Despite the fact

that most of the Catholic population in the United States
resided in urban areas, the Church had early addressed itself
to the plight of the farmer who was suffering from the

•^Columbia, April,

1933, pp. 11, 13.

33The

Catholic H e r a l d , December 7, 1933, p. 4.

3^The

Catholic Messenger, February 3, 1934, p. 2.
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depression.

The main source of Catholic thought on agricul

ture was the Rural Life Bureau of the NCWC, led by Reverend
Edgar Schmiedeler.

Schmiedeler, together with other Catholic

priests and bishops, was to formulate the Church's attitude
toward the farm problem.

While not an elaborate or detailed

plan, the philosophy behind Catholic thinking on agriculture
was sufficiently unique to permit its isolation as a kind of
Catholic Agrarianism.
As early as July,

1932,

Schmiedeler had stated the

aims of the Rural Life Bureau as being "the preservation and
enrichment of the farm home."1^

It was a recurring theme for

many Catholic thinkers that farming afforded a better oppor
tunity to lead a truly Christian life.

Not that this idea

was unique because it had been popular with all kinds since
the time of Thomas Jefferson.

16

For these Catholics the

chief benefit of rural living was the social stability it
promoted.

On the other hand, life in the city was conducive

both to unstable personal relations and to atheism.

An

urbanite was more susceptible to atheism because of his
"contact with brick and mortar, with concrete and steel--the

^ Q u o t e d in The Boston Pilot, July 30, 1932, p. 5.

York,

^ P a u l R. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World (Ithaca, New
1959), p. 12.
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things of man— [rather]— than with nature, and nature's
beauties— the things of God."

Thus spoke Reverend Dr.

Schmiedeler to a group of Catholic teachers in Kansas in
1936.

17

Another popular theme in Catholic discussions of

rural life was the tendency to attribute the rise in birth
control to the crowded living conditions in the city.
families,
ideas,

in contrast, were generally large.

Farm

Using these

some Catholics began to urge a "back to the land"

movement.
Such a movement was endorsed by the Administrative
Committee of the NCWC in a statement on April 25, 1933, and
by the Catholic Rural Life Conference in October,

1933.

18

The bishops on the Administrative Committee pointed out that
the depression was,

in part,

a result of the Industrial

Revolution, which had pushed people off the farm into crowded
cities inadequate to support them.

As a remedy,

^ Q u o t e d in Catholic A c t i o n , August,
18

the bishops

1936, p. 5.

NCWC News Service, October 19, 1933; Conkin, Tomor
r o w , p. 28, says "never before in the history of the United
States had back-to-the-land been so popular" as in 1932. The
CRLC was started in 1923 and advocated "property as a right
and a responsibility, denounced farm tenancy, advocated
subsistence farming, and . . . attempted to guide the backto-the-land movement."
See ibid., p. 25; see also Raymond P.
Witte, Twenty-Five Years of Crusading (Des Moines, Iowa,
1948).
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called for a return to the independent life of the farm.

19

Other Catholics expressed the fear that the depression would
force more farmers into the city and thereby turn them into
"aimless, drifting, proletariat."

20

Some criticized the

ruthless capitalism and laissez-faire attitude of the govern
ment as having contributed to the depression.

But they also

tended to categorize the "fostering of the drift of popula
tion from the country-sides to the slums of great cities" and
the "denial to the farmer of a just and stable price for his
products," as other evils of the existing economic system.

21

During the 1932 Presidential campaign, Catholics
showed a distinct interest in the farm problem.

F. P. Kenkel,

director of the Catholic Central Verein of St. Louis,
Missouri, wrote that the American farmer should be acutely
aware of the effect on him of future economic planning which

•^Huber, Our Bishops S p e a k , pp. 296-97.
This state
ment of the Administrative Committee was signed by the Arch
bishop of San Francisco, Edward J. Hana; Archbishop of
Cincinnati, John T. McNicholas; Archbishop of St. Paul,
Minnesota, John G. Murray; Bishop of Cleveland, Joseph
Schrembs; Bishop of Pittsburg, Hugh C. Boyle; Bishop of Fort
Wayne, Indiana, John F. Noll; Bishop of Kansas City, Missouri,
Thomas F. Lillis.
20

21

The Catholic H e r a l d , September 8, 1932, p. 4.

James F. Murphy, Presidential Address at 18th Ses
sion of NCCC, Proceedings, Omaha, Nebraska, September 25-28,
1932, p. 6.
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was being discussed in the campaign.

22

Father John Ryan was

impressed with the ideas set forth by Roosevelt in his speech
at Topeka, Kansas, during the campaign.

Here Roosevelt had

promised to reorganize the Department of Agriculture, to
lower taxes for farmers, and to pass laws for Federal financ
ing of farm mortgages and for a voluntary domestic allotment
plan to relieve surpluses.

23

To Father Ryan the domestic

allotment plan looked like the best way to help the farmers
by obtaining "better prices for staple agricultural products."
He hoped that Roosevelt would support the idea if elected
and only regretted that the candidate had not been more clear
in his advocacy of the plan.

24

Ryan had good reason to be disturbed by FDR's vague
ness on the question.

When Reverend W. Howard Bishop,

President of the Catholic Rural Life Conference, wrote to
the Democratic candidate, he enclosed a resolution of his
organization which endorsed the domestic allotment plan as
the best way to give needed relief to our farmers.

Father

22

F. P. Kenkel, "The Farmer and Economic Planning,"
NCCC Proceedings, 1932, p. 200.
23jajnes M. Burns, Roosevelt:
(New York, 1956), p. 142.

The Lion and The Fox

^ R e v . John A. Ryan to Professor W. L. Wilson, Septem
ber 17, 1932, Ryan Papers.
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Bishop asked Roosevelt what his plans were in this matter.
Roosevelt replied through his secretary that he was not as
yet completely committed to a definite plan for agriculture,
but he referred Father Bishop to the campaign speech at
T o p e k a .^ ^
After the 1932 election. Catholic agricultural thought
still centered upon the domestic allotment plan.

Some

accepted it because they thought it would create the least
disturbance in the world's prices.

It was better than

surplus dumping, which might produce retaliatory trade
measures by foreign nations.

26

By January,

1933, Father

Ryan was supporting the idea of "parity payments" as being
".by far the best method" of raising agricultural prices.

27

Others felt that no adequate adjustment of agricultural
prices could be hoped for without a simultaneous plan to
provide work and better wages for the city labor expected to
consume the farm products.

28

It was also recognized, however,

25prank O'Hara, "The Voluntary Domestic Allotment
Plan/' The Catholic World, CXXXVI (March, 1933), 641-48; The
Catholic~Messenger, becember 1, 1932, p. 1.
^ Central-Blatt and Social Jus t i c e , January,

1933, p.

303.
^ F a t h e r Ryan to D. P. Hughes, January 10, 193 3, Ryan
Papers.
^ T h e Catholic Herald, February 9, 1933, p. 4.
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that the debt-ridden condition of the farmer had to be
changed before any scheme to raise prices could be effective.
Further, wrote one Catholic editor,

"since Society and the

State both sinned by permitting land to be treated as mere
chattel,
mortgages

they should now provide for the reduction of farm
2Q

The Catholic hierarchy also made it clear that it
supported immediate aid to the farmer.

In June,

1933, a

group of bishops meeting in Cincinnati came out for local
and regional cooperation by farmers to offset the flux in
world prices.

They pointed out that a healthy rural economy

was the foundation for any national recovery.
ment of first principles the bishops remarked:

In a state
"The first

duty of the farmer is not to produce, but to live, and to
live in a manner befitting his worth as a man and his dignity
as a child of God."30
In order to live, however,

the bishops realized that

the farmer would need higher prices for his produce.

A

reform of the United States economic system was required to

29Central-Blatt and Social Justice, April,

1933, p. 11.

30Bishops of the Cincinnati Province, "Agriculture and
Catholic Principles," The Catholic M i n d , XXXI (July 8, 1933),
252-60.
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produce this rise.

The farmer must be protected against the

instability of the open market.

Going this far, however,

the

bishops clearly pointed out that they did not call for the
industrialization or collectivization of American agriculture.
Realizing that cooperation and government assistance would
be necessary to relieve the farmer, the bishops were never
theless vague on specific remedies.
presented them with a dilemma.

Actually their position

On the one hand, they wanted

to preserve at all cost the individualism and independence
of the farmer.

Yet they also saw the need for cooperation

and State assistance if the independent farmer was to
survive.^
This was the state of Catholic agrarian thought when
the Congress approved the agricultural policies of the New
Deal.

The major agricultural measure was the Agricultural

Adjustment Act, passed on May 12, 1933, which curtailed p r o 
duction and established parity prices.

Farmers were granted

O I

Ibid., passim; see also Catholic A c t i o n , July, 1933,
p. 4. The bishops who signed this statement included;
Archbishop John T. McNicholas of Cincinnati; Bishop James J.
Hartley of Columbus, Ohio; Bishop Joseph Chartrand of
Indianapolis; Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland; Bishop
Michael J. Gallanger of Detroit; Bishop Francis W. Howard of
Covington, Kentucky; Bishop Alphonse J. Smith of Nashville;
Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana; Bishop Karl J.
Alter of Toledo, Ohio.

121
payments for voluntary reduction of crops.

A tax on

processors of farm products was the source of relief money.
Farm mortgages could be refinanced through Federal Land Banks
at lower interest rates.

The entire law was to be carried

out by an Agricultural Adjustment Administration under the
Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace.32
Henry Wallace had strong support among important
elements of the Catholic Church.

Foremost among his backers

was the Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy, a faculty member at
Catholic University and a close friend of Father John Ryan.
Sheehy had remarked that "few persons in American public
life know better and agree more completely with the Catholic
conception of social justice than Mr. Wallace."

13

The

Secretary of Agriculture, said Sheehy, had quoted from the
Papal encyclicals of Pius XI and Leo XIII on numerous
occasions.

Sheehy felt certain that Wallace was using the

Papal teachings in his approach to the farm problem.3^

32Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 48, 51, 52.
33

Rev. M. S. Sheehy, "Henry A. Wallace and the Papal
Encyclicals," clipping from Daily Trib u n e , Dubuque, Iowa
[n.d.], in Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
^ S h e e h y , "Henry Wallace," Reel 3 , Sel. M a t .; Sheehy
was to support W a l l a c e ’s bid for the Vice-Presidency in
1940, Sheehy, letter to author, November 16, 1963.
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Other Catholics watched the debate on the farm bill
with mixed emotions.

The Commonweal was frankly confused as

to the theory behind the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
called it "a very good substitute for a jig-saw puzzle."
While deploring the "paternalism" it seemed to establish in
agriculture, the editor accepted it as an experiment and
admitted that something drastic had to be done in this
area.

35

Father John Ryan felt the bill might help the

farmer.

When the processing tax feature of the act was

attacked as being unconstitutional by Professor Edwin W.
Kemmerer of Princeton, Ryan defended the administration's
position.

The priest had certain doubts about AAA but felt

that Roosevelt's spirit of experimentation was to be
applauded.

William F. Montavon, Director of the Legal Action

Department of the NCWC, called the AAA a good plan but was
afraid it imposed too heavy an administrative burden on
President Roosevelt and Secretary Wallace.

36

A few Catholics took a more positive stand in support
of the bill.

Listeners of the weekly Boston radio program,

^ C o m m o n w e a l . April 5, 193 3, pp. 620-21.
•^William F. Montavon, "Constructive Work of the 73rd
Congress," Catholic A c t i o n , August, 1933, pp. 7-10; Broderick,
Right Reverend, pp. 212-13.
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The Catholic Truth Hour, heard Reverend Jones I. Corrigan,
S . J . , announce that the AAA had "saved agriculture by
*

substituting planned control for anarchy."

37

The annual

convention of the Catholic Rural Life Conference, held in
Milwaukee on October 1 9 , 1933, adopted resolutions endorsing
the AAA and subsistence fanning.

The CRLC also called for

more speed in implementing farm relief.

38

Reverend Edgar

Schmiedeler, Director of the NCWC Rural Life Bureau, went on
the radio in November,

1933, to praise the agricultural

program of the New Deal.

He called the AAA "a charter of

economic equality with the city" for the farmer.

He admitted

that much was yet to be done, but he praised the results thus
far accomplished by Roosevelt as "a foundation whereon to
build a rural life worthy of America."

39

Naturally there were elements in the Catholic popula
tion that disagreed with Father Schmiedeler's praise of the
AAA.

Father Coughlin wrote to FDR in August,

1933, that the

proposals of the AAA were "foolish" and embodied "puerile
policy" and an "asinine philosophy."^0

In California,

the

3?Quoted in The Boston P i l o t , October 21, 1933, p. 1.
3®NCWC News Service, October 26, 1933.
30Quoted in Catholic A c t i o n , November,
^°Morris,

"Father Coughlin," p. 29.

1933, p. 5.
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San Francisco Monitor applauded the New D e a l 's attempt to
relieve farm mortgages but felt the idea of paying rent for
unused land was "foolish."

The editor was convinced that

AAA would mean the end of the American farmer.

The rural

population would be forced into the city to be exploited as
cheap labor by industry.

41

As the control policies of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration unfolded,

there arose considerable opposition

among certain segments of the population.

Father Coughlin

and others looked with disfavor upon the destruction of crops
and pigs.

Father Ryan, however, was more generous in his

observations.

To a friend's query about the moral obligation

to use excess food to feed poor foreign nations, Ryan replied
that for such a noble deed to have any effect it would have
to be continued over a long period.

He thought "it would be

very difficult to prove the existence of such a moral obliga
tion."

Ryan did not think that American farmers were obliged

to feed foreigners from their surplus.^2

The Catholic Farmer

of Wisconsin also came to the defense of Wallace and the AAA.

^ The Monitor, September 16, 1933, p. 10 and April 16,
1933, p. 1.
^ 2Father John Ryan to Rev. Urban Baer, February 23,
1934, Ryan Papers.
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The editor of this paper defended both the Secretary and the
President against charges of excess waste in solving the
farm problem, but he did fear that the "radical farm bloc"
in Congress might force the administration into a more
totalitarian approach to the rural depression.

It would not

do, he felt, to have the Government telling the farmer what,
and how much,

to plant.^3

By the end of 1934, most American Catholics could echo
the sentiments expressed in November by the Catholic Rural
Life Conference at their annual meeting in St. Paul.

The

Conference adopted a resolution which commended the efforts
of the New Deal "to bring debt relief to the American
farmer."

But the CRLC also realized that other areas of the

farm problem were still unresolved.

44

At the annual meeting of the National Conference of
Catholic Charities, held in Cincinnati, October 7-10,

1934,

the delegates heard Reverend Luigi Ligutti of Granger, Iowa,
make an impassioned plea for the small farmers of the
country.

Ligutti insisted that the preponderance of large

corporate farms over small family-owned farms was one of the

^ 3The Catholic Farmer (supplement to The Catholic
H erald) , June 14, 1934, p. 1 and December 13, 1934, p. 2.
^ Catholic A c t i o n , December,

1934, p. 19.
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main problems facing American agriculture.

The large farms

permitted too much waste, said Ligutti, who called for "a
return to small farm ownership."

How this would curtail the

problem of overproduction, he did not say.

But he wanted

more people on farms and felt that the break-up of large
farms and extension of long-term Federal loans with low
interest rates to young independent homesteaders would
accomplish this goal.

This theme of the need to return to

the small family farm was one of the recurring ideas of
Catholic agrarianism.

45

Earlier a Catholic editor had called

the subsistence homestead movement "one of the sanest plans
in our national reconstruction."

ACL

President Roosevelt had always favored the idea of
subsistence homesteads as a means of relieving the farm prob
lem.

With FDR's support,

Senator John Bankhead of Alabama

incorporated an appropriation for the execution of such a
scheme into the National Industrial Recovery A c t . ^

Father

^ NCCC Proceedings, October 7-10, 1934, pp. 265-66.
Father Ligutti's interesting story is told in Conkin,
T o m o rrow, pp. 296-301.
He was a leader in CRLC "and one of
the most influential of American agrarians and distributists."
See ibid.. p. 294.
46Penver Catholic Register, April 22, 1934, p. 1.

47

Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 136.
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Ryan had been an early supporter of the Bankhead proposal.
"It seems to me," he wrote,

"that this [subsistence homestead

idea] is a very meritorious project and deserving of the
support of all who would like to see some of the unemployed
become self-supporting as farmers."

48

Indeed, Bankhead's

early proposal fitted perfectly with the Catholic idea of a
"back to the land movement" and the advantages of rural life
over urban.

In fact, President Roosevelt also shared this

idea of the advantages of rural living.
By 1935, Senator Bankhead had formulated a bill
designed to aid tenant farmers and farm laborers in becoming
genuine landowners.
torian,

The bill,

in the opinion of one his

"reflected the reformers^ faith in the Jeffersonian

dream of the yeoman farmer."^®

If this is true, then many

American Catholics were enamored by this dream.

The National

Catholic Rural Life Conference, meeting in Rochester, New
York, October 27-30, 1935, was quick to support the bill.
This organization spoke up for the New Deal's attempt at
rural resettlement and for anything which would encourage an

4fi
^°Father John Ryan to Rev. Howard W. Bishop, May 3,
1933, Ryan Papers.
^ L e u c h t e n b u r g , Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 136.
5QIbid., p. 140.
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urban to rural movement.

The NCRL spelled out the advantages

of the Bankhead bill as "enabling tenant farmers,

their sons,

and farm-minded city people to become independent proprie
tors."51
Father Schmiedeler, director of the Rural Life Bureau,
also spoke in favor of the bill.

"We find," said Schmiedeler,

"that the general principles underlying the Bankhead bill are
in thorough accord with the Catholic attitude toward land
ownership."

He then went on to quote from the writings of

Leo XIII, who favored as large a diffusion of land ownership
as possible.

The priest felt that if more laborers could

gain a share in the land, the gulf between vast wealth and
52
deep poverty would be narrowed, 4
Members attending the 21st annual meeting of the NCCC
at Peoria,

Illinois,

September 29 through October 2, 1935,

heard a number of speakers endorse the Bankhead bill.
Reverend James M. Campbell, president of the National Catholic
Rural Life Conference, called for an immediate program of
land resettlement as an alternative to the dole system for
combating chronic unemployment.

He pointed out that

51Quoted in Catholic A c t i o n , December,
52NCWC News Service, April 13, 1935.

1935, p. 25.
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. . . a land resettlement program . . . that would
provide reasonable terms of repayment and low rates
of interest, and that would assist the people to
develop cooperative undertaking, would not fall very
far short of a self-liquidating program.
Campbell concluded by warning the Church that she could not
afford to neglect the land resettlement p r o g r a m . ^
The Roosevelt administration had its own advocate at
this meeting in the person of Brooks Hayes, Special Assistant
to the Rural Resettlement Administration.

The RRA, headed by

Rexford Tugwell, had been set up in April,

1935, to promote

rural rehabilitation by loans to farmers for the tools of
their craft and by "massive resettlement and retraining of
exhausted f a r m e r s . " ^

Before his audience at the NCC meeting,

Hayes pushed the idea of resettlement by citing the work of
Reverend Luigi Ligutti of Granger,

Iowa.

Father Ligutti had

formed a sponsor group for resettlement in his area and had
succeeded admirably.

Hayes used this example to make his

point about the need of "enlightened religious leaders" in
the fight for better opportunity for "economic exiles" such as
tenant farmers.

55

53n CCC Proceedings, September 29-October 2, 1935,
pp. 98-102.

Deal

^4Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New
(Boston, 1959), p. 370.
55NCCC Proceedings, September 29-October 2, 1935, p.

96.
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Important elements of the Catholic press also came to
the support of the Bankhead bill.

The Commonweal thought it

merited "the strongest support of all Americans" because it
would guarantee liberty, which was dependent upon "the p o s 
session of really personal property in land by great numbers
of individuals."

The editor also quoted the statement of

Leo XIII on the need for wide ownership of land, and the
statement by Pius XI on the right of the State to "adjust
ownership [of property]

to meet the needs of the public

C C.

good."

The Jesuit magazine America echoed these sentiments

and called for support of the efforts of the Catholic Rural
Life Conference in its campaign for a wider distribution of
land ownership.

57

The Catholic Interracial Review also found

support for the Bankhead bill in the teachings of Leo XIII.
The idea of spreading private ownership of land widely among
the people was clearly in line with Catholic teaching.

The

magazine recommended that Catholics should give "active
support" to the bill.58
Many Catholics supported the agricultural policies of

5^Commonweal, April 26, 1935, pp. 719-20.
57Cited favorably by The Catholic Messenger, May 2,
1935, p. 2.
58Interracial Review, VIII

(May, 1935),

68.
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the New Deal in 1935 because these policies seemed to agree
with the Church's teaching on the benefits of the family farm
and on wide distribution of land.

While many regretted the

tight crop control and destruction of surplus,

they also

realized that it was impossible for the home market to absorb
production.

Some agreed with F. P. Kenkel, editor of Central-

Blatt and Social Jus tice, who said,
We are living in a new world; we must take into
account the economic dislocation the world has
experienced and the need for economic reorientation,
such as many nations have been repeatedly forced in
the course of centuries to adapt themselves to.^9
During 1936, the year in which the AAA was struck
down by the courts, Father Ryan and Father Schmiedeler con
tinued to support the New Deal agrarian measures.

Father

Ryan was appointed by President Roosevelt to a special
committee on farm tenancy.

The President wrote to Ryan out

lining his hopes of "developing a land tenure system which
will bring an increased

measure of security, opportunity,

well-being to the great

group of present and prospective farm

tenants."

and

Ryan replied by expressing his great interest in

the problem and his hope for corrective legislation.*^

59Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVIII
1935), p. 7.
^ Catholic A c t i o n , December,

1936, p. 16.

At

(April,
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the same time, Father Schmiedeler was urging farmers to co
operate with and support both rural resettlement and rural
electrification.

But Schmiedeler realized that the cure of

the agricultural problem was inexorably bound up with the
industrial problem.

Indeed, he felt that both areas demanded

the same remedy— "the organization of society into occupation
groups,

...

government,

a minimum of active help on the part of the
. . . the moral reformation of the individual."

These ideas were based largely on the philosophy expressed
in Quadragesimo A n n o . ^
At the annual meeting of the Catholic Rural Life
Conference in Fargo, North Dakota, on October 10-14, 1936,
Schmiedeler again urged close cooperation with and support
for various New Deal agricultural agencies.

He ended his

remarks by specifically calling attention to the BankheadJones bill which he felt deserved the support of the
Conference.^

6 ^-Rev. E. Schmiedeler, "Concern of the Encyclicals
for Welfare of Agriculture," Catholic A c t i o n , May, 1936,
p. 12 and August, 1936, p. 5.

^Ibid. , November, 1936, p. 24.

CHAPTER VII

N. R. A. AND AMERICAN CATHOLICS

To cope with the problems of industrial recession, the
Roosevelt administration fashioned the National Industrial
Recovery Act, passed on June 16, 1933.
based on self-regulation of industry,

A polyglot measure
the act created the

National Recovery Administration, which was to supervise the
drawing of codes to govern each industrial and trade associa
tion.

These codes were to regulate all phases of an indus

t r y ’s operation,

from production to market.

Federal courts

could issue injunctions against violators of the codes.

As

NRA administrator, Roosevelt chose General Hugh S. Johnson.
Across the United States Catholics reacted with
genuine enthusiasm to NRA.

The hierarchy set a tone of praise

which was echoed by Catholic periodicals, newspapers, reli
gious organizations, and finally by influential individuals.
Many members of the Eastern hierarchy made public
statements in favor of NRA.

Cardinal O'Connell of Boston,

the first churchman in America by seniority, gave his full
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backing to NRA by declaring that,

in order to push the

President's plan, August 27, 1933, would be observed as
"Rally Sunday" in every Catholic Church in the Boston Arch
diocese.

He directed the parish priests to enlist the

support of their parishioners for the "Blue Eagle."

The

Cardinal also wrote a personal letter to Victor M. Cutting,
chairman of the NRA for the Boston area, pledging his full
cooperation with an endeavor which he felt closely resembled
the plan outlined in the Papal encyclicals of Leo XIII and
Pius XI.

O'Connell also promised to urge his people to

patronize stores which displayed the "Blue Eagle" sign.1
Joining in Cardinal O'Connell's sentiments was
Cardinal Hayes of New York, who issued a statement that FDR
had instituted NRA "to banish the want of recent years and
to insure wider employment."
that,

The Cardinal went on to say

"because the welfare of the entire country is involved,

the National Recovery Act merits the unqualified and wholehearted support of every American."

2

In Brooklyn, Bishop

Thomas E. Molloy followed Cardinal Hayes'
11, 1933,

lead.

On September

in an address to religious teachers of his diocese,

^The Boston P i l o t , August 26, 1933, p. 1.
^Quoted in Commonweal, September 29, 1933, p. 499.
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Molloy called NRA "one of the greatest acts toward the
restoration of the economic well-being of a sorely tried
p e o p l e ."3
Elsewhere in the East, the response was equally
enthusiastic.

In northern New York, Bishop John A. Duffy of

Syracuse went even further than Cardinal Hayes in support of
NRA.

In an interview the Bishop said that FDR "has put into

effect the principle announced by Pope Leo XIII forty-odd
years ago, that government has not only the right but the
duty to assist in the formation of economic units."

He

called NRA the most Christian-like plan of recovery yet
devised.^

Finally, John J. Milan, Bishop of Hartford,

Connecticut, also made a public statement urging support of
NRA.5
In the Middle West, the Catholic hierarchy preached
the same theme of full cooperation for, and support of, the
NRA.

Archbishop John T. MCNicholas of Cincinnati sent a

pastoral letter to his flock urging tnem to buy from the
"Blue Eagle."

He wrote to Charles F. Williams,

3Quoted in Columbia, October,

local

1933, p. 13.

4

NCWC News Service, August 11, 1933; see also The
Catholic Transcript, August 17, 1933, p. 1.
5NCWC News Service, September 15, 1933.
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director of NRA, and pledged the support of the Church.
year later the Bishop's ardor had not cooled.

One

He admitted

there were weak spots in the NRA but felt these were inherent
in such an experiment.

He prayed that the "old order" would

never return, called for local responsibility as the key to
success for NRA, and hoped it could be preserved in improved
form.

7
Other Mid-western bishops who supported NRA in public

statements included Bishop Joseph Schlarman of Peoria,

Illi

nois; Archbishop Samuel A. Stritch of Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
Archbishop John J. Glennon of Erie, Pennsylvania; Bishop
James A. Griffin of Springfield,

Illinois.

Schlarman called

NRA the "Industrial Charter of 1933" and compared it to the
Magna Charta of 13th-century England, because it broke the
privileged chains of capitalism.

He felt the measure would

prepare "the way for a better social order."

Q

Griffin,

speaking at the installation of Ralph L. Hayes as Bishop of
Helena, Montana, said:

"The NRA does not go as far as Pope

^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , August 26, 1933, p. 1 and
October 14, 1933, p. 3.
^Speech of Archbishop John T. McNicholas, NCCC
Proceedings, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 10, 1934, pp. 65-66.
^The Brooklyn T a b l e t , September 9, 1933, p. 10.
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Pius XI leads in his encyclical

. . . but the NRA is an

effort to do for the American people what the Catholic Guilds
did for the people of the Middle Ages."

While lamenting the

fact that Catholic social teaching was so neglected in the
United States, the Bishop ended with:

"Thank God our God-

sent President Roosevelt has studied the encyclicals of Pope
Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI."

He felt that the NRA reflected

this study in its rejection of rugged individualism and
adoption of the spirit of cooperation.

9

Further west, American bishops expounded the same
theme as did their Eastern colleagues--full support of NRA
as the incarnation of the Papal encyclicals.

Among the

Western bishops expressing public support for NRA were
Francis Johannes of Leavenworth, Kansas; Bernard Mahoney of
Sioux Falls,

South Dakota; Philip G. Scher of Monterey-

Fresno, California; and Daniel J. G e r o k e , of Tucson,
Arizona.^-0

Bishop Johannes said that NRA was an attempt to

"reconstruct the social order largely along the lines advo
cated in the great encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and . . .

^NCWC News Service, Helena, Montana, October 5, 1933.
i^The Catholic Transcript, October 5, 1933, p. 1; NCWC
News Service, September 16 and 30, and October 5, 1933;
clipping of Michigan Catholic, September 28, 1933, in S e l .
Mat.
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Pius X I . m11

Bishop Scher also supported NRA because "in its

broad outlines it follows the principles laid down by . . .
Leo XIII and Pius XI on industrial relations."

He urged his

priests to promote cooperation with the "Blue E a g l e ," because
it was aimed at "curbing greed, eliminating sweatshops," and
at eliminatxng "that national disgrace,

child labor."

12

Following the script, Bishop Geroke expressed full confidence
in President Roosevelt and called NRA a wonderful opportunity
to spread the economic program of the Papal encyclicals.

He

requested his parish priests to devote a Sunday sermon to NRA
and to set up local committees to cooperate.11

At the same

time Bishop Mahoney felt sure that President Roosevelt's
approach to the depression would be successful.1^
Editorial opinion in the Catholic press was also
heavily weighted in favor of NRA.

Many diocesan papers

simply printed the "canned" editorials sent out by the NCWC
News Service which reflected the bishops'

idea that NRA was

11Quoted in NCWC News Service, Leavenworth, Kansas,
September 30, 1933.
^ Q u o t e d in The Brooklyn T a b l e t , September 23, 1933,
p. 6.
^ N C W C News S ervice, Tucson, Arizona,

September 15,

1933.
1933,

14Clipping of The Michigan Catholic, September 28,
in Sel. M a t .
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the embodiment of Catholic social teaching.

1s

The editor of

Extension magazine expressed grave doubts about the principles
of NRA but concluded by saying,

"Let us brush aside whatever

doubts and misgivings we may have, and repose our faith, our
hope and confidence,
its leader.

. . ."I®

in the one man the nation has chosen as
The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati

called the critics of NRA the same "money-changers and
industrial barons whose greed and selfishness have been the
main causes of the depression."

17

The Milwaukee Catholic

Herald cited favorably an article which had appeared in
L 1Illustrazione Vaticana stressing the great similarity
between the NRA and the Papal encyclicals.

18

The Brooklyn

Tablet urged Roman Catholics to buy from stores displaying
the "Blue Eagle" emblem.

19

Many Catholic papers relied

heavily on the comments of Father John Ryan for their inter
pretation of NRA, who always stressed the fact that the

^ Commonweal remarked that "so far as we are aware,
the whole weight of the Catholic press has been thrown to
the President."
See August 11, 1933, p. 355.
i6September,

1933, p. 20.

•^November 30, 1933, p. 4.
18June 14, 1934, p. 4.

^November 4, 1933, p. 8.
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measure was in harmony with the principles of Quadragesimo
Anno.
Many Catholic organizations and lay groups supported
the President's recovery program.

The two major lay affi-

ates of the National Catholic Welfare Conference,

the National

Council of Catholic Men and the National Council of Catholic
Women, were enthusiastic in their support of NRA.

At its

annual convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, on October 7-11,
1933, the NCCW passed a resolution expressing "joy and satis
faction" at the achievements of NRA and "pledging fullest
support and cooperation to the government,

to the end that

social justice be established throughout the land."
days later their male counterparts,

20

Ten

the NCCM, met in annual

convention in Chicago and passed a similar resolution.

The

NCCM noted that the crisis in the United States was the result
of a neglect of Christian social justice and that the NRA was
an attempt to reassert this justice.
"in part" with Catholic teaching,

Because NRA conformed

the NCCM pledged support

and urged "upon all Catholics, employers and wage earners
alike, active cooperation in accomplishing the success of the
act."

21

Such public support did not go unrecognized by the

20Quoted in Catholic A c t i o n , November,
21Ibid., p. 27.

1933, p. 18.
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Federal government.

Louis J. Alber, chief of the Speakers

Division of NRA, wrote Very Reverend Doctor John J. Burke,
general secretary of NCWC,

that the latter1s organization

and its affiliates were giving the NRA "splendid coopera
tion. " ^
Another powerful organization of Catholic laymen, the
Knights of Columbus,

also threw its support behind NRA.

their annual convention in Chicago, August 15-17,

At

1933, the

Knights heard their Supreme Secretary, William J. McGinley,
move that the organization take a pledge to cooperate and
support President Roosevelt in carrying out the plans of NRA.
The motion was seconded by Mayor Edward Kelly of Chicago and
was passed by the convention amid numerous speeches praising
Roosevelt's leadership as "unparalleled and courageous."

22

Local chapters of the Knights also swung their weight
behind the President.

The editor of the Knights of Columbus

Journal, Philadelphia chapter, praised the concern of the New
Deal with insuring a living wage to labor.

The paper rejected

the charge that NRA was "regimentation," pointing out that

^ Catholic A c t i o n , October,
^ C o l u m b i a , October,

1933, p. 16.

1933, p. 10.
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the government must act vigorously or face r e v o l u t i o n . ^
Augusta, Georgia,

In

the local Knights sponsored a radio speech

by the Reverend Harold J. Barr, who drew parallels between
NRA and the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.

Barr said

that Catholics should support a plan so obviously patterned
after the encyclicals.

"There is no group of citizens more

confident of the success of the NRA or more enthusiastic
about its possibilities than we Catholics," he went on,

"for

there is none more convinced of the soundness of the principies upon which it is based."

25

Another important source of support for NRA was the
Catholic Conference on Industrial Problems.

This organiza

tion was started early in the 1 9 2 0 's by the NCWC as an
attempt to bring Catholic principles to bear on society at
the diocesan level under the auspices of the local bishop.
Regional conferences were held under the auspices of this
organization and nationally known speakers were supplied by
NCWC.

During the depression these regional conferences

^ C l i p p i n g Knights of Columbus J o u r n a l , September,
1933, Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers; the Roosevelt
Papers contain many copies of resolutions pledging support
from local chapters of the Knights of Columbus throughout
the United States.
^5Quoted in NCWC News Service, August 11, 1933.
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adopted a radical outlook on what should be done to save the
country.

Reverend John Ryan, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan,

and other reformers usually held the spotlight.

All during

the depression these conferences called for national action
to combat the crisis.
support the NRA.

26

It was only natural that they should

To cite one instance, Arthur D. Maguire,

chairman of the Detroit regional meeting of the Catholic
Conference on Industrial Problems, held December 4-5,

1933,

was happy to write to the White House that
. . . the whole trend of the conference was favor
able to NRA, and this moral support of the President
and his policies, and the publicity given to this
support has had a tremendous and beneficial effect
. . . throughout the country.27
The NRA even evoked support among Catholic college
students.

A college convention of members of the "Sodality

of Our Lady," representing some seventy-five colleges and
universities, and totaling over 500 delegates, did not think
it out of place at their meeting to comment on current
affairs.

The students, who praised President Roosevelt as

"a leader who is employing Christian principles in govern
ment," passed resolutions supporting NRA, old age pensions,

^B r o d e r i c k ,

1933,

Right Reverend, p. 200.

^ A r t h u r D, Maguire to Marvin McIntyre, December 7,
in Reel 1, Sel. M a t .
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abolition of child labor, and unemployment insurance.^®
This organizational support for Roosevelt's industrial
recovery program was augmented by the efforts of many dis
tinguished individual Catholics, whose public support could
only enhance the attractiveness of the plan to their co
religious-

NRA was, of course,

supported by the social

reformers connected with the NCWC.

Father Ryan went about

the country making speeches in which he praised NRA,
presented its major features in laymen's terms, and dispelled
many fears.

29

Ryan's colleague and assistant in the Social

Action Department of NCWC, Reverend Raymond A. McGowan, wrote
and spoke to the same effect.

He declared NRA to be "in line

with the program of Catholic Action" and pointed out that
Catholics were "proud" of the similarity.

30

Reverend Doctor

Francis J. Haas, who was working for NRA, called the princi
ples behind the program correct in their approach.

Haas

spoke along these lines before a mass meeting of the

^®NCWC News Service, July 10, 1934.
OQ

Washington I. Cleveland to Father Ryan, October 26,
1933; Father Ryan to Rev. P. H. Burkett, S . J . , November 28,
1933, Ryan papers.
■^^Rev. Raymond A. McGowan, "Legislative Trends and
Effects on Industrial Life," NCCC Proceedings, New York
City, October 1-4, 1933, p. 561.
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Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.

At a later date he

also urged American Negroes to support NRA because it offered
better conditions for all labor .31
Other distinguished leaders of American Catholicism
also supported NRA.

At South Bend, Indiana, Reverend John

P. O'Hara, acting president of Notre Dame, came to the defense
of NRA after it had been attacked by the United States Chamber
of Commerce.

O'Hara pointed out that business could not go

its merry way unregulated,
depression.

for that policy had produced the

"There must be invoked a power that will free

business from its own defiance of economic and moral laws,"
he added.

32

Mary G. Hawks, president of the NCCW, addressed

the 13th annual convention of that organization on the duty
of Catholics to support NRA.

She urged the NCCW to use its

far-flung organization to explain the provisions of NRA and
to invite cooperation with the "Blue Eagle."

33

At the same

time, members of the Commonwealth Club of California heard
Roy A. Bronson, vice-president of the National Catholic

31NCWC News Service, Troy, New York., May 3, 1935;
The Brooklyn T a b l e t , September 16, 1933, p. 5.
32Quoted in The Catholic Transcript, November 30, 1933.
33

Mary G. Hawks, "The Catholic Duty in the Present
Crisis," Catholic A c t i o n , October, 1933, p. 7.
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Alumni Federation, say that the philosophy behind NRA was
the same as that behind Quadraqesimo A n n o .
Among the prominent Catholic laymen who took a hand
in evoking Catholic support for NRA was the Postmaster
General of the United States and prominent Knight of Columbus,
James A. Farley.

Farley, speaking to the annual convention

of the National Conference of Catholic Charities, called NRA
a great success which had already justified its existence.
Another layman, John E. Morris,

former president of the

Catholic Laymen's Retreat Association, wrote an article in
which he said that NRA was both Catholic and constitutional
in principle.

■
1C

Members of the clergy across the country expressed a
deep commitment to the industrial recovery program.

Reverend

Doctor Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., vice-president of Georgetown
University,

spoke over the radio and called NRA the last

stand of democracy in the United States.

Father Walsh, who

led the Catholic opposition to FDR's plan to recognize

3^NCWC News Service, San Francisco, California,
August 10, 1933; see also The Catholic Transcript, August 10,
1933, p. 1.
^^NCCC Proceedings, New York City, October 1-4, 1933,
pp. 94-100.

36The Monitor, February 10, 1934, p. 1.
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Russia,

felt that it was the public duty of all citizens to

support NRA.

37
'

Reverend Jones I. Corrigan,

speaking from a

Boston radio station, called NRA "the most progressive and
skillfully devised plan for national recovery enacted in any
nation."^®

In Denver, participants in the annual Catholic

Action Week, March 11-17, heard Right Reverend Monsignor
William O'Ryan praise PDR as one who would lead the nation
out of the present crisis and compare NRA with the Papal
encyclicals.

J

In Chicago, radio listeners heard Reverend

J. W. L. Maguire attack the Chicago Tribune and the Daily
News for their attempts to "blackjack the NIRA.
Prom the foregoing,

it seems clear that the NRA had

strong support among American Catholics.
ever, are the reasons for this support.

Less clear, how
Certainly,

in seek

ing motives, one should give much weight to the very

■^Quoted in The Brooklyn T a b l e t , November 18, 1933,
p. 1 1 .
Quoted in The Boston P i l o t , October 21, 1933, p. 6 .
^ Catholic A c t i o n . April,
an

1934, p. 19.

Rev. J. W. L. Maguire, "Blackjacking the NIRA,"
November 8 , 1933, Box 8 8 , Frank P. Walsh Papers.
Consider
able additional evidence of "grass-roots" Catholic support
for Roosevelt exists in the form of telegrams and letters
from pastors of small parishes in such places as Fort Smith,
Arkansas; Bridgeville, Pennsylvania; Aurora, Illinois; and
Grand Rapids, Michigan; see Sel. M a t .
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desperation of the times.

Many people were willing to

accept any scheme which gave hope of ending the depression.
It is conceivable that Catholics would have been just as
sympathetic to a program radically different from NRA.
Another motive to be considered,

and one which was expressed

at the time, was the fact that there was really no alterna
tive to NRA except a return to the "devil take-the-hindmost,
every-man-for-himself type of industrialism,

the failure of

which has brought the nation to its present frightful cond i t i o n ."

41

Yet as Catholic thinkers appraised the NRA in more
depth, certain other themes seemed to predominate their
interpretation.
own terms.

There were those who liked the plan on its

Others saw in it a recognition of Catholic social

teaching, some feeling that the proposal was based squarely
on the Papal encyclicals.
In August,

1933,

the National Catholic Alumni Federa

tion passed a resolution in which they heartily endorsed the
NRA's plan to set up trade associations and to organize the
economy.

They did stress, however,

that labor, the consumer,

and the government should share in controlling these

^ Commonweal, August 4, 1933, p. 335.

149
associations with business.

The Federation did not favor a

system promoting monopoly unless concrete gains for all
society were forthcoming.

42

Visitors to the Catholic Industrial Conference held
in Detroit during December,

1933, were surprised to hear

Reverend Frederic Siedenburg, ex-dean of Detroit University,
praise President Roosevelt as "still a champion of capital
ism."

Reverend Siedenburg felt that NRA revealed Roosevelt

as a man trying to "control and humanize" capitalism to meet
the needs of the people during the depression.

To this

priest, NRA represented a conservative attempt to save
capitalism from failure and real regimentation.

This same

idea--that the NRA was an attempt to help capitalism rid
itself of its vices--was also expressed by William F.
Montavon,

Secretary of the Legal Division of NCWC.

Meanwhile,

43

in Boston, Reverend Jones I. Corrigan,

S.J.,

was telling his radio audience on_the Catholic Truth Hour
that NRA was good because it prevented ruinous competition.

^ N a t i o n a l Catholic Alumni Federation, "A Program of
Social Justice," The Catholic M i n d , XXXI (August 8 , 1933),
281-88.
43

The Brooklyn T a b l e t , December 16, 1933, p. 4;
William F. Montavon, "73rd Congress," Catholic A c t i o n ,
August, 1933, pp. 7-10.

Regulated cooperation had replaced competition in industry;
and the results,

felt Corrigan, would be more economic

stability and fuller employment.

Both labor and capital

would benefit from NRA because "it will remove the ruthless
antagonism between them."

Corrigan concluded that "the only

way that men can be set free is by imposing restraints on
the abuse of freedom," and he felt that "the Recovery Act
must be read in the light of this principle .1,44

The editor

of The Catholic World applauded the ideas expressed by
Corrigan and went further in condemning capitalism.
Roman Catholic Church,

The

insisted this editor, has a "definite

socialistic bias," and no one should try to lay the albatross
of capitalism on the Church's shoulders.

"If the National

Recovery Act means anything," wrote the editor,
announcement to the world that in the U. S.
competition is henceforth t a b o o ."4 5

"it is an

. . . unregulated

Another commentator

insisted that NRA "must succeed and shall."

The emphasis on

industrial codes in NRA was viewed as "hastening the day when
we shall see a new spirit of social justice in accord with
Pope Leo XIII's encyclical on labor and Pope Pius X I 's

44Quoted in The Boston Pi l o t , October 21,
45The Catholic World, CXXXVIII

(October,

1933, p. 6 .
1933), 1, 3.
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encyclical on the reconstruction of the social o r d e r .1,48
As already indicated, a theme stressed by a large
number of commentators was the N R A 1s attempt to apply the
Papal social encyclicals to the American depression.
Reverend Francis J. Haas felt that NRA was "a start" in
applying the remedy of Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno
to the crisis.

47

Michale 0 ' Schaunessy, in his Social

Justice Bulletin, remarked that the encyclicals of Pius XI
"had a determining influence on the President and his ad
visors,

in formulating the measures being taken.

..."

The

St. Francis Home Journal of Pittsburgh also expressed the
idea that NRA meant the government had finally recognized
the wisdom of Catholic social principles .4 8

According to the

Jesuit weekly A m e r i c a , NRA recognized the "excellence" of the
ideas of Leo XIII and Pius XI.

The editor pointed out that

for years Catholic social teaching had been ignored in
America, but now,

suddenly, both Catholics and non-Catholics

were turning to these principles.

4 8 Pax,

September,

He concluded that "the

1933, p. 199.

4 ^Catholic A c t i o n , May,

1935, p. 3.

48Clipping of Social Justice Bull e t i n . No. 8 [n.d.];
St. Francis Home Journal [n.d.], in Official File, 76-B,
Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
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scene has been set for the recognition of many of its
fQuadragesimo A n n o l principles by the new American adminis
tration. 1,49
These superficial comments linking NRA with the Papal
encyclicals received considerable support in more scholarly
analyses.

Reverend R. A. McGowan of NCWC set out to test

the particular aspects of NRA against Catholic teaching.
First,

seeking points of similarity between NRA and the Pope's

program, McGowan noted that both schemes defended the idea
that government should act to relieve the country of economic
disaster.

That is, both rejected the laissez-faire theory

of the state and would substitute industrial order in place
of unlimited competition.

Both plans condemned the old

system of cut-throat competition and disregard of the common
good.

Likewise,

the idea that industrial groups should be

formed and directed by the government was a common goal.

50

Father McGowan also pointed to the similar approach to labor
by the Papacy and by Roosevelt.

The NRA,

in Section 7a,

recognized labor's right to organize and bargain collectively.

4 9A m e r i c a ,

September 16, 1933, p.

553; September 23,

1933, p . 278.
^°NCWC News Service, Denver, March 23, 1934; Rev. R.
A. McGowan, "Testing the NRA by Catholic Teaching-I,"
Catholic Action, October, 1933, p. 23.
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These same rights were stressed in Quadragesimo A n n o .5^
There was a congruence also in that both the Pope and the
President advocated a minimum wage and maximum hour law for
l a b o r .52
Father John Ryan also saw points of similarity between
NRA and the Pope's plan.

For one thing, Ryan felt that the

system of industrial codes being drawn up,

forming what Roose

velt called modern guilds, were quite similar to the "voca53
tional groups" called for in Quadragesimo A n n o .

Ryan felt

that "in so far as all the participants in each industry are
brought under a code of fair practice and in so far as each
association exercises a considerable measure of industrial
self-government," there was a convergence of intent between
Quadragesimo Anno and NRA.

54

A student of Catholic social thought has remarked
that few Catholic leaders denied "the NRA's resemblance,
superficially at least," to the vocational group system

5 1 Rev.

R. A. McGowan, "The National Industrial
Recovery Act," Catholic A c t i o n , July, 1933, p. 6 .
^ 2 Ibid., p. 13.
^ F a t h e r Ryan to Rev. P. J. Connelly, S.J., June 30,
1933, Ryan Papers.
54

Rev. John A. Ryan, "Pope Pius XI and a New Social
Order," Catholic A c t i o n , June, 1934, pp. 14, 15.
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outlined m

the Pope's encyclical.

55

Certainly the remarks

of Reverend Francis J. Haas and Reverend John LaFarge help
to substantiate this observation.

Haas saw NRA as "essen

tially a bargain" between government and employers,

in which

the latter received immunity from antitrust and price-fixing
laws in return for accepting the government's ideas on
minimum wages and maximum hours.

The idea of a worker-

employer-government partnership was, he felt,
harmony with the theme of Quadragesimo A n n o .

in close
LaFarge was

especially interested in the similarity between the Pope's
call for the formation of "vocational groups" and the
President's desire that the codes form "modern guilds."

He

also pointed out that both the Pope and the President called
for a minimum wage for labor.

c7

According to The Brooklyn T a b l e t , there were three
areas in which NRA ran parallel to the Papal encyclicals.
The President's insistence that the formation and cooperation
of industrial groups was fundamental to recovery found an
echo in Quadragesimo Anno that "the aim of social legislation

5 5 Abell,

American Catholicism, p. 248.

^ The Brooklyn Tab l e t , August 5, 1933, p. 1.
^ R e v . John LaFarge, S . J . , "Doing the Truth," Inter
racial R e v i e w , VI (August, 1933), 151.
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must be the re-establishment of occupational groups."
Secondly, both NRA and the Papal encyclicals stressed the
fact that membership in these groups or guilds should be
strictly voluntary.

Finally, the Pope's emphasis on the need

for a living wage for labor had received due consideration in
Section 7a of NRA.

It seemed clear that FDR had patented NRA

after principles he had quoted from Quadragesimo Anno in his
Detroit speech during the election campaign.

The editor

concluded that NRA "deserves the hearty endorsement and loyal
support of all Catholics."

58

Other Catholic newspapers joined the chorus linking
NRA with the Papal encyclicals.

The Catholic Messenger told

its readers that NRA would not destroy individualism but
only curb its excesses.

Both the Pope and the President,

through NRA, wanted industry and labor to cooperate to produce
a better standard of living for society.

59

While admitting

that the NRA was "not entirely parallel" with Quadragesimo
A n n o , the Denver Catholic Register did comment on the
"remarkable similarity" in the two programs.

The Pope called

for the control of business and industry for promotion of the

58The Brooklyn T a b l e t , June 24, 1933, p. 8 .
59

The Catholic Messenger, June 22, 1933, p. 2.
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common good, and this was also the guiding spirit of NRA.^®
The editor of this paper was so convinced of the
soundness of NRA that he even criticized A1 Smith when that
Catholic hero came out against the measure.

Smith thought

that government control of industry was a dangerous trend,
thereby disagreeing with Pope Pius XI who wrote that "free
competition and still more economic domination must be kept
within just and definite limits, and must be brought under
the effective control of the public authority.

. . , "^ 1

Rather than being dangerous, NRA was, said the Denver editor,
in many ways parallel to the Pope's program.

Both Roosevelt

and Pius would protect private property while at the same
time trying to distribute the goods of the earth more
equally.

62

Finally,

in Washington, the NCWC News Service

spread the word that
. . . under the direction of General Hugh Johnson
. . . the far-reaching experiment of molding
national economic policy to social requirements,
foreshadowed in the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII
and his successors, is gradually being put to the
test .63

^ D e n v e r Catholic Register, May 2, 1933, p. 1.
^ Q u o t e d in ibid., August 10, 1933, p. 1.

^ 3NCWC News Service, June 19, 193 3.
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A few perceptive prelates even argued that the Papal
program was more radical than President Roosevelt's scheme.
The most pronounced difference, which was pointed out by
Father Ryan and Father McGowan, and others, was that the NRA
did not provide for as much active participation by labor as
Pius XI desired.

Labor was not given an active role in con

structing and executing the various industrial codes; and the
fact that business was not interpreting Section 7a of the law
as permitting the closed union shop meant that labor's right
to organize and bargain collectively was jeopardized.

This

also meant there was little hope of achieving, under NRA,
Pius's goal of labor sharing ownership with the employer.

64

While both the President's and the Pope's program sought
increased purchasing power for the masses, NRA would rely on
high wages to achieve this, while Pius asked for profitsharing and a wider ownership of property to gain the same
result.

66

Another discrepancy,which made clear the Pope's

^ A l l of the following argued that the Pope was more
radical than FDR:
Rev. John A. Ryan, "Pope Pius," pp. 14, 15;
Rev. Joseph F. T h o r n i n g , S.J., "Principles and Practices of
NRA," The Catholic M i n d , XXXII (October 8 , 1934), 361-68;
Rev. R. A. McGowan, "The Natioanl Industrial Recovery Act,"
p. 13; Rev. John A. Ryan, Social Doctrine, p. 249.
6 ^Rev.

R. A. McGowan, "Testing the NRA by Catholic
Teaching-II," Catholic A c t i o n , November, 1933, pp. 28-29.
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plan was more radical than NRA, was that the occupational
groups called for in the encyclical posited a much closer
association of labor and management than that provided for
under the industrial codes of FDR's plan.

66

Perhaps the most cogent presentation of the differences
between NRA and the Papal plan was that given by Father
McGowan, who found three major areas of divergence.

First,

in NRA only employers directed an industry while labor
remained "an outside bargaining body."
for vocational groups,
control.

In the Pope's plan

all aspects of industry were in joint

Secondly, under NRA "each industry stands separate

from every other industry" and from the government.

The

vision of the encyclical was the joining together of all
industry to promote the common good,
independent of, government."
occupations and professions,

"separate, but not

Thirdly,

in the encyclical all

including agriculture, were

considered groups to be organized, whereas NRA was interested
only in urban industry, banking,

and trade.

67

Admitting these deficiencies in NRA, Ryan and McGowan,

^ A d d r e s s of Father John Ryan before Catholic Confer
ence on Industrial Problems, Detroit, in New York T i m e s ,
December 5, 1933, p. 8 ; Amer i c a , March 17, 1934, p. 557.
6 ^Rev.

R. A. McGowan, "Testing NRA by Catholic
Teaching-Ill," Catholic A c t i o n , January, 1934, pp. 12, 31.
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who were the two most consistent students of the act,
saw it as a progressive piece of legislation.

still

While the

minimum wage might be too low, it was still established as a
principle.

While cooperation of all elements of the economy

could have been closer, NRA was still the first step toward
a more rational national planning of the economy.

While

labor could have had more power allotted to it, still the
right to organize and bargain collectively was on the statute
books even if weakened by the open-shop interpretation of
Section 7a.

Both Ryan and McGowan were optimistic about NRA.

Ryan felt that it could easily evolve "into the kind of
industrial order recommended by Pope Pius XI."

68

McGowan

likewise viewed NRA as a first step "towards the social order
of

'vocational groups,'

of Pius XI advocates.

...

. .

of Guilds, which the encyclical
Clearly,

to many Catholic

social thinkers NRA marked the beginning of a period of ful
fillment for the Church's social teaching in the United
S tates.
As usual, however,

there was a vocal minority in the

Church who took a more critical view.

6 ®Ryan,

An extreme position

Social Doctrine, p. 249.

^^McGowan,

"Testing NRA-III," p. 11.

was taken by F. P. Kenkel, who labeled NRA as the beginning
of "State Socialism."

Kenkel lamented the fact that the

measure would surely destroy the middle class in America:
"It [NRA] gives great power to big companies and will drive
the little fellow to the wall."

As for the idea that NRA

was similar to the guild system advocated by the Popes,
Kenkel felt there was little basis for such comparison.
The liberals behind NRA looked toward socialism rather than
toward any 18th-century guild system for their model.

7 f)

Another author who disliked NRA was L. S. Herron.
Writing in Central-Blatt and Social Justice, Herron remarked
that NRA would surely "strengthen the position of capital
istic industry and still further intrench monopoly."

The

codes gave big business an unfair advantage over small.

The

NRA, according to Herron, was "essentially the nationalplanning scheme,

seized upon by big business and pushed

through Congress in the guise of an emergency measure."
Herron felt that NRA was a hinderance to social cooperation
and real economic reform because it legalized "the unfair
and monopolistic practices of big business.

..."
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^®F. P. Kenkel, "New Deals, Past and Present,"
Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVII (July-August, 1934),
112, 117, 241.
^ 1 L. S. Herron, "Codes Threaten Growth of Cooperation,
ibid., XXVI (March, 1934), 385-88.
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On the West Coast, disenchantment with NRA was also
expressed by The Monitor of San Francisco, whose editor felt
that certain Catholics were only fooling themselves by
praising NRA as being based on the Papal encyclicals.

He

pointed out that the Roosevelt plan contained as many
parallels with Marxism and Kantism as it did with Catholi
cism.

"The NIRA," he insisted,

"can very deftly be turned

into an American brand of Communistic state."

To this

editor, the brain trusters who conceived this bill were
advocating an alien philosophy and should be watched care*
11 72
fully.

There were other Catholics who criticized NRA not
because they thought it was leading to state socialism but
because it was failing in its job.

Many recognized that one

of the main weaknesses of NRA was the failure of business to
live up to the codes.

Employers were reluctant to "make any

sacrifice at all for the common good.

. . ."73

others

regretted that NRA lacked a "strong set of teeth" with which
to force the rugged individualist to conform.

74

In Detroit,

7^The Monitor, July 29, 1933, p. 1; August 19, 1933,
p. 1.
73columbia, November, 1933, p. 13.
7^The Catholic Herald, March 1, 1934, p. 4.
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Father Coughlin agreed that the NRA would fail because only
a minority of American industrialists "had honestly sub
scribed to the codes of N R A . " ^

Even pro-NRA men such as

McGowan and Ryan insisted that,

in order to work properly,

NRA had to give more power to labor.

Ryan further feared

that NRA was "placing too much faith in automatic methods of
recovery.The

fact that the American Negro had not

received much benefit from the act was another short-coming
mentioned.

77

Despite these criticisms,

the majority of American

Catholics probably agreed with Reverend John Ryan when he
praised the program as a step in the right direction.

Ryan

felt that the only alternatives to NRA were socialism,
communism, or fascism.

He told his audience at the annual

meeting of the NCCC that, by backing the NRA, Catholics had
a great opportunity for "putting into effect the Catholic
conception of a social order reconstructed upon the

^ 5Morris,

"Father Coughlin and the New Deal," p. 29.

?^Columbia, August, 1933, p. 13; Quoted in New York
Times, March 26, 1935, p. 8 .
77

Justin McAghon, "The Negro Under the New Deal,"
Interracial Review, VIII (March, 1935), 38-39.
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principles of social justice ."7 8
Public criticism of the NRA reached its apogee with
the publication of the Darrow Report in 1934.

After many

charges by small businessmen that they were being discrimi
nated against because of NRA's tendency to favor monopoly,
Roosevelt decided to investigate.

In March, 1934, he

created the National Recovery Review Board, headed by
Clarence Darrow, the famous defense attorney,
charges.

to study these

After a brief investigation, Darrow reported that

"giant corporations dominated the NRA code authorities and
squeezed small business,

labor, and the p u b l i c .*'78

Catholic reaction to the report was mixed.

The Jesuit

weekly, America, felt that if the report was correct, the
basic purpose of NRA was being defeated.

The solutions

offered by Darrow, however, would probably lead to even
worse results .8 8

F. P. Kenkel felt that the Board's findings

justified his complaint that NRA was strangling the American
middle class.

81

Other Catholics viewed the report with

7 8 Rev.

John A. Ryan, "Shall the NRA be Scrapped?"
Catholic Action, November, 1934, p. 4.
7 9 Leuchtenburg,
8 ^America,

Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 67.

June 2, 1934, p. 169.

8 ^-Central-Blatt

and Social Justice, May, 1935, p. 48.
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skepticism.

Some felt that Darrow was exaggerating in order

to attract attention, and that such a large undertaking as
NRA was bound to "have some rough spots.

OO

The members of the National Catholic Alumni Federation
applauded Hugh Johnson who spoke to them on May 31, 1934,
denouncing the Darrow Report.
geration,

Johnson, with his usual exag

said the NRA was the personification of the golden

rule in business and called its opponents "scribes and
pharisees."

83

When talk arose of forming a small review

board to hear the specific complaints of small businessmen,
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy told General Johnson that "since
we had the biggest communist and atheist in the country at
*
the head of the other b o a r d ," it would be wise to put someone
like Father Ryan in charge of the new board.

QA

The strong Catholic support for NRA which did exist
was not limited to mere written and spoken praise.

Many

Catholic priests and laymen played an active role in adminis
tering the various facets of NRA.

The two most prominent of

such priests were Reverend Francis J. Haas, Director of the

^2Penver Catholic R e g i s t e r , June 3, 1934, p. 4.
®^Quoted by New York T i m e s , June 1, 1934, p. 6 .

28,

® 4 Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Rev. John A. Ryan, June
1934, Ryan Papers.
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National Catholic School of Social Service, and Reverend
John A. Ryan.

Haas had been asked by Roosevelt to serve on

the Labor Advisory Committee of NRA, was later appointed to
the National Labor Board, and finally served as Labor Repre
sentative on the new General Code Authority of NRA.®5
Father Ryan played his most active role as one of the
three members of the Industrial Appeals Board,
complaints of small businessmen against NRA.

formed to hear
Precipitated

by the Darrow Report, the Appeals Board lasted ten months
and heard approximately seventy cases.

Ryan later remarked

that few businessmen claimed discrimination by NRA.

Rather,

the majority requested "exemptions from compliance with the
minimum wage rates" fixed by the codes.
sympathy for these petitions.

Ryan had little

He would prefer to "let the

small businessmen perish" rather than reduce wages for
thousands of workers.
There were other Catholics who played minor roles in
the functioning of industrial reform.

Reverend Doctor George

Johnson, director of the NCWC Educational Department, was

®^The Boston P i l o t , October 14, 1933, p. 1; October
13, 1934, p. 1; Perkins, The Roosevelt I K n e w , p. 216.
®^Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 217-18; Ryan, Social
Doctrine, pp. 249-50.

appointed to the four-man NRA committee of the American
Council of Education.

Miss Mary G. Hawks, national presi

dent of the NCCW and Mrs. Nicholas F. Brady, distinguished
New York Catholic, were members of the Committee for Mobili
zation for Human Needs and the National Committee for Child
Health.

Most Reverend Thomas K. Gorman, Bishop of Reno,

Nevada, served on a regional recovery board for the rehabili
tation of the industrial system.

William G. Bruce, prominent

Catholic publisher, was named to the Wisconsin State Advisory
Board of the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works.

Right Reverend Monsignor C. J. Donohoe was appointed

chairman of the Davenport,

Iowa, Adjustment Board of the NRA.

Reverend Frederic Siedenburg was named director of the
Detroit Regional Labor Relations Board by President Roose
velt.

In the deep South, Reverend Peter M. H. Wynkoven of

New Orleans, Louisiana, was chairman of one of the twelve
regional United States Labor Boards.

Elsewhere in the

country, prominent Catholics served on NRA boards and on
various labor dispute boards.

Altogether, the involvement

of American Catholics with the industrial recovery program
of the New Deal was extensive.®^

®^Catholic Ac t i o n , January, 1934, p. 13; October,
1933, p. 14; The Brooklyn Ta b l e t , August 12, 1933, p. 1; NCWC
News Service, Davenport, July 31, 1934 and Detroit, September
17, 1934; The Catholic Messenger, December 28, 1933, p. 1.
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This involvement helps explain the rather keen re
action produced among American Catholics when the NRA was
declared invalid by the Supreme Court on May 27, 1935.

In

1933, the Legal Committee of the National Catholic Alumni
Federation said that NRA was constitutional and would
"probably be upheld . . .

at least in its broad outlines

. . . during the period of emergency."

OQ

When the measure

was struck down by the Court, many Catholics attempted to
rationalize the decision.

In Chicago, The New World admitted

that there was little hope of resurrecting the project
because of the unanimity of the decision.
on the bright side, however,

Trying to look

the editor pointed out that NRA

had made certain definite gains such as elimination of sweat
shops, restricting child labor, and— most important— stirred
the people to the possibilities of a better social order.
Certainly such a project was not to be condemned because it
did not fit the Supreme Court's view of the Constitution.
The Constitution was not,

the editor insisted,

"intended to

handicap Americans in the pursuit of life, liberty and
happiness, which,

in the present instance, means a fearless

. . . effort to bring about a better social order."

88The Catholic Herald, July 20, 1933, p. 4.
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Constitution, he concluded,

is "the bulwark of our

liberties," not "a millstone on our n e c k s . T h e

editor of

America was just as disturbed but more optimistic about the
decision.

He felt that all was not lost by the Court's

decision because the NRA had already served a noble purpose.
It had educated the people of the United States to the
"doctrines of social justice, as preached by Leo XIII and
Pius XI," and this gain could not be erased by the Court's
action.

90
Commonweal likewise regretted the passing of NRA and

took issue with those who applauded the Court's decision.
The editor felt that the industrial codes "were definite
achievements" as moving toward "the vertical, cooperative
organization of industrial society which alone seems a
feasible idea."

Yet the magazine admitted that NRA had

evolved into "an organic conception, which tended evidently,
to blur the edges between private custom and law, administration and legislation."

91

In this same vein The Boston

^ T h e New W o r l d , October 5, 1934, p. 4; June 7, 1934,
p . 4.
^ A m e r i c a , June 8, 1935, p. 194.

91Commonweal, June 7, 1935, p. 142; June 14, 1935,
p. 169.
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Pilot felt that the test case before the Court had appeared
"too frivolous and unimportant to merit consideration."

But

the C o u r t 1s reasoning seemed sound and NRA had served its
purpose.

It fitted a gap and "established standards that

might well be followed by private industry."

QO

While

applauding the Supreme Court's defense of the Constitution,
the Catholic Central Verein warned that it "must not be
accepted as a command to return to the old economic system,
to the laws of the jungle."

Laissez-faire economics was not

the answer and a new unique system must be established.

93

Individual Catholics also spoke out on the Court's
decision.

Father McGowan regretted both the decision and

the Court's tendency toward a strict interpretation of the
Constitution.

He felt it essential that the Court change

its viewpoint "if the federal government . . . [is to do its]
duty to the economic welfare of the people."

More attention

should be paid, said the priest, to the constitutional
clause calling on the government to promote the general w e l 
fare.^

In Denver, Hubert A. Smith, editor of the diocesan

^ The Boston P i l o t , June 6, 1935, p. 4.
^ C i t e d by The Catholic H e r a l d , June 6, 1935, p. 4.
94Quoted in ibid., June 13, 1935, p. 4.
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newspaper,

felt the Court's decision was a calamity.

He

advised the Roosevelt administration to continue the fight
by passing a constitutional amendment giving the government
the powers outlined in NRA.

Smith felt that NRA had pre

vented revolution in America, but feared what would happen
now that it had been declared v o i d . 9 ^

To Reverend James

Gillis, editor of The Catholic W o r l d , the issue was simple.
The removal of NRA meant that all hope of social ana eco
nomic reform was gone.

But, Gillis insisted,

get reform, we shall get revolution."
were shared by Father John Ryan.

" i f we don't

Tnese sentiments

Upon hearing of the invali

dation of NRA, Ryan issued a public statement that "some
other way must be found . . .

to subordinate wealth and

business to the common welfare of the country."

Ryan feared

that, with NRA gone, the standard of living would drop,
wages would be cut, and hours would be lengthened.

97

In order to unite Catholic opinion against any such
reactionary trend, Ryan and Father McGowan composed a state
ment of Catholic principles relevant to the economic crisis.

9 5p e n v e r
Catholic Register, May 30, 1935,
June 9, 1935, p. 1.

96The Catholic W o r l d , CXLI

(July,

1935),

9^Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 219.

p.

1;

385-86.
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McGowan had been working on such a statement before NRA had
been struck down.

The text was now revised by Ryan to incor

porate this latest development.
ment,

In its final form the state

"Organized Social Justice," called for a new NRA, under

a constitutional amendment, to include farmers and profes
sional men in a system of "occupational group organizations"
providing freedom of economic behavior and collaboration
with the Federal government.

Any return to the old system

or failure to construct a new NRA would mean communism or
fascism for the United States.

The statement declared that

"had NRA been permitted to continue, it could readily have
developed into the kind of industrial order recommended by
qp
the Holy Father."
Father Ryan worked assiduously to get a cross section
of Catholic businessmen and industrialists to sign the state
ment.

Many of his correspondents refused because they feared

an increase in the power of the Federal government which
would follow a constitutional amendment as suggested in the
Ryan statement.

Although Ryan's correspondence indicates

his discouraging experience, the priest still insisted that
at least eighty per cent of those to whom the document was

^®Quoted by New York Times, December 5, 1935, p. 28;
Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 220-21.
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sent were willing to sign it.

Altogether,

131 distinguished

Catholics finally signed the manifesto, most of them out
spoken liberals.

Among the signers, besides McGowan and

Ryan, were Frank P. Walsh, Assistant Secretary of Labor,
Edward F. McGrady, Reverend Haas, Reverend Gillis, and
Dorothy Day, editor of The Catholic W o r k e r .
the hierarchy signed.

Originally,

No member of

two bishops, Robert E.

Lucey of Amarillo, Texas, and Aloysius J. Muench of Fargo,
North Dakota, signed the statement, but their names were
blocked out of the published edition in order to avoid
embarrassing them by their uniqueness.

It seems clear that

"Organized Social Justice" failed in its purpose to present
a truly representative statement of Catholic social teaching
because its support was limited to that element already
committed to the New Deal.

QQ

^ B r o d e r i c k , Right Reverend, p. 221; Clipping of
Baltimore S u n , December 5, 1935, in Ryan Papers; Abell,
American Catholicism, p. 251.

CHAPTER VIII

LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY

From what has been written concerning the major
provisions of NRA, it should be apparent that for the most
part American Catholic spokesmen were pro-labor.

This

support of labor had historic roots in a Church made up
primarily of the lower classes and immigrants.

Father Ryan,

of course, was a long-time advocate of a "living wage" for
labor and had been praised by Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins for his forward-looking ideas.
public advocate of labor's rights,

Besides being a

Ryan was constantly

writing fellow priest and laymen on the advantage of good
labor legislation.'*'
In his struggle for better labor laws, Ryan was joined
by Reverend Francis J. Haas.

When this priest was appointed

to the Labor Policies Board of the Works Progress

^Ryan, Social Doctrine, p. 279; Bishop Francis C.
Kelley of Oklahoma City to Ryan, January 7, 1933; Ryan to
Rev. Philip H. Burkett, November 9, 1935, and many other
letters in the Ryan Papers.
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Administration, many Catholics saw the action as a vindica
tion of the Church's stand for a living wage,
right to organize, and for shorter hours.

for labor's

Haas gave strong

support to Secretary of Labor P e r k i n s ' program to improving
work conditions.

He was radical enough to declare it the

duty of every worker to join a union and to actively assist
Sidney Hillman's attempt to recruit members for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America.
Elsewhere, Reverend McGowan of NCWC also praised the
work of Secretary Perkins as being in accord with the ency
clicals of Pius XI.

In 1932, Dorothy Day founded the

Catholic Worker Movement in New York City.

In 1937,

Reverend John P. Monaghan established the Association of
Catholic Trade Unionists.

Both of these movements were

attempts to keep the loyalty of the Catholic laborer who
might be attracted by the advantages of M a r x i s m .4

2 Rev. Haas to Hon. Prances Perkins, March 14, 1934,
Correspondence-general, 1933, Haas Papers; The Brooklyn
T a b l e t , August 3, 1935, p. 9.
3

Rev. Haas to Rev. William C. Keane, Director of
Catholic Charities of Albany, New /ork, May 8 , 1934, Haas
Papers; Rev. John Ryan to Edward Keating, November 9, 1933,
Ryan Papers.
4 Ellis,

American Catholicism, p. 144; Dorothy Day,
The Long Loneliness (New York, 1952), p. 219; NCWC News
Service, June 29, 1935.
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How some Catholics felt about the labor problems
facing America during the depression is indicated by their
reaction to the 1933 proposal of Senator Hugo Black of
Alabama for a thirty-hour work week.

The Black bill, which

Roosevelt refused to support because he felt it was uncon
stitutional and negative in its approach, was supported by
over one thousand students at Notre Dame University in a
petition sent to the House Labor Committee.

5

Father Ryan

was enthusiastic in his support of the proposal.

He wrote

to Frances Perkins in April, 1933, that he was glad it had
passed the Senate and felt "it is a good sign for the Presi
dent's program that this revolutionary measure got through
so fast by such a wide margin."*’

He also wrote to Senator

Black, remarking that he had made a speech in favor of the
thirty-hour week some six months earlier in the Town Hall
Meeting in New York City.

He referred to the Senator's bill

as "able and comprehensive," and was surprised at what a
good argument could be made by using the powers in the Interstate Commerce clause to establish mininum hours for labor.

5Catholic A c t i o n , June, 1933, p. 26.
6 Rev. John A. Ryan to Hon. Frances Perkins, April 7,
1933, Ryan Papers.

7 Rev. John Ryan to Senator Hugo L. Black, April 7,
1933, Ryan Papers.
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Indeed, Ryan even requested an opportunity to testify in
favor of the bill before the House Committee on Labor-

He

wrote to Congressman W. P. Connery, chairman of the committee,
that it was a "great disappointment" when he was denied an
□

opportunity to appear.
Catholic priests took an active part in securing
labor's rights under NRA.
mentioned.

Ryan's role has already been

A few of the more prominent prelates who served

as mediators in the labor disputes in 1933 and 1934 include:
Archbishop Edward J. Hanna, Chairman of the National Long
shoreman's Board; Reverend Haas, as Federal mediator in the
Minneapolis Truck Driver's strike; and Very Reverend John
W. R. Maguire, Chicago Regional Board and mediator in the
Kohler Wisconsin strike.

Other priests served on local and

regional NRA boards— Reverend John 0 'Grady on the NRA
National Sheltered Workshop Committee; Reverend James F.
Cunningham, Los Angeles Advisory Board, Dress Code Authority;
Monsignor P. M. H. Wynhoven, Chairman of the New Orleans
Regional Labor Board; Reverend John P. Boland, Chairman of
Buffalo Regional Labor Board; and Reverend Frederick Siedenburg, Chairman of the Detroit Regional Labor Board.

®Rev. John Ryan to Hon. W. P. Connery, May 3,.1933,
Ryan Papers.
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Not only were Catholics involved in the labor policies
of the New Deal, but many even criticized these policies
because they were not radical enough.

As has been seen,

some regretted the neglibible part labor had played in form
ulating the NRA codes.

There was also dissatisfaction with

the contents of Section 7a.
F. Dubrul,
1934,

One Catholic spokesman, Ernest

told the annual meeting of the NCCC in October,

that it was against Catholic teaching to force a man

to join a union.

Q

But voluntary unionism was not what

Father Haas and other Catholic liberals wanted.

In fact,

Section 7a was criticized by more progressive Catholics
precisely because it seemed to support such rights as Dubrul
argued were necessary according to the teachings of the
Church.

One editor felt that labor had been shortchanged by

NRA because "this administration does not support, and never
did, an interpretation of Section 7a which would have helped
labor.Another,

who was critical of the collectivist

tendencies of NRA, complained that it was setting up company
unions and thereby leading to disaster for the working

^Ernest F. Dubrul, "NRA and Collective Bargaining,"
NCCC Proceedings, Cincinnati, October 7-10, 1934, pp. 28793.

^ A m e r i c a , May 11, 1935, p. 97.
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man.^

In Brooklyn an editor expressed fear that the right

of collective bargaining spelled out in Section 7a would be
undermined by a weak interpretation or by simply ignoring it
in practice.

12

Father Haas publicly called for the estab

lishing of independent unions over the company unions.

He

wrote to William Green, President of the A. F. of L . ,
expressing hope that the administration would not act rashly
on the labor provisions of NRA, as this was the "all impor
tant matter.

Another source felt that Section 7a was too

weak because the interpretation of it by government and
industry "have been turning collective bargaining and the
right to organize into an insulting delusion."

14

Such Catholic impatience with N R A ‘s labor policy was
well founded.

It is clear that neither FDR nor other New

Dealers like Johnson and Richberg looked upon Section 7a and
the NRA as a means of building up industrial unionism in the
United States.1^

Yet when NRA was invalidated by the

^ T h e Moni t o r , September 9, 1933, p. 1.
^2|Fhe Brooklyn T a b l e t , September 2, 1933, p. 6 .
^ I b i d ., August 26, 1933, p. 1; Rev. Haas to William
Green, November 11, 1933, Haas Papers.
1 4 America,

March 24, 1934, p. 582.

^ L e u c h t e n b u r g , Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 108.
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Supreme Court, Roosevelt was already supporting the Wagner
Labor b i l l . ^

Senator Robert Wagner of New York had been

trying to get his bill through Congress since 1934 but had
failed to receive administration support.
July,

As passed in

1935, the act set up a National Labor Relations Board

. . . as a permanent independent agency empowered
not only to conduct elections to determine the
appropriate bargaining units and agents but to
restrain business from committing "unfair labor
practices" such as discharging workers for union
membership or fostering employer-dominated com
pany un i o n s .1 ?
Many Catholics were attracted by the proposals out
lined in the Wagner bill.

When it was being debated in the

Senate Committee on Education and Labor in 1934, the Bishops'
Administrative Committee of the NCWC drafted a statement for
presentation before this body.

The statement was a vigorous

defense of labor's right "to organize freely into associa
tions of their own choice."

Portions of Pius X I 's ency

clical Quadragesimo Anno were placed in evidence as favoring
the bill.

In a letter to David I. Walsh, chairman of the

House committee, Reverend John J. Burke, General Secretary

1 6 Burns, Roosevelt, p. 226, points out that FDR
supported the Wagner Act before NRA was declared invalid.

17

'Leuchtenburg, Franklin D.

Roosevelt, p. 151.

of NCWC, urged that the Bishops'

statement be given strong

consideration.
The B i s h o p s ' statement stressed that the Wagner bill
would "protect the worker's right to self-organization."
The prelates also liked the idea of establishing an indus
trial tribunal for "the adjudication of industrial contro
versies."

They remarked that both of these ideas "are in

complete accord with and are required by the Catholic social
program enunciated by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 and by the
present Holy Father, Pope Pius XI in 1931."

Labor's right

to organize unions and to bargain collectively were "inherent
rights."

A tribunal of adjudication was necessary to

"resolve the conflicting claims" of both labor and management
Anything less would be "chaos and anarchy."

19

Father Ryan, actively supporting the Wagner bill,

felt

it was "probably the most just, beneficient, and far-reaching
piece of labor legislation ever enacted in the United States.
He made public statements endorsing the bill and sent many
letters to Congressmen urging their help in its passage.

1 ®Huber,

Our Bishops Speak, p. 305.

^ Q u o t e d in Commonweal, April 27, 1934, p. 701.
20Quoted in Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 220.

He
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wrote to Senator David I. Walsh, giving his full backing to
Wagner's proposals.

In this letter, Ryan included a copy of

a statement by Reverend John J. Burke and the N C W C 1s Adminis
trative Council supporting the measure.

Ryan himself favored

the bill because, like the bishops, he thought it was in
accord with the wishes of both Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius
XI.

He pointed out that the act was needed to make the NRA

codes effective.

21

Ryan's stand was echoed by the Denver

Catholic Regis t e r , which felt that the bill,

if constitu

tional, would put labor and capital "on somewhat of a
l evel."

22
A dissident note, however, was raised by the Jesuit

weekly, Ame r i c a .

The editor of this magazine doubted that

the bill could be enforced after the Supreme Court's decision
in the Schechter case.

If the National Labor Relations

Board could not "go into the states, and compel employers to
recognize the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively, the Wagner bill is nothing more than a
gesture."

But such power could not be delegated to the NLRB

by Congress under the existing interpretation of the Supreme

2-*-Catholic A c t i o n , May,

1935, p. 17.

^ Denver Catholic Regi s t e r , June 20,

1935, p. 4.
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Court.

The Interracial R e v i e w , on the other hand,

feared

that the clause in the bill which provided that a majority
vote would decide the exclusive bargaining representatives
for any labor unit might be used to exclude the Negro.
was recognized, however,

It

that such a clause was a neces

sity .23
From the foregoing,

it would appear that a significant

element of the Catholic Church was vigorous in supporting the
more radical labor policies of the New Deal.

Yet when one

approaches the question of child labor, the eradication of
which was a goal sought by the New Deal, a striking amount
of opposition is revealed on the part of the Church.

Federal

child labor legislation had begun as early as 1916, with the
Keating-Owen Act, but the Supreme Court had seen fit to
declare invalid this and subsequent acts.

In 1924, a child

labor amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the
states by Congress, but by 1932 it still lacked the needed
support of at least ten states.

It was against this amend

ment that much of the Catholic opposition was directed.
amendment provided,

first,

The

that "Congress shall have power

to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under

2 3 America,

X

July 13, 1935, p. 313; Interracial R e v i e w .
(May, 1937), 6 8 .
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eighteen years of age"; second, that "the power of the
several states is unimpaired by this article except that the
operation of state laws shall be suspended to the extent
necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by Congress."
Altogether it did not seem a radical proposal.

Yet Catholic

opposition to the measure was widespread.
Reverend Michael J. Ahern,

S.J., one of Cardinal

O'Connell's bright young men, gave the most elaborate
explanation of Catholic opposition.

Speaking over the

Boston radio, Ahern pointed out that he, of course, did not
approve of child labor, but this had nothing to do with
Catholic opposition to the amendment.

Catholics were opposed

to the amendment because it invested too much power in Con
gress.

Because it gave Congress such unlimited power,

Catholics thought it "dangerous and un-American."

Limita

tions to the measure had been suggested to Congress before
its submission to the states, but all were rejected.

Friends

of the amendment urged that the people depend upon a reason
able interpretation by Congress.

Ahern stressed that "we

much prefer to have this reasonableness written into the
Constitution, than to have it left to the vagaries of
political opinion."

As it stood, Congress could use the

power granted to "regulate,

limit, and even prohibit the
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education of these young people."

This was not expected,

but w hy not make such things clear in the amendment?
seems to us," he continued,

"It

"that under this amendment as it

now stands Congress could regiment all children and youths
under eighteen years of age, as they have been regimented in
some communistic and fascist countries."

The priest went on

to note that the amendment had other weaknesses of omission,
such as the failure to distinguish between harmful and non
harmful child labor.

Furthermore, he insisted, child labor

was no longer a major problem and President Roosevelt had
already admitted that he needed no amendment to eradicate
what was left .^4
Much of this argument appears fantastic now, but it
should be made clear that a number of Catholic bishops and
much of the Catholic press expressed oppositipn to the amend
ment along the lines mentioned by Ahern.
hierarchy,

Besides the

the Catholic Daughters of America and various

local Holy Name Societies also came out against the proposal.
The CDA argued that the amendment would "substitute for the
authority of the parent,

the authority of Congress."^5

^4Quoted in The Boston P i l o t , February 27, 1937, p. 6 .
^^Quoted in New York T i m e s , February 23, 1936, II, 1*
February 8 , 1937, p. 5.
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In Massachusetts the amendment ran into the opposi
tion of Cardinal O'Connell.

The Cardinal's representative

at the Massachusetts Legislative Committee dealing with
ratification of the amendment, Reverend Jones I. J. Corrigan,
surprised his congressional audience by asserting that
"nothing redder ever came out of Red Russia" than the amend
ment in question.

He argued that the ratification of the

amendment would be to "Russianize American parents and
nationalize American children."

26

This remarkable outburst

prompted a reply by John J. Cummings of Boston, a Catholic
and former legislator, who insisted that the Cardinal was
really too old to know what the amendment said.

He also

pointed to such prominent Catholics as Ryan, Haas, and P. H.
Callahan, who favored the amendment, as evidence that it was
not communistic in n a t u r e .
The Cardinal, however, was to have his way as the
Massachusetts legislature failed to ratify the amendment
both in 1936 and 1937, despite a personal broadcast plea by
President Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was assisted in the prepera-

tion of his plea by Bishop Frances Spellman of New York, who
was a former assistant to Cardinal O'Connell.

The

26Quoted in The Boston Pilot, February 23, 1935, p. 1.
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Massachusetts action caused Michael Flaherty, secretary of
the Boston Painters Union,

to charge that the Church

obviously must own some sweatshops and that the Cardinal was
running the legislature.

27

Other states also witnessed Catholic opposition to
the amendment.

In Connecticut, Bishop McAuliffe of Hartford

sent a representative to oppose the amendment before the
state legislature.

28

In Texas one state senator remarked

that ratification of the proposal was being hindered by
pressure from the Catholic Church "which has been pouring
letters and telegrams into the Senate."

29

At the same time,

however, Texas was the home of the most outspoken friend of
the child labor amendment in the American hierarchy.

Robert

E. Lucey, Bishop of Amarillo, did his best to promote ratifi
cation.

He wrote to the Governor endorsing the latter’s

stand for the amendment.

Lucey also quelled the opposition

organized by the state council of the Knights of Columbus. 3 0

2?R0bert I. Gannon, The Cardinal Spellman Story (New
York, 1962), p. 154; New York T i m e s , February 20, 1937, p. 18.
^ C o l u m b i a , April,

1937, p. 3.

29

Claude C. Westerfeld to Marvin McIntyre, February
22, 1937, Official File, 58-A, Box 5, Roosevelt Papers.
^°Robert E. Lucey, Bishop of Amarillo, to Frank P.
Walsh, January 23, 1937, Box 136, Frank P. Walsh Papers.
The Frank Walsh Papers in the New York Public Library are a
rich source of information on this whole question.
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But the Bishop seems to have been alone among the hierarchy
in publicly supporting the amendment.
In New York state the opposition reached its apogee.
All eight New York bishops came out in opposition to ratifi
cation by the state legislature.

Bishop Gibbons of Albany

appeared in person before the legislative committee to
oppose the amendment.

Cardinal Hayes of New York City

asserted that "authority over the lives of children rests in
their parents" and not in any removed governmental agency.
Bishop William Turner of Buffalo also spoke out against the
^1
amendment.
Throughout the struggle for ratification, which
occurred off and on from 1935 through 1937, President Roose
velt was aware of the opposition of the Catholic Church to
the amendment.

Charles C. Burlingham wrote to him, asking

him to intercede in New York to overcome the h i e r a r c h y 's
resistance.

32

Roosevelt himself remarked to Harold Ickes

that the Catholic opposition to the amendment could prove
very harmful to the Church because it might provoke

^ C o m m o n w e a l , March 5, 1937, p. 509; Catholic A c t i o n ,
February, 1935, p. 21.
22Charles c. Burlingham to President Roosevelt,
January 24, 1935, Official File, 58-A, Box 5, Roosevelt
Papers.
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■5 O

Protestant reaction.

This same thought was expressed by

Irving Brant, editor of the St. Louis Star-Times, to Father
John Ryan.

Brant felt that the hierarchy's action would

lead to "a new kind of anti-Catholicism and anti-clerical
ism."

In his reply, Ryan emphasized that only a small

minority of bishops were involved in the controversy while
most were silent .34
President Roosevelt, after being re-elected in 1936,
decided to give the amendment his support in New York.

He

wrote to Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York City, reminding
h i m of the Presidential plea made to the Governors that rati
fication "be made one of the major items in the legislative
program in their states."

Roosevelt added,

"I sincerely

hope that my own state will be among those to ratify."3^

A

few days later he wrote the same sort of message to Governor
Herbert H. Lehman, trusting "that the assembly will take
. . . favorable action as quickly as possible" and that his

3 3 Ickes,

D i a r y , II, 8 6 .

34Irving Brant to Rev. John A. Ryan, April 22,
Ryan Papers.

1937,

3-*President Roosevelt to Fiorello LaGuardia, telegram,
February 4, 1937, in Rosenman, Public P a p e r s , VI, 34.
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"own home state will be very prompt in ratification . " 38
In the words of Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, editor of
Am e rica. the Catholic press was "overwhelmingly against the
amendment."
posal.

38

37

The Jesuit weekly did indeed oppose the pro-

Other Catholic sources also came out against it,

but none more strongly than The Boston Pilot and The Brooklyn
Tablet.

The Boston paper supported Cardinal O'Connell's

opposition with editorials, pointing out that "it is the
solemn duty of [the Cardinal]

to safeguard these children

from any menace to their sacred and essential inheritance as
Americans and as Catholics."

The amendment under considera

tion was "another invasion into the private rights of the
individual."

The editor regretted the President's support

of the measure which so endangered parents'
their children.

39

rights over

The Brooklyn Tablet opposed the measure

for various reasons, one of which was the fear it "would
result in new Federal snooping and a million-dollar enforce-

3 fi
-^President Roosevelt to Hon. Herbert H. Lehman,
February 22, 1937, in Rosenman, Public Papers, VI, 92.
37

Rev. Wilfrid Parsons to Mrs. G. F. Zimand [n.d.],
copy in Ryan Papers, 1937.
3 8 America,

39

March 10, 1934, p. 535.

The Boston P i l o t , February 17, 1934, p. 4; January
23, 1937, p. 4; February 27, 1937, p. 6 .
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ment bureau with all the graft that went with national p r o 
hibition."

The editor felt the amendment was designed to

regiment adolescents and argued that boys fifteen and over
should be allowed to work if their family needed the addi
tional income .2*0

The official publication of the Knights of

Columbus also came out against the proposal because it meant
a further encroachment "upon local self-government."

The

Catholic Central Verein concurred in this judgment that the
measure would mean the Federal government would assume more
state power.

4.1

Against this formidable array of opposition was
pitted a group of influential Catholics determined to see
the amendment ratified.

As might be expected,

this group was Father John Ryan.

foremost in

His early support took the

form of letters addressed to members of state legislatures
where the amendment was being considered.

In this vein, on

November 3, 1933, he wrote to w. W. Burke, chairman of the
Missouri Child Labor Committee, who had requested the
priest's assistance in promoting the passage of the amendment

4 0The Brooklyn T a b l e t , February 24, 1934, p. 8 ;
December 1, 1934, p. 8 ; January 19, 1935, p. 8 .

4 ^Columbia, April, 1935, p. 12; The Boston Pilot,
February 17, 1934, p. 4.
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in that state.

Ryan was glad to write that he supported the

amendment and wished it were l a w .4 2
went to Victor A. Olander,

A similar statement

Secretary of the Illinois State

Federation of Labor, who was pushing ratification of the
amendment in his state .4 3

Ryan sent his endorsement to the

Illinois Legislature, as well as to those in Nebraska,
Massachusetts, and Indiana.

Idaho,

In many of his letters Ryan

liked to quote the late Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana,
who had said that the amendment was subjected to "selfish
and pernicious propaganda."

The priest felt that Catholics

had fallen prey to this propaganda and were misguided in
their opposition.

44

The fears that Congress would set the

minimum age for working at eighteen were, he believed,
unfounded.

Furthermore,

the amendment did not give Congress

any exhaustive power in education.

Indeed, the states

already had more power over children's education than did the

42Father Ryan to W. W. Burke, November 3, 1933, Ryan
Papers.
^ F a t h e r Ryan to Hon. James Boyle, June 14, 1933,
Ryan Papers.
44Francis Downing, "American Catholicism and the
Socio-economic Evolution in the United States," in Church
and Society;
Catholic Social and Political Thought and
Movements, 1789-1950, ed. Josephy N. Moody (New York, 1953),
p. 875.
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Federal government.

Why, asked Ryan, were the states so

much safer than the Federal government ? ^ 5

In all of his cor

respondence concerning the measure, Father Ryan was careful
to point out that the National Catholic Welfare Conference
had "taken no formal position either for or against the
Federal Child Labor Amendment," but that he personally sup
ported i t .^ 5
One group dedicated to the ratification of the con
stitutional amendment, and one attracted by Ryan's statement,
was the National Child Labor Committee.

The committee

secretary, Courtenay Dinwiddie, was very desirous of enlist
ing some prominent Catholics for his group,
outspoken opposition of some of the bishops.

in view of the
With this in

mind he wrote to Reverend Francis Haas asking him for a
public statement in favor of the amendment.

Haas replied

that he was "in complete accord with the stand of the NCLC"
and felt that some Catholic criticisms of the amendment were
"positively stupid."

He regretfully declined, however,

to

make a public statement in favor of the amendment because he

^ 5Father Ryan to Ethel Van Benthuysen, January 20,
1934, Ryan Papers.
46

Father Ryan to Cranston Brenton, August 23, 1935,
Ryan Papers.
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feared it might "affect my opportunity of service to the
National Labor Board.
Sometime later, Dinwiddie tried again.

He telephoned

to Father Ryan, suggesting that the priest organize a com
mittee of Catholics in favor of ratification.

After dis

cussing the matter with Father McGowan, who also favored the
amendment, Ryan replied that a committee was a good idea but
that it could not be connected with the NCWC or the Catholic
Conference on Industrial Problems.

Furthermore, he would

join but could only lend his name to the cause.

48

While Ryan was reluctant to sponsor such an organiza
tion, Frank P. Walsh, New York attorney, was not.

On

February 17, 1936, Walsh announced the formation of a Catholic
Committee for Ratification of the Child Labor Amendment.
Walsh made a public statement that he was "especially dis
tressed by the opposition on the part of many Catholics" to
the amendment.

This opposition was,

in Walsh's opinion,

"influential in blocking the ratification of the amendment in

^ R e v . Francis Haas to Courtenay Dinwiddie, February
12, 1934, Correspondence-general, 1934, Haas Papers.
^®Father Ryan to Courtenay Dinwiddie, November 5,
1935, Ryan Papers.
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certain of the state legislatures."

4.0

He went on to stress

that his committee felt the amendment was necessary for the
elimination of child labor in the United States.

He listed

as charter members such prominent Catholics as Father Ryan,
Father McGowan, Reverend J. W. R. Maguire, Professor Carlton
J. H. Hayes, Professor David A. McCabe, Grover Whalen, Rose
J. McHugh, Dorothy Day, and Theodore A. Thomas.50

Walsh

later added the name of Michael O 1Shaughnessy to his list of
supporters.

O 'Shaughnessy was convinced of the need for the

amendment by FDR's statement that child labor had increased
since the invalidation of NRA.

He wrote that "the present

evil over shadows the possible evil of congressional inter
ference with education to the detriment of religion."5^
Naturally the Walsh Committee came in for some
criticism from Catholic sources.

The Brooklyn Tablet

assailed both the leader and the cause for going against the
wishes of the hierarchy.

49

52

The Boston Pilot also felt that

Quoted in Commonweal, February 28, 1936, p. 495.

50New York T i m e s , February 16, 1936,

XI, 2.

51

Michael O 'Shaughnessy to Frank P. Walsh, January 4,
1937, Box 136, F. P. Walsh Papers.
The Walsh papers have
two big boxes dealing with the work of this committee.

5^New York Times, February 17, 1936, p. 19.
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Walsh's efforts were misguided and pointed out that ratifica
tion was not really a Catholic issue but touched all men who
did not want to surrender control over the education of their
children to Congress.5"*

S. A. Baldus, editor of Extension

magazine, criticized the Walsh group because they had failed
to consult proper ecclesiastical authority before dragging
the Church into politics.

This was "at least embarrassing

to the official representatives and spokesmen of the Church."
He felt that the group should not be supported by Catholics.

CA

This discussion of the debate on the child labor
amendment reveals a definite paradox in Catholic labor
thought during the first term of President Roosevelt.
During Roosevelt's first term, most Catholic spokesmen
argued for a wider role for labor under the NRA, and later
supported the benefits of the Wagner Labor Relations Act,
because they felt that freedom to join a union and collective
bargaining were both part of the Papal program.

At the same

time, however, elements of the hierarchy vigorously opposed
the ratification of the amendment.

While some Catholics

called for a more radical interpretation of NRA to permit

5^The Boston P i l o t , February 29, 1936, p. 4.
54

Extension. May,
Walsh Papers.

1936, clipping in Box 136, F. P.
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the growth of occupational groups, others opposed the child
labor amendment because it would mean a decrease in state
power.

How clergymen, who in 1933 could call for a strong

assertion of Federal power in combatting the depression,
could only a few months later work against the child labor
amendment because they feared that under its provisions this
same Federal government would bolshevize their children is a
paradox difficult to explain.
If American Catholic opinion on labor had its
ambiguous aspects, no such division was evident in its atti
tude toward social security.

The Wagner-Lewis or Social

Security Act, signed by President Roosevelt on August 15,
1935, was one of the most important relief measures fostered
during the New Deal.

As enacted,

the law created a coopera

tive Federal-State system of unemployment compensation.
levied a tax on employers,

It

and authorized grants to the

states to finance the administration of unemployment insur
ance.

It provided a tax for old-age and survivor's

insurance to be levied in equal amounts upon employers and
employees.

It further provided cash grants to states to

subsidize old-age pensions allowed under state laws and
■various other forms of relief to the destitute and infirm.
In connection with the administration of the new law,
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President Roosevelt addressed a personal letter to the
clergymen of America.

In this note of September 23, 1935,

he stressed that he was "particularly anxious that the new
social security legislation . . . shall be carried out in
keeping with the high purposes with which this law was
enacted."

He wanted the clergymen in America to write to

him about the conditions in their communities and suggest to
him how the government could help. 55
Catholic support for the new law was swiftly evident.
Harry Hopkins,

Federal Relief Administrator,

spoke in sup

port of the law to the members of the New York Catholic
Committee of the Laity.

He was followed to the platform by

Cardinal Hayes who also endorsed the measure.
said,

The Cardinal

"the security program of our President is .

. taking

into consideration the preservation

and conservation of

those principles of action so vital

to man's liberty and

man's happiness here on earth."

56

At the annual meeting of the

National Conference

of

Catholic Charities, Katherine F. Lenroot, Chief of the
Department of Labor's Children's Bureau, hailed the Social

'^Rosenman, Public Pa p e r s , IV, 370.
^ N C W C News Service, New York City, May 6, 1935.
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Security Act as an important step toward protecting the
family.

She further stated that the foundation for the act

could be found in both Pope Pius X I 's encyclical and the
statements of the American bishops.

The next speaker, Right

Reverend R. Marcellus Wagner, called for "a new deal in
social justice."

President Roosevelt honored the meeting

with a personal letter in which he stressed that the NCCC and
similar organizations were necessary "to complete the structure of our national security.

. . ."

57

Other leaders of Catholic welfare work joined in the
support of the social security measure.

Mary L. Gibbons,

a

director of the New York Catholic Charities Bureau, called
it only a first step but a good beginning.

She warned, h o w 

ever, against an optimism which might lead to the belief that
passage of the act would remove the necessity for a continu
ation of direct Federal relief.

After all,

she pointed out,

the Federal government only entered the field when it became
obvious that local resources were inadequate to meet the
needs of the depression.

eg

5^Quoted in New York T i m e s , September 30, 1935, p.
15; Catholic A c t i o n , November, 1935, p. 14.
5®Mary L. Gibbons, "The Future of Public Relief," NCCC
Proceedings, Peoria, Illinois, September 29-October 2, 1935,
p. 80.

199
At the Cincinnati meeting of the Catholic Conference
on Industrial Problems, Doctor Edwin E. Witte, ex-director
of the President's Committee on Economic Security, urged the
promotion of social insurance laws.

He made a point of

thanking Church leaders for their support of the social
security program.

After praising the encyclical of Pius XI,

Quadraqesimo A n n o , he called President Roosevelt's economic
program "a major step in achieving for Americans the ideals
of social justice set forth in that document."

CQ

At the 1936 meeting of the NCCC, a formal statement
was made on social security.

The executive committee, which

drew up the statement, endorsed the idea that the Federal
government was responsible for promoting social security.
The statement submitted to the conference, which was largely
the inspiration of Right Reverend John 0 'Grady, secretary,
accepted the government's role as protector of the individual
against injuries from a complex and depersonalized industrial
economy.^

At the same meeting, Right Reverend Thomas J.

O'Dwyer, ex-director of the Los Angeles Catholic Welfare
Bureau, pointed out that there was much room for expansion

59NCWC News Service, Cincinnati, March 25, 1935.
6C*The Boston P i l o t , May 23, 1936, p. 7.
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in the Roosevelt social security system.

It was, however,

"a very substantial beginning and is one of the most signifi
cant governmental actions in h i s t o r y . " ^
The 1935 convention of the National Conference of
Catholic Women also went on record as favoring the new social
security law.

A resolution was passed which called for

vigorous state action along the same lines to provide assist
ance for unemployment insurance and pensions for the aged.62
Many distinguished individual Catholics also threw
their support to the social security measure.
was whole-heartedly in favor of the measure.

Father Ryan
He called it a

great document which "brings the United States up to date
with Europe on the question of social insurance in one bold
stroke.'

63

As a matter of fact, Father Ryan played a part

in constructing the legislation.

He worked as a member of

Frank P. Graham's general advisory council on social
security.6^

Joining Ryan,

in support of the new law, was

6^NCCC Proceedings, Seattle, Washington, August 2-5,
1936, pp. 126-31.
62Catholic A c t i o n , December, 1935, p. 24. The annual
convention was held in Fort Wayne, Indiana, from November 17-

20 .
63Rev. John A. Ryan, "Social Justice in the 1935
Congress," Catholic A c t i o n , September, 1935, pp. 7-9.
In
this same article Ryan endorsed the Labor Disputes Act.
^ B r o d e r i c k , Ricrht Reverend, p. 219.

201
the influential Jesuit author, Reverend John LaFarge.

La-

Farge was "entirely in sympathy" with the measure and feared
that without it "we should be facing chaos."85
Significant elements of the Catholic press also gave
their endorsement to social security.

The Brooklyn Tablet

felt that the act pointed in the direction of the Papal
encyclicals was was a "major accomplishment."

66

The Boston

Pilot called the principles behind the bill "commendable."
The editor liked the idea of both State and Federal govern
ment sharing this responsibility.

His only criticism was

that the act did not provide enough funds for the aged and
unemployed.

67

The Denver Catholic Register supported the

new law and applauded the decision of the Supreme Court which
upheld its constitutionality.

The editor felt that the law

was "in accord with the spirit of Quadraqesimo Anno of Pope
Pius XI."

68

The two influential Catholic periodicals,

Commonweal and A m e r i c a , were not as headlong in their endorse
ment as was the editor of the Denver Catholic Register.

The

Quoted in New York T i m e s , September 26, 1935, p. 2.
88August 24, 1935, p. 10, but one year later, July 18,
1936, the same editor felt the bill had been "poorly drawn."
^ A p r i l 27, 1934, p. 4; January 26, 1935, p. 4.

68June 6, 1937, p. 4.

editors of Commonweal felt that almost everyone was in
sympathy with the aims of the measure but,
torial,

in the same edi

lamented that inefficient government pump-priming

was leading the President n o w h e r e . ^

The editor of the

Jesuit weekly was also behind the aims of the bill, but
remarked that "social insurance is not a goal itself but
only the indication of a deeper evil in our society."

He

also felt that the law would have a difficult time passing
the test of constitutionality.

"From the standpoint of

constitutional law," he remarked,

"the . . . act seems to be

an example of doing the right thing in a wrong way."

70

^ D e c e m b e r 13, 1935, p. 171.

^ A m e r i c a , March 30, 1935, p. 582; August 31, 1935,
p. 482.

CHAPTER XX

RECOGNITION OP RUSSIA

During Roosevelt's first term in office,

foreign

affairs took a back seat to the more pressing domestic
economic problems.

When Catholics took any interest in

the foreign policy of this period,

they were generally in

complete harmony with the feelings of the majority of their
fellow citizens.

Most Americans were primarily interested

in keeping the United States out of European affairs and
neutral in any international quarrel.^

The Catholic

attitude was just as disinterested with two notable excep
tions.

The first dealt with the question of the United

States recognizing the Soviet Union.

The second concerned

our diplomatic dealings with Mexico during a period of anti
clericalism there.

Because these two questions produced

some uniquely Catholic reactions,

they must be examined in

some detail.

^Burns, Roosevelt, pp. 247-49; see also Robert A.
Devine, The Illusions of Neutrality (University of Chicago,
1962), pp. 57-81.
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Catholic opinion seemed to be divided on the merits
of Roosevelt's decision to follow a policy of economic
nationalism.

Those individuals who represented Catholic

thought at its most parochial level, the editors of Catholic
diocesan newspapers, generally applauded the decision in
terms reminiscent of the Populists.

Other Catholics, who

dealt in a wider arena of thought, were not enthusiastic
about economic nationalism.
When Roosevelt seemed to repudiate the efforts of the
London Conference by his message of July 1, 1933, the
managing editor of The Brooklyn Tablet applauded the decision.
He felt this demonstrated that the United States was no
longer going to permit "international bankers” to run her
economy.

This meant we were going to worry about our own

problems rather than those of Europe.4

In San Francisco the

local editor called FDR's move toward economic nationalism
''decidedly sane," for "it places the President in line with
DeValera and Mussolini in taking care of his own country
first and freeing it from the control of the Bank of England
and the fiscal agents of that bank in the United States."^

4July 8, 1933, p. 9.
^The Monitor, October 28, 1933, p. 1.

Samuel A. Baldus, editor of Extension magazine had already
criticized Secretary of State Hull's international views as
representing "a santa claus complex."

Baldus rejected the

idea of pushing international trade and wanted the United
States to stop being concerned with the problems of the
entire world.®
Even Father John Ryan, who usually took a more cosmo
politan approach to economics,
nationalism.

seemed to favor economic

Speaking at the annual conference of the

Catholic Association for International Peace, he seemed to
give praise to the isolationists by stressing the reasons
why the United States should give priority to internal
economic self-sufficiency over the expansion of foreign commerce.

7

Later Ryan clarified his position by pointing out

that this did not mean the United States should practice
economic isolation.

He wrote a friend that the "buy America

idea "is about the silliest that has been exploited in the
United States in a good many ye a r s ."
part,

Any such move on our

felt Ryan, could only be expected to kill American

export trade because foreign nations would quickly retaliate

6Extension, XXVII
7

(May, 1933), 19.

Catholic Action, May, 1934, p. 15.
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Excessive imports had little to do with causing the depression, according to Ryan.

Q

A general report issued by the Catholic Association
for International Peace in 1934, prepared by Father Ryan,
Doctor Parker T. Moon, and Father McGowan,
of our trade policies.

took a broad view

The report stressed that tariffs

should be reduced because they were both morally and econom
ically wrong.

Furthermore,

recovery could be achieved,
be settled.

the report went on, before any
the question of war debts should

While at one time such debts were just, they no

longer obliged the debtee to pay, because of the emergency
of the depression.

Q

At the same time, Father McGowan went on record as
favoring international economic cooperation.

He warned that

the failure of the United States to take part in a world-wide
effort to solve the depression could only prolong it.*^
While McGowan and others might call for international
cooperation for economic reasons,

it became readily apparent

that this spirit of internationalism did not extend,

in

®Rev. John A. Ryan to G. M. Breen, March 13, 1933,
Ryan Papers.
^The Catholic H e r a l d , February 8, 1934, p. 1.

^ T h e Catholic Transcript, November 30, 1933, p. 1.
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Catholic opinion, to our dealings with the Soviet Union.
Woodrow Wilson had severed diplomatic dealings with Russia
after the overthrow of the Kerensky provisional government
in 1917.

The Republicans who followed Wilson in power during

the Twenties looked askance at R u s s i a 1s attempts to con
fiscate all private property, her repudiation of inter
national debts, and her emphasis on world revolution.
Although the Soviet Union sought on a number of occasions to
discuss the points of dispute with the United States,

com

munist propaganda in the form of diatribes on the evils of
capitalism did not help to promote understanding between the
two countries.1^"
During the 1932 presidential campaign,

the question

of Russian recognition was hardly the most topical one.
it did arise.

Yet

In an interview published in the October

issue of Soviet Russia T o d a y , Roosevelt was asked his
position on the question of recognition.
adroit but noninformative.

His answer was

He pleaded that domestic affairs

were so pressing that he had taken little time to inform him
self in this matter.

Actually there is evidence to indicate

that Roosevelt did oppose the current nonrecognition policy

■^Robert Browder, The Origins of Soviet-American
Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey, 1953), pp. 18, 22.
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as being a mere "futile gesture.'

12

But there was little

political sense in pushing a topic which could only alienate
some Catholic voters and really did not relate to the major
issue of 1932— the economic crisis. J
Roosevelt's equivocation, however,

failed to satisfy

the Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice-president of Georgetown
University and a leading Catholic authority on Communism.
Father Walsh, who opposed recognition, demanded that Roose
velt make his position as clear as Hoover had, when the
latter stated that he would continue the policy of non
recognition.

The excuse of being uninformed on the subject

was hardly adequate to Walsh who warned,

in an address to the

New York Civic Federation, that Russia desperately needed
United States recognition because of her floundering
economy. 14
After Roosevelt's victory in November, however,

it

became increasingly clear that the administration was
seriously contemplating a revision in American policy toward

^ T r a v i s Jacobs, "America Recognizes Russia:
A
Conspiracy?" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University,
1960), p. 70.
13I b i d ., p. 71.

3^New York Times, October 15, 1932, p. 9.
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the Soviet Union.

There were various rumors as to why Roose

velt should sponsor recognition.

Some commentators pointed

out that the United States could hardly assume world leader
ship— a position which seemed to be thrust upon her by the
world-wide depression— and ignore the existence, of Soviet
Russia.

15

Others speculated that the recognition would be

only a part of a new foreign policy aimed at curtailing the
power of Germany in Europe and halting the Manchurian pene
tration of the Japanese.

Even more popular was the theory,

held by A1 Smith and William Borah, that Russian trade would
help lift the United States out of the depression.

Finally

there was the belief that recognition would do much to help
restore international good w i l l . ^
Yet members of Roosevelt's official family were by no
means united on the question.

In the Cabinet, Secretary of

State Cordell Hull, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace,
and Postmaster General James Farley opposed recognition.
Hull's reasons for opposition are not clear.

According to

Henry Morgenthau, Hull wanted the Russians to permit religious
freedom for American nationals, but also believed that

^^NCWC News Service, May 22, 1933.
•^Ibid. , January 9, 1933; Jacobs,
pp. 81, 83.
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recognition would only antagonize large elements of Catholic
Democrats because of the anti-Christian attitude of M o s c o w . ^
Yet other factors entered into Hull's decision.

He was also

concerned with the communist repudiation of the Tsarist debt
and the subversive activities of the Third International.
Wallace opposed recognition because of the harsh policies of
collectivization then being practiced under Stalin.

He

expressed his opposition to both Hull and Roosevelt. 18
Farley, on the other hand, agreed with Hull and disliked the
anti-Christian tendencies of the Bolsheviks.

He was

skeptical of any promise by the Russians of religious free
dom, and tried to convey this skepticism to Roosevelt, but
without success. 19
This internal opposition was not all that Roosevelt
had to cope with on the recognition question.

The Catholic

Church had been expressing vigorous opposition to communism
and Russia long before the 1932 campaign.

Recognizing the

militant atheism of the Russian leaders as a direct assault

l^John M. Blum, e d . , From the Morgenthau Diaries:
Years of Crisis, 1928-1938 (New York, 1959), p. 56.
18Wallace, letter to author, South Salem, New York,
January 23, 1964.

l^Farley, interview with author, March 20, 1965.
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on the very foundations of the Church, priests and laymen
united in resisting the advance of bolshevism.

This opposi

tion was directed primarily at the philosophical basis of
communism, but as the Russian state practiced a vigorous
anti-Christian campaign the antagonism naturally shifted to
the existential exponents of the philosophy, namely, Soviet
leaders and their government.
The rumors that President Roosevelt was planning to
recognize Russia soon after taking office produced a signif
icant reaction from American Catholic spokesmen.

The

Catholic press was virtually unanimous in its opposition to
such a move.

The Brooklyn Tablet started campaigning against

recognition as early as December, 1932, and carried on right
up to November 16, 1933, when official recognition was
extended.

In 1932, the editor expressed shock that Roosevelt

was even considering such a course and pointed out that
recognition would be approving "the godless policy" of
Russia.^®

A few months later the paper printed front-page

headlines calling for Catholics to awaken to the insidious
campaign afoot to promote recognition.

The writer, warned

the administration that such recognition would be looked

2QThe Brooklyn Tablet. December 10, 1932, p. 10.
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upon as treason by twenty million Catholics.2-*- A few months
later, after Roosevelt sold some surplus cotton to Russia,
the managing editor warned that "dealing with Russia . . .
is a blunder materially, morally,

and patriotically."22

In New England, The Boston Pilot kept up a continuous
barrage against any proposal to deal with the Soviets.
Attacking the argument that recognition would be good for
trade,

the editor reminded his readers that England had not

experienced any increased trade after extending recognition.
Furthermore,

commerce should be secondary when discussing a

nation which not only denied every human right but also persecuted religion.

23

As for the propriety of Catholics

sponsoring mass rallies to oppose recognition,

this editor

could only say that "the honor of every human being in our
Republic is at stake in the settlement of this issue."

24

Many other Catholic diocesan papers also came out
against any dealings with Russia.

The San Francisco Monitor

compared the American offer of friendship to Russia to a man

2-*-I b i d . , March 25, 1933, p. 1.
22Ibid., July 8, 1933, p. 9.
23The Boston P i l o t , March 4, 1933, p. 4.
24Ibid., May 27, 1933, p. 4.
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that "has clasped to his bosom a viper more deadly than
death."25

The Catholic Telegraph of Cincinnati, Ohio,

admitted Roosevelt's "sincerity and honesty of purpose," but
said that "only insatiable greed" could prompt such a mistaken course as Russian recognition.

2 f.

The Catholic Herald

of Milwaukee was against any dealings with Russia.

The

editor insisted that the Russian attempt to destroy democracy
should be the main consideration in this debate, and not
trade advantages.

27

In Chicago, The New W o r l d , which was

usually liberal, insisted that the United States would lose
face by dealing with Russia and gain nothing in the way of
commerce.

28

The Catholic Messenger of Davenport,

Iowa,

argued that recognition of Russia would only stimulate com
munist agents in the United States to greater acts of
subversion.

The editor warned that Roosevelt, by treating

with the Soviets, might lose all the good will he had gained.
Before even sitting down with the Russians,

said this editor,

Roosevelt should insist upon recognition of the Tsarist debt

^ A u g u s t 12, 1933, p. 8; this editorial view was
endorsed by The Western Catholic.
26August 3, 1933, p. 4; November 2, 1933, p. 4.
2^The Catholic H e r a l d , May 11, 1933, p. 4.

2®April 21, 1933, p. 4.
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and an end to subversion by the current masters of Russia.^9
The hatred of religion exhibited by the Soviet leaders was
the main factor in turning the editor of the Denver Catholic
Register against attempted negotiations.

He insisted that

"many will ask whether the price we must pay by closing our
eyes to moral filth is not too great."
Catholic periodicals joined the diocesan papers in
their campaign against dealing with Russia.

The Central-

Blatt and Social Justice magazine felt that recognition would
only strengthen a monster and push forward "the day when the
resurrected hordes of Jengis Khan will put an end to European
. . .
31
civilization."

Commonweal attacked the ideas that recog

nition would mean more trade with Russia, and that she was
an honest customer.

Russia's presumed repudiation of inter

national law, her opposition to religious freedom, and her
ignorance of basic human rights, were in this magazine's
eyes enough cause for refusing recognition.

32

The Jesuit

^ O c t o b e r 5, 1933, p. 2; June 8, 1933, p. 2.
3®October 29, 1933, p. 4; The Michigan Catholic and
Our Sunday Visitor of Huntington, Indiana, were other
Catholic papers opposed to recognition.
3^Central-Blatt and Social Justice, XXVI
1933), 11.

(April,

32April 12, 1933, pp. 647-46; August 4, 1933, p. 337.
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journal, America, was also against recognition,

chiefly

because of Russian persecution of the c h u r c h . ^

Columbia,

the official journal of the Knights of Columbus,

insisted

that the Russian government "does not merit the recognition
of any civilized people."

The question of trade benefits

could not possibly make up for the loss of national honor
which would follow our dealing with "such atheists."^4

In

The Sign, a national Catholic magazine. Reverend Harold
Purcell, editor, published articles condemning the recogni
tion of Russia.

Purcell wrote "in the hopes of doing the

little within our power to give a true picture of Soviet
Russia and do what we can to prevent our Christian Government
from entering into diplomatic or trade relations with the
anti-Christ and anti-God Bolsheviks."

35

The opposition of the Catholic press was augmented by
the efforts of various distinguished individual Catholics
and by religious organizations.

Prominent Catholics who

expressed public opposition to the idea of the United States
dealing with Russia included Father Charles Coughlin, Father

"^November 4, 1933, p. 97.
34January, 1933, p. 17; April, 1933, p. 11.
3^Quoted in NCWC News Service, March 31, 1933.
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John LaFarge, Father James Gillis, Father Jones I. Corrigan,
professor at Boston College, and Bishop Joseph Schrembs of
Cleveland.

But undoubtedly the most vigorous voice in oppo

sition belonged to Father Edmund A. Walsh, vice-president of
Georgetown University.

36

A number of Catholic organizations also came out
publicly against any change in relations with the Soviet
Union.

The National Council of Catholic Men passed a resolu

tion stressing the fact that a nation which denied the
existence of God could hardly be expected to abide by an
international agreement.37

In Detroit, two hundred repre

sentatives from the Holy Name Societies of the city started
a campaign to oppose recognition on the grounds that the
Soviets were opposed to both democracy and religion.
Long Island Chapter of the Knights of Columbus,

38

The

stressing

the fact that religious persecution was going on in Russia,
denounced any dealings with that nation.

This group also

36

Rev. John LaFarge, "Shall We Recognize Russia,"
Am erica, February 18, 1933, pp. 472-73; The Brooklyn T a b l e t ,
February 25, 1933, p. 3; May 20, 1933, p. 1; Jacobs, "America
Recognizes," p. 16; Commonweal, November 10, 1933, p. 29.
37The Catholic World, CXXXVIII

{December, 1933), 357.

3^The Michigan Catholic. May 18, 1933, p. 1; also
NCWC News Service. Detroit, February 11, 1933.
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pointed to the communist attempt to spread world revolution
as another factor which should prevent us from dealing with
them.

39

In Massachusetts a petition against recognition

gained over 600,000 signatures and was presented to the Roose
velt administration by Senators David Walsh and Marcus A.
Coolidge.

The petition seems to have attracted little notice

in the press, however, and there is every indication that it
did not reach President Roosevelt.^®

From Vatican City came

unofficial comments expressing hope that recognition of
Russia by the United States could be prevented.

41

Not all Catholics, however, were so certain that the
United States should ignore the Soviet Union.

The Catholic

Association for International Peace, during its annual con
vention in 1933, attempted to draw up a comprehensive report
on Russia, but was unable to make much headway because of
the varied opinions represented in the organization.

^ The Brooklyn T a b l e t , April 1, 1933, p. 1.
^^When queried on it, Steve Early wrote that it
probably went to the State Department and that he had not
shown it to FDR.
Steve Early to Mrs. J. C. Gray, August 2,
1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
^ C l i p p i n g of Washington P o s t . October 22, 1933, in
Russia, 1933, Box 18, Papers of R. Walton Moore at Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, New York.

2X9
Nevertheless, a tentative report was drawn up which embodied
all of the different views expressed at the convention.

One

statement said that Russia was so important from an economic,
political, cultural, and religious standpoint that "if it is
at all possible to deal with her, such should be undertaken."
Another comment was that Russia's communistic system made
her a threat to world peace and impossible to deal with;
thus, rather than recognition, action short of war should be
taken to assist the Russian people in overthrowing the
Bolsheviks.

Finally, one group proposed that after recogni

tion the United States should undertake by propaganda and
diplomatic action to secure a change in the Russian attitude
toward religion.

This preliminary report, which revealed

both an awareness of the complexity of the problem of recog
nition and a divided mind on the solution, was signed by
Father McGowan and other prominent p r e l a t e s . ^
Elsewhere Catholics were shocked to read that A1 Smith
had advocated recognition of Russia in an appearance before
the Senate Finance Committee.

Smith expressed the opinion

that he did not know "any reason for not doing it."

He

pointed out that, although the Tsars owed us money, we had

^ R e p o r t of Catholic Association for International
Peace, Washington, D. C . , in Box 88, F. P. Walsh Papers.
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kept troops in Russia while technically at peace with her
and that this occupation had caused some damage.

More

importantly, Smith stressed the fact that we already had
clandestine trade with Russia, so why not bring it out in
the open?

He did not personally like the Soviet system, but

felt that communism was no threat to the United States.4 ^
These comments by Smith were enough to cause the Jesuit
weekly America to wonder if there was not "a dent in the
brown derby.1,44
Another prominent Catholic layman who supported the
idea of recognition was Frank P. Walsh of New York City.
Walsh received a letter from Albert Coyle in which the latter
sought assistance in his campaign to become American ambas
sador to Russia.

Coyle pointed out to Walsh that "your
i

office should logically get a very substantial amount of the
legal business that is certain to follow recognition of the
Soviet Union."

45

While this does not mean that Walsh was

motivated by material gains, it is true that he favored

4 ^Paul Boiler, Jr., "The Great Conspiracy of 1933,"
Southwest Review, XXXIX (1954), 99.
44America, March 11, 1933, p. 543.
4 ^Albert Coyle to F. P. Walsh, November 9, 1933, Box
8 8 , F. P. Walsh Papers.
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recognition.

When Roosevelt finally did establish relations^

with Russia, he received a telegram from Walsh assuring him
that the deed would receive "a high place in the record of
your splendid achievements."^6
Smith and Walsh, however, represented a distinct
minority in Catholic opinion.

Most Catholics agreed with

Father Gillis, Father Walsh, and others, who vigorously
opposed recognition.

There was some optimism generated in

group during 1933 that Roosevelt would back off from recogi

nizing Russia.

In his invitation to an international confer

ence in Washington during April to discuss the world-wide
depression, the President ignored the Soviet Union— a fact
looked upon by some as a sign that all plans of recognition
had been shelved.

Roosevelt's remarks to the National

Conference of Catholic Charities in early October promoted a
similar conclusion.

At the conference, Roosevelt had made

the remark that a nation could not ignore God and survive.
This was interpreted as a direct slap at the Soviet Union.
Yet other Catholics realized that recognition of the Russian
government really had little to do with the President1s

^ M r . and Mrs. F. P. Walsh to President Roosevelt,
telegram, November 18, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia
miscellaneous. Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.

222
feeling on communism.

It was reported that the whole question

"is being weighed as a practical one."

Neither approval nor

disapproval of the regime was associated with diplomatic
recognition, which merely indicated "a working arrangement
with a de facto authority which will facilitate commercial
intercourse.

47

In October, however,

Roosevelt took a step which dis

pelled much of the false optimism occasioned in Catholic
circles by his speech to the NCCC.

On October 10, 1933, the

President made public a letter which he had addressed to
Mikhail Kalinin, President of Russia.

In the letter Roose

velt requested that the Soviet Government send a representa
tive to the United States to discuss all outstanding
differences between the two countries in hopes of settling
them.

In response to this invitation, Maxim Litvinov, Com

missar for Foreign Affairs,

left Russia for the United States.

With this development, many Catholics turned to
Reverend Edmund Walsh for advice.
foremost critic of recognition.

Walsh was the first and
Right after the 1932

election, Walsh addressed a Women's Club of Holyoke, Massa
chusetts, on the eternal conflict between the Russian and the

4 ^NCWC News Service, April 10, 1933 and "Washington
Letter" of October 9, 1933.
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American view of life.

Its dedication to world revolution

was the one thing that made Russia unique and made dealing
with it different from dealing with any other nation.48
few days later,

A

in Brockton, Massachusetts, Walsh continued

his campaign against Russia, but said hopefully,

"I doubt

very much that a Democratic administration will repudiate a
national policy initiated by Woodrow Wilson and continued by
three Republican administrations."

49

As rumors of impending recognition grew stronger in
1933, Walsh increased the pace of his campaign.

He saw

R u s s i a 's withdrawal from the League of Nations as a diplo
matic move to promote United States recognition in exchange
for Soviet pressure against Germany and J a p a n . I n

reply to

Smith's statement favoring recognition, Walsh asserted that
the New Yorker was really missing the main point of the dis
pute.

The questions of trade and repudiation of debts were

really secondary to the fact that the two civilizations were
"diametrically opposed in their principles,

their practices,

48The Boston P i l o t , November 19, 1932, p. 5.
49Quoted in The Brooklyn T a b l e t , November 26, 1932,

p. 6.
58The Brooklyn Tablet, March 18, 1933, p. 1.
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and their objectives.

. . . "51

Commonweal added that Father

Walsh was opposed to recognition primarily because "he is
bitterly and justly opposed to the war upon religion,

to the

suppression of fundamental rights of the Christian conscience,
wnich prevails there.
Walsh himself presented the most detailed statement
of his argument against recognition before a mass meeting
held in Washington on April 18, J.933, and attended by repre
sentatives from the AFL, the American Legion, and other
groups opposed to dealing

with the Soviet Union.

Once again

the priest stressed the ideological aspects of the problem.
His basic premise was that Russia was trying to destroy
democracy via the Third International.

Furthermore, the com

munist ethic recognized no legal or moral law.

Also the

Bolsheviks could not even lay claim to complete sovereignty
of Russian territory because of daily revolts by her enslaved
people.

Walsh concluded that only by abandoning the Third

International and the aim of world revolution could Russia
demonstrate a sincere desire to live in the community of
nations.

Strangely, Walsh made no mention in his speech of

S^The Boston Pilot, April 29, 1933, p, 12.
^ Commonweal, May 5, 1933, p. 4.
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Russia's persecution of the Church or of tne militant
atheism of the Communist Party.

53

While Father Walsh was the most persistent opponent
of recognition, he had valuable support from other sources.
The Most Reverend Joseph Schrembs, Bishop of Cleveland, and
Episcopal Chairman of the Department of Lay Organization of
the NCWC, gave a public interview on October 23, 1933.

In

his statement the Bishop expressed the hope that the adminis
tration would demand that "Russia promise liberty of con
science and of religious worship to its citizens and that it
cease from its active communistic propaganda" as a prerequiC

site of recognition.

A

In Rome, Bishop Michele d'Herbigny,

President of the Pontifical Commission for Russia at the
Vatican, called on President Roosevelt to demand religious
liberty as a requirement for United States recognition of
Russia.^

Other sources indicate that even the Pope wished

Roosevelt would use recognition as a leverage to get some

53

Copy of address by Rev. Edmund Walsh in Congres
sional R e c o r d , 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., in Official File
220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers;
Browder, O r i g i n s , p. 39.
^ N C W C News Service, Cleveland, October 23, 1933.

55Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 13.
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guarantee of religious freedom from Russia.56
Behind the scenes it appears that President Roosevelt
was noting this Catholic opposition and talcing steps to
ameliorate it.

On the same day that he sent his letter to

President Kalinin inviting discussion of the outstanding
differences between the two countries, Roosevelt met with
Father Walsh to discuss the whole question at the White
House.

Walsh was later convinced that recognition was

already a fait accompli, and that Roosevelt suggested the
talk simply to find out the priest's reaction.

Walsh later

stated that the President seemed to have a rather cavalier
attitude toward the issue.

"In reply," said Walsh,

. . . to certain observations I had made respecting
the difficulty of negotiating with the Soviets, he
answered with that disarming assurance so character
istic of his technique in dealing with visitors,
"Leave it to me, Father; I am a good horse dealer."
Perhaps to impress Walsh with the importance he attached to
religious freedom, the President asked him to prepare a report
on the state of religion in Russia which could be used when
serious discussions were undertaken.5^

Despite Walsh's

later misgivings, it appears that he was convinced enough of

66Gannon, Cardinal Spellman Story, p. 98.
67Rev. Louis J. Gallagher, S.J., Edmund A. Walsh, S . J . ,
A Biography (New York, 1962), p. 93.
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Roosevelt's sincerity to promise not to make any public
statements which "would embarrass" the President in his
talks with the Russians.

This was a rather substantial con

cession for a man who had taken such a public stand against
co

recognition.
Indeed, other sources exist which seem to indicate
that Roosevelt had succeeded in converting Walsh into an
ally after their talk of October 10.

On October 15, 1933,

Walter G. Hooke of New York City wrote to Marvin McIntyre
that Father Walsh had authorized him to say "that he
was prepared to place the AFL, the American Legion,

[Walsh]
the

Bishop Freeman Committee (Protestants), and the Catholics
squarely behind the administration's program for Russia,
solely on economic grounds, and with reasonable protection
of our own interest."

Admitting that this was an exaggerated

view of Walsh's influence,

it still represents a rather

startling new position for the priest.

In the same letter,

Hooke requested that McIntyre arrange a conference for Walsh
with the President because the priest was "anxious to
furnish certain information."^9

^®Jacobs,

"America Recognizes," p. 89.

^9Walter G. Hooke to Marvin McIntyre, October 15,
1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
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After the meeting, which occurred on Friday, October
20, 1933, Walsh wrote to McIntyre to thank him for arranging
it.

The priest also said that he was "preparing the memo"

requested by the President.

He enclosed a copy of a press

release he had made on October 21, "which I trust," he said,
"will contribute something to the tranquility of mind needed
for the forthcoming negotiations."

The priest also mentioned

that he had canceled a scheduled lecture in Providence, Rhode
Island, on Russia and was substituting one of capitalism
instead.60
The October 21 press release that Walsh referred to
is a revealing document.

In it the priest declared that

President Roosevelt should not be restricted in his dealings
with Russian diplomats by public debate among American
citizens.

"The President," said Walsh,

"should not be ham

pered, or annoyed, or embarrassed, as he undertakes to fulfill
his constitutional duty and exercise his constitutional pre
rogative in the conduct of our international relations."
This seemed a rather remarkable statement for someone who had
engaged in vigorous public debate on the question of

60Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., to Marvin McIntyre.,
October 21, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
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recognition for almost twelve months.

Now when the issue

reached its most critical stage, Walsh called for silence.
Elsewhere in the statement, Walsh said he was not convinced
that the President's letter to Kalinin insured that recog
nition would take place.

According to the priest, FDR

simply wanted to discuss the outstanding problems between
the two countries.

Walsh said that if these difficulties

could be resolved, he would be first to support recognition.
He promised to refrain from making public comments until the
conference between Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov was over.6 ^
How can this remarkable turnabout in Walsh's outlook
be explained?

It should be recalled that Walsh had con

stantly attacked the inherent conflict between the Russian
or communist philosophy of life and American democracy.
Another subject of his attack was the subversion practiced
by the Third International.62

He had given little discussion

to the question of religious freedom in Russia or to the
persecution of the Church.

Instead, he had concentrated on

the conflict of systems of government and philosophy.

How he

61New York T i m e s , October 22, 1933, p. 25; this press
release seems to contradict Gallagher's observation that
Walsh already accepted recognition as an accomplished fact.
62Jacobs,

"America Recognizes," p. 89.
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expected a conference of diplomats to resolve this conflict
is difficult to understand.

Probably he did not expect any

resolution to the problems he had raised in his speeches,
but now realized that, in Walter Hooke's words,

"the Presi-

dent has the cards in his hands and he knows it."
It seems clear, however,

that the President had con

vinced Walsh that his best course of action,

if he really

wanted to assist his country in the forthcoming negotiations,
would be to submit a private memorandum specifying in detail
the particular grievances of the Church against Russia and
citing cases and individual names.

This would be worth more

than public speeches filled with bitter generalities which
could only weaken Roosevelt's hand in his talks with the
Russians.
Before Walsh could present his memorandum, however,
there were other developments.

The priest had called Marvin

McIntyre on October 30 and promised delivery of his memo on
the following day.

At the same time, he requested another

private conference with President Roosevelt.
words,

In McIntyre's

"certain embarrassing complications had come up" and

Walsh felt that "we were going to run into opposition but

^ H o o k e to McIntyre, October 15, 1933, Official Pile
220-A, Russia, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
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that it could be straightened out."^4

What complications he

referred to were not stated, but it should be noted that
Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland had recently made a
public statement in which he listed certain demands which
the United States should make as a prerequisite to recogni
tion of Russia.
Bishop's demands.

Naturally, religious freedom was one of the
Furthermore, the Catholic press had not

ceased discussing the question.

Reverend Wilfrid Parsons,

S.J., editor of America, wrote an "Open Letter to M. LitiviCC

nov," in which he stressed the point of religious liberty.
The memorandum that Walsh finally sent to President
Roosevelt, on October 31, discussed the entire question of
religious liberty in Russia.

The priest began by asserting

that "the attitude of the Soviet Government toward Religion
is entirely different from any other government in the
world."

To prove this thesis, he used illustrations from

the pages of history and concluded by saying:
. . . Communism, which is the political, social and
economic force controlling the Soviet Government,
undertaken to abolish religion itself, the "God idea,"
in its every form and manifestation.

Marvin McIntyre to President Roosevelt, confidential
memo, October 30, 1933, Official File 220, Russia, Box 1,
Roosevelt Papers.

^ America, November 4, 1933, p. 107.
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Walsh then went on to sketch the history of religion under
the Communist party in Russia.

Atheism was,

said Walsh, an

integral part of a movement both international in design and
militant in attitude.

This being the case,

. . . the anti-religious content of Soviet foreign
policy, inasmuch as it visualizes the entire world,
is as inadmissible by other foreign states as is
the Third International.
One is directed against
our political sovereignty, the other against our
religious institutions.
Both are sponsored by the
Soviet Government, no matter what the evasions or
pretexts may be.
Once having said this, Walsh went on to make clear that he
did not favor extending diplomatic recognition to Russia.
If, however, recognition were extended, he hoped that the
following objectives might be supported by the United States:
1. Complete liberty of conscience for all,
whether citizens of Russia or nationals of a
foreign jurisdiction residing on Soviet territory,
be they Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, Jews or
Mussulmans.
2. Private and public exercise of their religious
beliefs for all by such external forms as appertain
to their respective worship without discrimination
arising from adherence to such religious beliefs.
3. Release of prisoners— Bishops, priests, other
ministers of religion, and laymen— now in confine
ment under charges connected with religion.
Walsh admitted that "conventional guarantees custom
arily alleged are useless and sterile."

This made it even

more imperative that Roosevelt take a strong stand, because
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the United States was "the last government in a position to
effectively implement such guarantees."

This could be done

"by requiring appropriate and explicit clauses to be inserted
in any proposed agreement— and published before recognition
or at least simultaneously."

Walsh insisted that "the unusual

circumstances and the extraordinary importance of the issue
justify unusual and extraordinary measures."

Certainly the

priest realized that if the United States did recognize the
Soviet Government without the aforementioned guarantees, such
action could not be interpreted as meaning that Roosevelt or
his administration favored the religious policies of the
communists.
without

Nevertheless, he insisted that "recognition

[such guarantees] would have the practical effect of

helping to perpetuate conditions that are a matter of public
record."

Although pessimistic, Walsh could only hope that

Russia might "now be prepared to do something concrete in
amelioration of religious persecution in order to secure what
they most need from the United States."

66

A few days later, Walsh sent in a supplement to his
original document.

In this letter, dated November 7, the

^ E d m u n d A. Walsh, "Memorandum on Religion in Soviet
Russia," presented to President Roosevelt, October 31, 1933,
Washington, D. C.
Copy in author's possession.
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priest pointed out that in several conferences he had with
ex-Senator S. W. Brookhart of Iowa on Soviet recognition, a
certain Boris Skvirsky,

the unofficial Soviet representative

in the United States, had entered into the talks and had
relayed their substance to Moscow.

According to Walsh,

Moscow's reply was "Let Walsh specify who is in prison on
account of religion and where.
tion."

We will consider his proposi

Father Walsh suggested to Roosevelt that this answer

was "valuable as indicating at least a tendency on the part
of the Soviets to listen to the recommendations outlined in
the memorandum,— and which we all devoutly hope you can per
suade Mr. Litvinov to accept."

Walsh also included for

Roosevelt copies of editorials from Commonweal and Am e r i c a .
He described the views expressed therein as representing the
feelings of the majority of American Catholics and what he
himself would have said

"had I not deemed it more helpful

to rest our case on the arguments submitted in my private
memorandum of Oct 31st."6^
What most Catholics would demand as preconditions for
any dealings with the Soviet Union is not surprising.

®^Rev. Edmund A. Walsh to President Roosevelt,
November 4, 1933, Official File 220-A, Russia miscellaneous,
1933, Box 4, Roosevelt Papers.
The editorials will be
discussed below.

Certainly a cessation of religious persecution was high on
the list of priorities.

Other sources spelled out the pre

conditions in more detail.

The Vatican,

it seems, had asked

Cardinal Hayes of New York to represent to Roosevelt its
desires that he raise the question of religious persecution
in his forthcoming talks with Litvinov.

Cardinal Hayes sent

Monsignor Robert F. Keegan to the White House to transmit
this desire on the part of the Catholic Church.

On November

1, Keegan presented to President Roosevelt a memorandum on
four topics:

freedom of conscience for Russians and

foreigners? freedom of worship, public and private;

libera

tion of those imprisoned for their faith; and cessation of
propaganda against God.

fift

Keegan must have been very eloquent in his presenta
tion,

for on November 2, Cardinal Hayes wrote a confidential

note saying:

"The President conferred with the Monsignor

for more than one hour . . . and substantially [accepted]
the points of the memorandum."
During this same period, Bishop Francis Spellman of
Boston also got into the act.

He received a letter from

6 8 Gannon, Cardinal Spellman, p. 425, fn. 2, who cites
the Spellman Papers, a source open only to a select few.

69Ibid.
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Count Enrico Galeazzi which told of the Pope's desire to
have the President insist upon religious freedom as a pre
requisite for recognition of Russia.

After recognition was

extended to Russia, Bishop Spellman wrote in his diary,
"Jack Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear
in history, did much to get President Roosevelt to insist
that American citizens at least should worship God as they
wished in Russia."7®

Count Enrico Galeazzi was the official

Vatican architect and Pius X I I ■s "closest lay adviser."
According to Reverend Robert I. Gannon, Galeazzi and John C.
Kelly gave FDR a picture of the religious situation in
Russia "and the deep concern of all religious people outside
of Russia."7'1'
While these oblique negotiations between Catholics
and the administration over the terms of Russian recognition
were going on, an incident occurred which indicates that
Walsh, Keegan, and Spellman did not represent all American
Catholics in this matter.

The Bishops of the Administrative

Council of the NCWC were scheduled to meet in Washington on

70Excerpts from Cardinal Spellman's Diary, November 7,
1933 and November 10, 1933, cited in Gannon, Cardinal Spell
m a n , p. 98.

71 Rev. Robert I. Gannon, letter to author, May 6,
1965.
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November 15, 1933, with Bishop Jcimes Ryan of Catholic Univer
sity as host.

Before the meeting opened, Reverend Maurice S.

Sheehy of Catholic University wrote a letter to Marvin
McIntyre, presumably with the knowledge and concurrence of
Bishop Ryan, in which he made a number of interesting p r o 
posals.

Sheehy felt that the meeting of the bishops during

the turmoil of debate on the recognition of Russia presented
an opportunity to "render some service to the President,
whom we are unutterably indebted."

to

One must speculate that

this indebtedness was due to Roosevelt's appearance at
Catholic University earlier in the year to receive an honorary
degree.

The question of Russian recognition,

Sheehy con

tinued, had disturbed many of the American bishops and they
had,

in turn, asked Bishop Ryan for guidance.

coming to the point,

Finally

Sheehy suggested that the President

might want to address the bishops "on the service religion
can render to the Government in the present crisis."

If this

were not feasible, the priest recommended a formal statement
by FDR that "the interests of religion were properly safe
guarded in all international dealings."

Sheehy's purpose was

obvious— he wanted to forestall any statement by the bishops
that might, as Walsh had earlier warned, hamper the President
in his negotiations with Litvinov.

It is strange that Sheehy
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should not have been aware of the negotiations already in
progress between Walsh and Roosevelt, but there is no indi
cation that he was.

Sheehy ended his letter with a revealing

statement:
The press and the educational institutions of
the Catholic Church have been solidly behind Presi
dent Roosevelt in his every move.
We are concerned
to insure that there be not the slightest break in
this united front back of the President's program.
The priest feared that the negotiations with Russia might
produce such a break and desperately wanted to head it off.
He need not have had any fears,

for, as has been seen, other

sources were already making arrangements with the adminis
tration.

Sheehy's own efforts, however, came to naught,

primarily because McIntyre felt the proposal too explosive
and did not even acknowledge receipt of the letter.
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It appears that only certain elements of the Church
were aware of the administration’s willingness to listen to
Catholic objections to recognition.
Walsh and Cardinal Hayes.

These elements included

Despite this limited awareness,

the Catholic press shifted its stand on the entire question
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Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Marvin McIntyre, November
3, 1933, Official Pile, 220-A, Russia miscellaneous, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
McIntyre sent the letter to Miss LeHand
with a memo saying, "maybe I am unduly cautious, but I am
not even acknowledging this letter."
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soon after Roosevelt sent his letter to President Kalinin of
Russia on October 10.

Editors no longer ruled out recogni

tion completely, but instead concentrated on insisting that
the negotiations consider the question of religious freedom
and persecution.

73

Most editors agreed that Roosevelt him

self was dedicated to such principles and would press for
them more vigorously if public manifestations were made.
The Monitor of San Francisco now agreed to recognition “if
Russia is willing to recognize free religious organization
in Russia."

74

The Michigan Catholic urged a joint statement

by all Catholic organizations demanding, as a prerequisite
to diplomatic relations,

“definite guarantees against reli-

gious persecution and war on our government."

75

Tablet made similar demands, as did Ame r i c a .7^

The Brooklyn
In the latter

publication, Father Parsons wrote an article entitled “Open
Letter to M. Litvinov" in which he demanded religious freedom
for Russia, but significantly stated that Catholics should
stand behind the President in the discussions.

7 ^p a x ,

November,

7 4 0ctober

Addressing

1933 , p. 55.

28, 1933, p. 1.

7^November 2, 1933, p. 4.

7^The Brooklyn Tablet, October 28, 1933, p. 1;
America, November 4, 1933, p. 97.
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himself to Litvinov, Parsons warned,

"you may be sure at the

outset that the President has our confidence and support in
77
these d i s c u s s i o n s Commonweal echoed the sentiments of
Bishops Schrembs of Cleveland that Roosevelt should make
Russia "promise liberty of conscience and of religious worship."

78

Extension magazine realized that the United States

could not conduct international diplomacy on moral platitudes,
but was still against recognition of Russia because in doing
so we would "lose our shirts in any loan and buy transaction.

. . ."

7Q

In this atmosphere, after nine days of discussion,
Roosevelt and Litvinov formally exchanged notes on their
conversation on November 16.
of salient features.

The notes contained a number

First, Russia promised to curtail sub

versive activity in the United States.

Second, the Soviets

agreed to permit to American citizens in Russia free exercise
of their religion.

Third, both nations promised to negotiate

a settlement of mutual claims.

This exchange of notes

represented the extension of full diplomatic recognition to

^America,
78

November 4, 1933, p. 107.

Quoted in Commonweal, November 10, 193o, p. 30.

^December, 1933, p. 17.
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the Soviet Union by the United States.

Clearly the question

dealing with religious freedom played a significant part in
the negotiations.

William Bullitt even described Litvinov as

becoming exasperated with Roosevelt's preoccupation with
religion while important trade matters were yet to be dis
cussed.®^
This emphasis on religion, however, was not due solely
to the pressure of American Catholics.

It should be recalled

that Roosevelt himself had a high regard for the role of
religion in any society.

His remark to the NCCC that nations

must recognize God in order to survive, was not mere political
window-dressing.

Frances Perkins,

Secretary of Labor under

Roosevelt, was convinced that it was the President's personal
convictions,

rather than "Roman Catholic pressure," which

caused him to stress the religious guarantees in the talks
with Litvinov.

"It seemed to him," she wrote,
81

moral guarantee." x

"a natural

Furthermore, Roosevelt frequently took

pleasure in describing how he lectured Litvinov on the
importance of religion, even going so far as to predict that
the Russian would himself return to God before he died.

Gannon, Cardinal Spellman, p. 175.
81

Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew, pp. 142-43.
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Roosevelt related that at this,

"Max got red and fumbled and

seemed embarrassed and just didn't know quite what to say."

Op

Of course, recognition of Roosevelt's religious sincerity
*

does not preclude recognition of his political sensitivity.
Here was one occasion when, by serving one, he also "served
the additional purpose of placating some of the vigorous
opposition to recognition . . .

by the Catholic Church."8 ^

As other observers have pointed out, most Americans
were quite satisfied with the terms of recognition worked
out by Roosevelt and Litvinov.

Before Litvinov sailed for

home, he was given a farewell dinner in New York City.

Many

prominent American businessmen attended, but it was noted
that "no Cardinal or other Catholic official was present."
This did not mean, however,

84

that American Catholics were

displeased with President Roosevelt's actions.

Indeed,

evidence indicates that the President emerged from the affair
with an even higher reputation among Catholics than he had
possessed before it started.

Monsignor Robert F. Keegan,

82Quoted in ibid., p. 143.
83

Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, p. 346. Tugwell
observes that FDR "felt very strongly" about freedom of
religious worship.
84
°^Boller,

"Great Conspiracy," p. 111.
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Cardinal Hayes's Secretary, congratulated Roosevelt on his
achievement.

"The masterly fashion," wrote Keegan,

"in which

you championed the vitally sacred principles which we Ameri
cans hold so dear is clear."

Keegan also spoke of the

Cardinal's satisfaction over the terms of recognition . ® 5
The President replied that "we have really accomplished much
in regard to the difficult question of religion in Russia,"
and asked for official Catholic sentiment on the terms .8 6
Official Catholic sentiment on the terms of recogni
tion was not difficult to discover.

Individual Catholics

did not hesitate to comment on the proceedings.
Walsh,

Father

the most articulate opponent of recognition,

statement in Washington on November 23.

He felt the agree

ment meant the end of the Third International.
of the President's terms,

issued a

Acceptance

said Walsh, meant "a significant

abandonment of the previous Soviet policy."

But Walsh was

careful to point out that much depended upon an honest fulfillment of the terms by the Soviet Union.

87

Reverend Joseph

F. Thorning, S . J . , one of A m e r i c a 's editors, emphasized that

8 5 Msgr. Keegan to FDR, November 18, 1933, President's
Personal File, Box 628, Roosevelt Papers.

®6FDR to Msgr. Keegan, November 22, 1933,

ibid.

® 7 0uoted in The Boston P i l o t , November 25, 1933, p. 12.
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the chief aspect of the entire agreement was that the inherent
spiritual nature of man had been recognized by Russia.

The

talks were a lesson in morality for the Soviet Union and
could possibly open the door for a change in her godless
policy.

88

Another Jesuit, Reverend John LaParge, was skepti

cal of Russia's sincerity but not of FDR's.

No one who had

seen President Roosevelt's "profoundly religious and
patriotic attitude," said LaFarge, could doubt that he would
insist upon the fulfillment of the terms of the agreement .8 8
It was also reported, by Bishop Henry P. Rohiman of Davenport,
Iowa, that Pope Pius XI was gratified with Roosevelt's work
in securing freedom of worship for Americans in Russia .8 8
The Catholic press, while divided on the merits and
terms of recognizing Russia, was unanimous in its praise of
President Roosevelt's personal behavior.

The Brooklyn Tablet

did not want recognition now or ever, but felt that FDR's
handling of the entire matter was "splendid."

The Catholic

News of New York was skeptical about Russia's sincerity, but
hoped that this might mark the beginning of a change in that

® 8 Rev. Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., "What Russian Recog
nition Means," America, December 2, 1933, p. 200.
89Quoted in The Brooklyn T a b l e t , January 6 , 1934, p. 4.
88New York T i m e s , March 27, 1934, p. 9.

245
country.

The Baltimore Catholic Review was not satisfied

with religious freedom solely for Americans, but wanted it
extended to Russians as well.

The Denver Catholic Register

felt that "President Roosevelt acted in the best of con
science," but that "recognition was granted because of
secret international fears."

Both The Intermountain Catholic

of Salt Lake City and The Witness of Dubuque, Iowa, called
recognition a mistake.

The Catholic Universe Bulletin of

Cleveland felt obliged to support FDR's action because he
apparently knew more of the entire situation than did the
general public and the paper trusted his judgment.

In

Rochester, New York, The Catholic Courier congratulated
President Roosevelt for "winning from Litvinov the concession
of freedom of religion."

The Western Catholic of Quincy,

Illinois, speculated that Litvinov must have been "shocked"
by Roosevelt's great stress on religion.

FDR's action,

according to The Catholic Herald of St. Louis, Missouri,
served "official notice that religion means something to the
American people."

91

Throughout its coverage of recognition, the Catholic
press seemed certain of two facts:

91

that recognition of

A review of these editorial opinions is presented
in NCWC News Service, December 4, 1933.
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Russia was a bad policy no matter how interpreted; and
second,

that President Roosevelt was a hero for defending

the value of religion in society against communistic propaganda.

92

The over-all reaction was best summarized by

Commonweal, which said that FDR "accomplished as much for
religious freedom in Russia as . . . was possible.

93

A few

sources even credited Catholic pressure with being the
decisive factor in winning the issue of religious liberty a
place at the bargaining table.

It was, asserted The Brooklyn

T a b l e t , the united action of Catholic and Protestant groups
which caused FDR to go slow in the negotiations and to
demand religious freedom as one of the conditions ,for recognition.

94

The Michigan Catholic felt that Roosevelt

obviously "kept uppermost in his mind" the demands by Catholics
that he request guarantees of religious liberty from the
Russians.

95

America w as satisfied about the terms because

"what we asked for was accomplished."

^Pax,

December,

1933, p . 91.

93December 1, 1933, p. 117.
94

November 18, 1933, p. 1.

^ N o v e m b e r 30, 1933, p. 4.

^December 2, 1933, p. 193.
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What remains unexplained amid all this editorial com
ment is how the Catholic Church could change from a position
of outright hatred for a godless regime, whose basic princi
ples precluded international agreements or any dealings with
democracies,

to a position which, while still skeptical,

could view the terms of recognition as a real achievement,
provided Russia kept its word.

After constantly hammering

away at the untrustworthiness of the Russians,

"suddenly, the

hierarchy seemed to believe that Moscow, with equal suddenness, would faithfully adhere to the paper pledges."

97
'

After debating the question of relations on a level which
took note of such historic and philosophical principles of
communism as world revolution,

the class struggle, and ethical

pragmatism, Catholics seemed greatly reassured over "paper
pledges" of religious liberty for Americans— a condition which
Litvinov always insisted already existed in Russia. 98

A

final explanation for this shift of position is impossible,
but one may hypothesize that perhaps the Church and most
Catholic spokesmen never really expected to prevent Roose
velt's negotiations with Russia, but felt duty bound to make

97

Jacobs, "America Recognizes," p. 90.

9®Ibid., p. 19.
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their opinions known on the subject.

Then when the adminis

tration seemed to take cognizance of their views and gave
them some attention, they became flattered by the unexpected
hearing.

Thrown slightly off balance by the President's

interest, they accepted his largely meaningless demand for
religious liberty of Americans in Russia with little critical
analysis.

How else explain Father Walsh who at one time

stressed the untrustworthiness of Russia and afterwards said
that the only thing that remained short of normal relations
was the "honest . . . fulfillment of Moscow's public pledge"?
Surely all of his prior comments indicated that,

to him,

an honest fulfillment from the Soviets was impossible.

such

CHAPTER X

THE MEXICAN AFFAIR

The Roosevelt administration has been praised by
historians for its development of a "Good Neighbor" policy
toward Latin America.

The merits and justice of this title

are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Any final assess

ment of Roosevelt's Latin American policy would, however, be
incomplete without an evaluation of his dealings with Mexico
during the height of that country's troubles with the
Catholic Church.

Such a commentary may also throw additional

light on the relationship between the American Catholic
Church and the Roosevelt administration,

for the antagonism

aroused over the "Mexican question" was the most severe strain
imposed on the generally harmonious relationship between
Roosevelt and American Catholics.
In order to appreciate the sensitivity of the Mexican
situation, it should be recalled that the question of the
Church's role in Mexico,

following the epic period of the

Revolution, had not been settled satisfactorily.

As a close

ally of the old established regimes preceding the Revolution,
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the Church was viewed by many Mexicans as being opposed to
the Revolution and the ideas behind it.

The Church's influ

ence in education was considered to be a serious hinderance
to the social goals of the Revolution.

During the 1920's,

much anti-Church legislation had been passed and actual
physical conflict had broken out between the followers of
the government and the Church.

American Catholics had shown

a lively interest in the fate of their co-religionists south
of the border and,

through the good offices of Ambassador

Dwight Morrow, had participated in negotiations to bring
about a truce between Church and State in 1929.

This

arrangement, however, was a precarious one at best and soon
the Mexican Government was once more challenging the Church's
prerogative in education.^
It was with a keen awareness of this situation that
American Catholics viewed the appointment of Josephus Daniels
as the Roosevelt ambassador to Mexico.

Daniels, as Secretary

of Navy under President Wilson, had been the chief of the
young Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was serving as Assistant
Secretary.

Daniels'

selection as ambassador in 1933 meant,

^E. David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison,
Wisconsin, 1960), p. 83; E. D. Cronon, "American Catholics
and Mexican Anticlericalism, 1933-1936," Mississippi Valiev
Historical R e v i e w , XLV (September, 1958), 202.
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as the NCWC viewed it, that "FDR would have a personal
representative in this extra sensitive post."^
American Catholics lost little time in informing
Daniels of the importance of his new post.

Reverend Wilfrid

Parsons, editor of A m e r i c a . wrote an open letter to the new
ambassador calling upon him to use his position to pressure
the Mexican government into curtailing its persecution of
the Church.

Parsons assured Daniels that he had the author

ity to do this based upon the precedents established by
Ambassador Dwight W. Morrow.

Thus from the very outset

Daniels was called upon by American Catholics to become
embroiled in the Church-State question.

While not directly

calling for Daniels to meddle into the internal affairs of a
foreign nation. Reverend John Burke, Secretary of the NCWC,
wrote a confidential letter to the Ambassador cautioning him
about the explosiveness of the Church-State question in his
new p o s t .4
It soon became clear that many American Catholics

^NCWC News Service, March 20, 1933.
*^Rev. Wilfrid Parsons, "An Open Letter to Ambassador
Daniels," Ame r i c a , April 1, 1933, pp. 618-19; NCWC News
S e rvice, April 1, 1933.
4 Cronon,

Josephus Daniels, p. 85.
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needed no excuse in order to protest against what they con
sidered to be unjust treatment of their co-religionists in
Mexico.

On January 12, 1933, the Bishops' Administrative

Committee of the NCWC issued a statement protesting the anti
clerical practices of the Mexican government.

They asked

American citizens "to interest themselves in the restoration
in Mexico of religious freedom for its citizens."^
sador Daniels was,

Ambas

it seemed, about to become a scapegoat

for an attempt to pressure the Roosevelt administration into
helping the Church in Mexico.
Daniels was soon to realize that it was virtually
impossible to avoid the critical eyes of American Catholics.
When presenting his credentials to President Abelardo L.
Rodriguez upon arrival in Mexico,

the new ambassador

expressed admiration for the great social advances made by
the Mexican people.

The statement was a mere platitude,

almost universal among diplomats at largely ceremonial
meetings.

Yet Daniel's remarks provoked condemnation by the

Baltimore Catholic Review and a few other Catholic publica
tions.

This— to Catholics— inauspicious beginning was

mitigated some by the effect of the ambassador's call for

^Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 201.
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freedom of religion in his address in Mexico City on July 14,
1933.

This address was given wide coverage by American

Catholic papers.**
In the meantime, events occurred in Mexico which gave
Daniels reason to hope that his conduct could win the support
of American Catholics.

Archbishop Diaz of Mexico City, one

of the leading churchmen in the country, had seen fit to
praise Daniels for his "high conception and conduct . . .
religious matters."

on

The Archbishop remarked in private

conversation that the ambassador's public statements and
actions "had gained the friendship, respect and confidence
of many people in and out of government circles."^
Daniels' hopes were shortlived,
Catholics were demanding his recall.

for soon American
In retrospect, the

cause celebre which was the reason American Catholics called
for D a n i e l s ' dismissal and pressured President Roosevelt to
intervene in Mexican affairs,

seems embarrassingly innocent.

On July 26, 1934, Ambassador Daniels addressed the members of

6The Brooklyn T a b l e t , July 22, 1933, p. 1; Cronon,
"Mexican Anticlericalism," pp. 203-204.
^Memorandum of a conversation between Colonel Moreno
and Archbishop Diaz, Mexico City, August 28, 1933, Box 777,
Josephus Daniels Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
C o n gress.

254
a seminar on education in Mexico City.

In the course of his

speech, he quoted the remarks of General Plutarco Elias
Calles on the importance of education to the future of Mexico.
Callas had said,

"we must enter and take possession of the

mind of childhood,

the mind of youth."

Daniels, considering

this phrase innocent enough, had remarked that,

"to the

carrying out of that aim, which alone can give to Mexico the
high place envisioned by its statesmen,

the Government is

making the rural school a social institution."®
What appeared innocent to Ambassador Daniels, however,
was not viewed in the same light by American Catholics.

A

few Catholic publications immediately criticized the speech.
Seeking to head off an unpleasant situation,

the NCWC News

S e r v i c e ■sought out Daniels own interpretation of the affair
and published a fair account.

It stressed the fact that the

Ambassador was only endorsing the type of public school
system used in the United States.

Q

But many Catholic editors

had a different interpretation of the speech.

Commonweal

wrote that D a n i e l s ' action in "upholding the destructive
central policy of the absolute state, will have a profound

Q

#

Q

Copy of address by Daniels, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
Cronon,

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 208.
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effect upon the New Deal in the U. S."

It would cause

Americans "to ask themselves how soon they are to meet the
same fate here as their fellow religionists are suffering in
Russia, Germany, and Mexico."^®

The Catholic W o r l d , through

the editorial comments of Reverend James Gillis,

said that

the education praised by Daniels was socialized and atheistic.
Gillis felt that Daniels should keep quiet or else resign his
post.H

The Jesuit weekly, Ame r i c a , agreed that Daniels

should resign.

If the Ambassador did not know the entire

context of Calles' remarks that he had quoted, his ignorance
could not be excused.

Later the same magazine claimed that

the entire "good neighbor" policy developed by Roosevelt was
being jeopardized by an antireligious government fostered by
our State Department.

12

The protest soon spread to Catholic organizations.
In New York City, delegations of Catholic students picketed

^ O c t o b e r 26, 1934, p. 600.
^ The Catholic W o r l d , CXL (December,

1934), 259-60.

•^A m e r i c a , September 1, 1934, p. 484; December 1,
1934, p. 169.
Catholic diocesan papers also joined the gen
eral condemnation of Daniels; see The Catholic Register.
Baltimore Catholic Re view, and The Brooklyn T a b l e t , which
all expressed disapproval of D a n i e l s ' remarks and suggested
his removal.
Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 208;
The Brooklyn T a b l e t , November 3, 1934, p. 9.
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the Mexican Consulate and called for the resignation of
Ambassador Daniels.

The Catholic Evidence Guild sent letters

of indignation to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.
Even the Ancient Order of Hibernians got into the act.1^
Mary C. Duffy, Regent of the Catholic Daughters of America,
wrote to the President protesting D a n i e l s ' endorsement of
the pagan education of Mexico.14

The Holy Name Societies of

Cleveland, Ohio, and Richmond, Virginia, passed similar reso
lutions rebuking Daniels and asking for his recall.16

Both

the National Council of Catholic Women and the Massachusetts
League of Catholic Foresters sent resolutions to the White
House expressing very much the same theme.16
Other signs appeared which indicated the growing
seriousness with which American Catholics viewed the situation.
A public meeting was called in New York City to protest the
anticlerical policy of the Mexican Government.

Reverend

Wilfrid Parsons made the major speech of the evening and

1^The Boston P i l o t , December 22, 1934, p. 1.
14Mary C. Duffy to President Roosevelt, November 8,
1934, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
15Cronon, “Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209? NCWC
News Service, Cleveland, October 20, 1934.
16Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209; The
Boston Pilot, January 12, 1935, p. 3.
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criticized Ambassador Daniels.

Parsons also sounded a note

which was to recur during the whole episode.

He called on

the United States to stop intervening in Mexican affairs as
it was doing through its support for the current anti
clerical government.

Here was a nice bit of double-think.

Realizing the futility of calling for Roosevelt to intervene
to help the Church in Mexico, Parsons would avoid this diffi
culty by calling for a cessation of intervention, both a
possible and popular move.

The priest pointed to Daniels'

endorsement of C a l l e s ' speech as evidence that the United
States was,

in fact, intervening in Mexico.

17

The priest's

assertion received support from Reverend Charles C. Coughlin,
the radio priest of Detroit.

Coughlin told his listeners

that the United States Government "from Wilson down to our
President Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of
Mexico."18
What explains the scope and rapidity of protest
following Daniels' action?

The fact that such a storm of

protest followed so quickly the remarks of the Ambassador
makes one speculate that American Catholics were anxiously

-*-^New York Times, November 19, 1934, p. 14.
l8Quoted in The Brooklyn Tablet, December 29, 1934,
p. 3.
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looking for some reason to voice their growing concern over
the persecution of the Church in Mexico.
made his statement,

If Daniels had not

some other excuse would no doubt have

been found to release the frustrated feelings of American
Catholics.

Indeed, as events developed, Daniels himself soon

faded into the background as Catholics directed their pres
sure toward Roosevelt himself, demanding that he intervene
in Mexico to stop the persecution of the Church.

It was

perhaps inevitable that Roosevelt would be dragged into the
dispute which arose over Daniels.

The Ambassador was the

personal friend of the President.

Furthermore, as the scope

of criticism widened,

it was essential to Catholics that the

President become the focal point for pressure since he alone
could dictate the policy they sought.
One of the first signs that the President would be
called upon to enter the dispute was the great volume of mail
pouring into Washington from Catholic sources.

Most of these

letters asked for D a n i e l s ’ removal and for an end to Mexican
anticlericalism.

The list of Senators and Representatives

asked to take action in this matter is a lengthy one.

It

included such separate representatives as Senator Francis T.
Maloney of Connecticut, Representatives James M. Meade of
New York, and Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota.

In fact,

few
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Senators and Representatives were neglected in the surge of
protest mail, which came both from individuals and from groups
such as the Knights of Columbus.

Of course,

the fact that a

Senator or a Representative presented a petition to Congress
did not mean that he was personally committed to the ideas
expressed in the petition.
York,

Senator Robert Wagner of New

for one, simply put forward petitions sent to him by

his constituents without any supporting remarks.

Although

some Catholic papers attempted to leave the impression that
Wagner was in sympathy with the resolution, such was not the
19
case.
Catholic attempts to exert Congressional pressure on
the administration to take action against Mexico received
unexpected support from widely respected Senator William E.
Borah of Idaho.

Borah introduced a resolution in the Senate

in late January, calling for an investigation by the foreign
relations committee "into the persecution of Christians . . .

19Clipping of The Catholic Telegraph, January 24,
1935, in Box 778, Daniels Papers; The Boston P i l o t , January
26, 1934, p. 1; see Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers, for
letters of protest.
E. David Cronon, in Josephus Daniels in
Me x i c o . calls Wagner "an influential Catholic Democrat."
As
a matter of fact, Senator Wagner did not become a Catholic
until the 1 9 4 0 's. Cronon is also mistaken about the religious
affiliation of Rep. John Higgins of Massachusetts, wh o m he
also discusses under the topic of Catholic congressmen.
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now being practiced in Mexico."

The measure also called for

Senate resolutions protesting the "anti-religious campaign"
in Mexico.

2o

Why Senator Borah, an avid isolationist and

non-Catholic, should sponsor a measure so inconsistent with
his career is difficult to analyze.

When asked to explain

his action, Borah said he had evidence that American citizens
were "being maltreated" in Mexico.

If American citizens

were not involved, however, he said "the situation would be
different."21
Evidence exists
originated with Martin
Knights of Columbus.
early January,
administration.

that the idea of a resolution
H. Carmody, Supreme Knight of the
The Knights had visited Congress in

1935, to help put pressure on the Roosevelt
A delegation of Knights had met with Repre

sentative Higgins and Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts.
Judge John E. Swift, Massachusetts director of the Knights,
reported later that both men promised to be helpful.

22

Walsh,

who was in contact with the Apostolic Delegate regarding the

2^Quoted in The

Catholic W o r l d , CXL (March, 1935), 746.

21Quoted in The

Boston P i l o t , February 16, 1935, p. 3.

22

.

Newspaper clipping, January 21, 1935, in Scrapbook
No. 49, David I. Walsh Papers, Holy Cross College Library,
Worcester, Massachusetts.
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V a t i c a n ’s attitude toward Mexico, apparently agreed to
approach Borah and ask him to present the resolution.

Walsh

and Carmody probably felt that the petition would gain more
23
weight if introduced by a widely respected non-Catholic.
In any event, Carmody wired to Borah on January 31, 1935,
that Walsh had informed him of the former's willingness to
sponsor the resolution.2^

The question still remains, h o w 

ever, as to why Borah should be susceptible to Walsh's
pressure.

One scholar has speculated that this was a pay

off for the strong Catholic support Borah had earlier re
ceived in defeating the World Court resolution.2^
his motive,

Whatever

it soon was apparent that Borah was not enthus

iastic about the resolution.

He failed to defend it

vigorously and even refrained from voting for it when it
later came up before the committee.
The Catholic press,

on the other hand,

supported the Borah resolution.

strongly

Commonweal, generally more

22Clipping of Boston G l o b e , January 27, 1935, Scrap
book No. 49, David I. Walsh Papers.
2A

Robert E. Quigley to Rev. W. L. Lucey, September 13,
1960, in Letter Pile, 1935, David I. Walsh Papers.
Mr.
Quigley, professor of History at LaSalle College, wrote Rev.
Lucey, Holy Cross Librarian, and cited C a r m o d y 's telegram
to Borah of January 31, 1935, in the Borah Papers.
2^Cronon,

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 214.
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temperate in its statements,
attacks on Daniels.28

supported the congressional

The editor of America answered the

objection that the Borah resolution would be intervention in
Mexico's internal affairs by asserting that "the Mexican
question is an American question of the most domestic kind."
His reasoning was based on the premise that the United States
had put the existing "atheistic" Mexican government in power
originally.

"An inquiry into religious persecution in

Mexico," said the editor,
ings with Mexico."

27

"is an inquiry into our own deal-

When it appeared that Roosevelt was

not supporting the Borah resolution, The Catholic World wrote
that the administration would be more sympathetic "if Methodists or Baptists were suffering in Mexico."

28

Diocesan

newspapers also clamored for the passage of the Borah resolu
tion.

They generally insisted that Americans had a right to

know what was going on in Mexico.

The idea that President

Roosevelt might be out to kill the resolution led some of
these papers to warn that the consequences of such an action

26Commonweal, January 18, 1935, p. 329.
^America,

February 16, 1935, p. 437; March 2, 1935,

p. 487.
28The Catholic World, CXL (February, 1935), 523.

might be political alienation.^
These newspapers were right in their assessment of
President Roosevelt's attitude.

The administration viewed

the Borah resolution as a gigantic mistake.

R. Walton Moore,

Undersecretary of State, wrote to Senator Pittman that the
measure was "a premature indictment of a friendly neighboring
Government."

More importantly, Moore said the measure had

the effect of permitting the Senate to shape foreign policy
"without the aid or advice of the President."'*®

Actually

there was little danger of the measure being adopted once
the President and Cordell Hull let their desires be known.
This set back, however, did not distract some of the
more vitriolic critics of Roosevelt's Mexican policy.
Representative Clare G. Fenerty of Pennsylvania, Representa
tive Hamilton Fish of New York, and Representative John P.
Higgins of Massachusetts kept the drums beating in the House.
By June, Higgins was circulating a petition among hris col
leagues asking for an inquiry into the religious persecution
in Mexico.

This was the Borah resolution minus Borah.

^ 9The Brooklyn Tablet, April 13, 1935, p. 10; The
Catholic H e r a l d , April 4, 1935, p. 4; The Boston P i l o t ,
August 31, 1935, p. 6 .
3 ®R.

Walton Moore to Senator Pittman
Mexico, R. Walton Moore Papers.

[n.d.], Box 10,
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Higgins succeeded in obtaining the signature of 242 members
of the House to his petition.

What this meant in terms of

real support is unclear, because various motives were involved
in the response.

A number of Catholic Representatives were

absent from the list.

Furthermore, pressure was successfully

exerted by other Catholic Representatives, who did sign the
petition, to add a footnote saying that the signees were
"unalterably opposed to any semblance of . . . intervention
in Mexico.
On July 16, 1935, Higgins presented the petition to
President Roosevelt at the White House.

In its final form,

the document deplored the persecution of all Christians and
not just the Catholic Church.

It asked that Roosevelt

inquire about the inability of American citizens to practice
their faith in Mexico but rejected any intervention by the
United States into the internal affairs of that nation.

It

appeared that the petitioners really wanted a statement by
FDR in which he would publicly disassociate himself from
Mexico's antireligious policy.

32

Roosevelt, however, was

31Edward L. Reed to R. Walton Moore, June 21, 1935,
Box 10, Moore Papers; Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p.
219; New York T i m e s , July 17, 1935, p. 1.

^2New York Times, June 22, 1935, p. 13; July 17,
1935, p. 1.
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aware that the main question remained the status of the
Catholic Church under the current Mexican government.

In

answer to the petition, he issued a statement saying he was
in sympathy with those who "make it clear that the American
people and the Government believe in freedom of religious
worship not only in the United States, but also in other
nations . 1,33
The Catholic press was happy to play up the Presi
dent's remark as a forthright call for a cessation of
religious persecution in Mexico.

A large number of diocesan

papers carried verbatim reports of the President's statement.

34

The NCWC News Service sent out a story with the

explanatory note that President Roosevelt's remarks must be
construed as a protest against Mexico's antireligious
campaign.

This protest was, according to this source, the
O C

motive behind the petition.

The Denver Catholic Register

thanked FDR "for breaking the silence on the persecution of
Catholics in Mexico," and confidently predicted an "official
protest from Washington to Cardenas."

3 3 Rosenman,

Such a protest,

the

Public Papers, IV, 305.

34

P. H. Callahan to James A. Farley, August 1, 1935,
Box 778, Daniels Papers.

3^NCWC News Service, July 22, 1935.
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editor felt, would have a telling effect."*®

The Commonweal

applauded the President’s statement and suggested that this
attitude might lead to a "Kellogg Pact" type of international
agreement by all nations "pledging freedom of religious
worship."

37

The editors of America said that when FDR

issued his statement,
Mexico was achieved.

"a major objective of our campaign on
Altogether, the congressional

petition seemed to have produced satisfactory results.
Not all Catholics, however, were satisfied with this
settlement.

Existing concurrently with congressional pres

sure were the efforts being made by the Knights of Columbus.
Indeed, the Knights represented the most serious Catholic
effort to have Roosevelt intervene in Mexico.

The Kn ights’

activities began on January 13, 1935, when the Supreme Board
met in New York City and adopted a resolution attacking the
Mexican Government as being "opposed to religion, morality,
justice, and liberty."

The resolution further declared that

the anticlericalism in Mexico meant that this nation had
"forfeited its rights to further association with our govern
ment.

..."

As a consequence of this feeling, the Supreme

36July 18, 1935, p. 1.
38July 27, 1935, p. 362.

37July 26, 1935, p. 316.

267
Board,

in the name of 500,000 Knights, petitioned the Roose

velt administration
. . . to make representations to the government of
Mexico, that unless the evils . . . are ended forth
with, further recognition of the Mexican government
will be withdrawn and diplomatic relations . . .
will be severed.39
These statements were the opening broadside in a cam
paign by the Knights which would last throughout 1935.

The

major protagonist in the Knights' effort was Martin H.
Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut.

Carmody was the Supreme

Knight of the organization, and was characterized by one
observer as "a life-long R e p u b l i c a n . E a r l y

in January,

1935, Carmody and a committee of Knights sought a private
interview with the President to press their case.

Their

argument at that time, and throughout the dispute, incor
porated all the stock phrases used by Catholics to attack the
Mexican government and gives little indication of original or
personal investigation.

Roosevelt demurred from meeting the

Knights at this time, claiming the press of public business,
and referred them to Cordell Hull and the State Department.
After meeting with the Secretary for an h o u r , the Knights

39Quoted in The Boston Pilot, January 26, 1935, p. 2.
4 0 P.

H. Callahan to Stephen B. Gibbons, August 8 ,
1935, Box 778, Daniels Papers.
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emerged and termed the talk "very satisfactory."

From here

they visited Senators Pittman, Wagner, and David Walsh,
undoubtedly to coordinate the congressional petitions on
Mexico.

41
Roosevelt, however, was mistaken if he felt he could

placate Carmody and company by having Hull assure them of
the United States' continued interest in religious freedom.
By April,

1935, Carmody was writing Roosevelt again.

In his

letter, the Supreme Knight pointed out that no action had
been taken on the January resolution passed by the Knights.
He reminded the President that conditions in Mexico had grown
worse since that time and that women and children were being
subjected to persecution for their faith.

Carmody requested

a private conference with Roosevelt as soon as possible to
discuss the matter.

Before FDR had time to reply another

letter of May 3, arrived from Carmody.

In this second letter,

Carmody was acting under authorization of the Supreme Board
of Directors who, meeting in Detroit in early May, had
apparently been stirred to action by the May 1 statement of
the American bishops on the Mexican situation.

Carmody now

complained about Roosevelt's disregard for the prior petitions

4^NCWC News Service, January 22, 1935.
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of the Knights, explained that conditions in Mexico were
getting worse, and deplored the apparent opposition of the
administration to the Borah resolution.

The Supreme Knight

also insisted that there was clear precedent for intervention
in such a case of religious persecution as was now occurring
in Mexico.
Roosevelt referred C a r m o d y 's second letter to the
State Department for preparation of a suitable reply.

By

May 11, Assistant Secretary of State Moore had drawn up a
reply for the President's signature.

Moore stressed that

the United States had no more right to intervene in the case
of Church-State relations than it had in any other domestic
Mexican question.

In an attempt to explain United States

policy, he referred to the "Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States" signed at Montevideo, December 26, 1933.
At this meeting Secretary Hull, acting for the United States,
had voted for the article forbidding one state from inter
vening in the affairs of another.

Indeed, concluded Moore,

Carmody's proposal went against the entire tenor of the
"Good Neighbor" policy Roosevelt was attempting to implement
«

toward Latin America.

It was decided by the White House

42The Catholic World, CXLI (June, 1935) , 364.
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that Hull, rather than Roosevelt, should sign this reply to
Carmody
Carmody and the Knights of Columbus were not so easily
satisfied.

On June 23, Carmody again wrote to the President

and stressed his disappointment over Roosevelt's refusal to
acknowledge the earlier telegram.

Carmody also regretted

that he was unable to see the President personally and
lamented the fate of the Borah resolution.

44

After this

communication, Roosevelt apparently decided that something
had to be done to satisfy the Knights.

He sent Carmody's

latest note to Hull with the following memorandum:

"For

preparation of reply for my signature as quickly as possible,
as I think that speed is essential."4 "*
Meanwhile, the State Department was feeling direct
pressure over the Mexican question from the Knights and other
Catholic groups.

This prompted Assistant Secretary Moore to

write to Hull that, although they must refrain from any
action offensive to Mexico,

if they did not make some

^ M e m o r a n d u m of May 11, 1935, by Assistant Secretary
of State, Official File 146, Mexico, 1933-40, Box 1, Roose
velt Papers.
44Martin Carmody to President Roosevelt, June 23,
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers.

4^Ibid., June 26, 1935.
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statement "fairly satisfactory" to the Catholic interest,
"the political effect may be injurious in many localities."
Moore felt that there would be no harm in making a reply to
indicate that the State Department did "honestly regret the
situation in Mexico."

With this in mind, Moore submitted a

draft reply to Catholic inquiries which made the following
points:

(1) There was no treaty between the United States

and Mexico covering religion.

(2) The United States had

always demanded religious freedom for its nationals within
its jurisdiction.
in this case,

(3) The United States had no power to act

since it would be an unwarranted intervention

in Mexico's domestic affairs.4 ^
A few days after receiving this recommendation from
his Assistant Secretary, Cordell Hull also received FDR's
request for a reply to Martin Carmody's new letter.

After

consultation with James Farley, who recommended that the
Knights be ignored for their discourtesy, Hull submitted a
draft reply which the President on July 3 sent to Carmody.
Apparently Hull had decided not to incorporate Moore's
recommendations into this reply because,

4 ^R.

in its final form,

Walton Moore to Secretary Hull, June 24, 1935,
Mexican Religious Situation, Box 10, R. Walton Moore Papers.
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the letter simply explained to Carmody that pressing public
business had prevented a private audience earlier, but that
now the President would be glad to meet and discuss the
Mexican situation with h i m . ^
After some preliminaries, a meeting was arranged for
July 8 between the President and a delegation of Knights,
including Carmody, William J. McGinley,

secretary, D. J.

Callahan, treasurer, Luke E. Hart, advocate, John E. Swift,
and James Donahoe.

The delegation declared that they

represented not merely the 500,000 Knights but all American
Catholics.

They reiterated their plea that the President

protest the persecution going on in Mexico and brought up
many precedents in which the United States had spoken out
under similar circumstances.

Roosevelt listened with his

usual patience and good manners.

He made a few remarks about

religious conditions in the world and about communism, but
was noncommittal regarding the particular subject of the
Knights' visit.

The group left, reporting to the press that

the President was very courteous and generous with his time.

^ M e m o r a n d u m of Secretary of State, June 26, 1935,
Mexico, 1933-40, Official File, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
^ C o l u m b i a , August,
9, 1935, p. 6 .

1935, p. 4; New York T i m e s , July

48
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It should be noted that it was only eight days after this
visit that President Roosevelt met with the congressional
delegation on the same topic and issued his statement on
religious freedom.
Roosevelt's statement to the congressional delegation
did little to placate the Knights of Columbus.

As reports

continued to flow into the United States of atrocities
against Christians in Mexico,

the Knights met at their annual

convention in New York City on August 21.

One of their first

actions was to authorize Carmody to send another letter to
President Roosevelt concerning Mexico.

In the same unanimous

resolution, the Knights expressed regret at the administra
t i o n ’s passivity toward the question and disappointment that
the State Department, with the President's approval, was
opposing the Borah resolution.

49

This outburst, however, was

only a small indication of what was to come from the Knights
on the subject of Mexico.
In early October, a quarterly meeting of the Supreme
Board of Directors of the Knights was held in Chicago.

At

this meeting it was decided to make another vigorous repre
sentation to the President on the Mexican situation.

A

^ C o l u m b i a , October, 1935, p. 17; New York Times,
August 22, 1935, p. 15.

letter of protest was drawn up here but was not sent until
Roosevelt returned from an extended trip late in the month.
Signed by Carmody and by W. J. McGinley,

the letter traced

the events since the July 8 meeting with the President.

At

this time, said the Knights, President Roosevelt promised to
make a public statement deploring the Mexican religious
situation.

It was noted that FDR had made a statement

favoring religious freedom on October 2 in San Diego, Cali
fornia.

At that time Roosevelt had said:

Our national determination to Keep us free of
. . . foreign entanglements cannot prevent ua fr n
feeling deep concern when ideale and nrinciplas
that we have cherished are ch~^lenged.
a regard
it as axiomatic that every person siiall enjoy the
free exercise of hie religion a-’cording to the
dictates of his conscience. . . .50
Many newspaper" sugges ,ad that ^h^s statement, because it
was made neai

the Mexican border, was a reply to the Knights

request and was directed aya'nst M^rioo.
pany, however, we*e more m c x i n e c
opinion ^ a t

Carmciy and com

to accept one reporter's

thi speech was "a s; all :»op to the Catholics.,"

Indeed, Carmodv not only accepted «his interpretation, but
added that our "Good Neighbor" policy could not excuse

50Quoted in Denver Catholic Register, October 3, 1935
p. 4, whose editor praiseu the statement as an answer to the
Knight's charge of Presidential indifference.
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inaction.

In a tone of surprising bitterness, Carmody con

cluded his letter:
You cannot escape responsibility for throttling
the Borah Resolution.
You cannot escape respon
sibility for the endorsement given to the Mexican
Government . . . by your Ambassador.
You cannot
escape responsibility for non-action on behalf of
bleeding and oppressed Mexico.51
The tone of this latest outburst by the Knights embar
rassed many Catholics.

Most Reverend John J. McNicholas,

Archbishop of Cincinnati,

felt compelled to issue a public

statement, read in all churches of his archdiocese on
November 3, that the Knights "in no sense speak for the
priesthood or for the Catholic laity" of Cincinnati.

This

response was made even though the Archbishop himself felt
the administration could have done more to ameliorate the
Mexican situation .52
Taking note of this divided sentiment, the President,
after consultation with Catholics close to the administration
such as Jim Farley and Frank Walker,
attack of the Knights.

replied to the October

In a letter addressed to Carmody and

dated November 13, Roosevelt flatly refused to interfere in

^Quoted in Columbia, December,
Times, October 28, 1935, p. 3.

1935, p. 11; New York

52QUOted in The Catholic World, CXLII {December,
1935), 362.

276
the domestic affairs of Mexico.

As for United States citi

zens in Mexico, the administration desired that they should
be permitted freedom of worship.

But, Roosevelt went on,

"there has not been brought to this government during the
past year a single complaint by any United States citizen
that such opportunities in Mexico have been refused him." In
light of this, Roosevelt insisted that his policy of non
intervention would continue.

This, however, did not mean

that he was unsympathetic to the cause of religious tolerance.
Roosevelt quoted from his recent speech in San Diego regard
ing his "deep concern" for religious freedom.

Obviously the

President was deeply committed to such freedom, but he did
not feel that this was a justification for intervening in
the domestic affairs of a foreign nation.5^
For Roosevelt this letter represented the final word
in the episode.

Catholics, however, had different ideas.

The Catholic press was almost unanimous in its criticism of
Roosevelt's reply to Carmody.

The Brooklyn Ta b l e t , predict

ably critical, pointed out that Catholics had asked Roosevelt
to end intervention, not start it.5^

The Catholic Action of

^ P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt to Martin Carmody, November 13,
1935, in Rosenman, Public Papers, IV, 450-52; Commonweal,
November 29, 1935, pp. 113-14.
"*^The Brooklyn Ta b l e t , November 23, 1935, p. 1.
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the S o u t h , a New Orleans paper,

felt that Roosevelt's atti

tude could only give comfort to the enemies of religion.

The

Baltimore Catholic Review said that FDR was condoning tyranny.
The Catholic Tribune of St. Joseph, Missouri, remarked that
Catholics should have expected a refusal because of Roose
velt's past actions.

The Providence Visitor called Roose

velt's reply mere "political hedging" and reiterated the
Knight's claim that the President could not escape much of
the responsibility for current conditions in Mexico.

Light,

a publication of the International Catholic Truth Society,
insisted that FDR should make Mexico honor the pledge of
religious freedom given to Woodrow Wilson.

This paper called

Roosevelt's reply to Carmody mere "artful weaving of words.
Reverend Wilfrid Parsons, editor of America,

insisted that

Roosevelt's letter would give a "green light" to those
elements in Mexico most antagonistic toward the Church.
fortunately,

Un

the President had intervened even while refusing

to do so, said Parsons, and the result was to give "comfort
to the enemies of religion.

^^In Albany, New York; Hartford, Connecticut; St.
Louis, Missouri; Buffalo, New York; Portland, Maine; and
Rochester, New Yorlf, the Catholic diocesan press echoed
these criticisms of the President and at times went even
further.
See Columbia, January, 1936, p. 18, which
published a resume of Catholic press reaction.
~*6New York T i m e s , November 19, 1935, p. 7.
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In retrospect it appears that President Roosevelt had
little chance of appeasing these elements of Catholic thought.
They insisted that what they wanted was not intervention, but
a cessation of the interference then taking place.

Unfor

tunately, they could point to no specific action by the
Roosevelt administration,

save Ambassador Daniel s statement,

which could be termed intervention.

It is difficult to imag

ine what more they desired in the way of a public statement
by the President if they were not satisfied with his San
Diego remarks.

In his reply to the President, Carmody used

the same argument— that he had never asked for intervention,
only an investigation of charges of oppression.

How this

investigation was to be accomplished without intervention, he
did not specify.

Carmody's reply,

in the form of a public

statement to the press, was made November 17, 1935, in New
York City, when the Supreme Knight insisted that Roosevelt
had ignored good precedent for speaking out against foreign
religious persecution.

After another month had elapsed,

Carmody wrote to the President again.

On December 16, he

accused Roosevelt of distorting history to support his

^ New York Times, November 18, 1935, p. 1; The Catholic
World, CXLII (December, 1935), 362-63; Columbia, December,
1935, p. 13.
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position of non-intervention.

The Knights concluded that

FDR's reasons for not acting in this case were "based upon a
false premise," namely,

that the Knights desired actual

physical intervention.^®
This final outburst by the Knights was referred from
the White House to Sumner Welles of the State Department.
Welles examined the letter and wrote to the President that
it did not deserve a reply, because "it raises no new ques
tions."

He further presented a detailed memorandum showing

that the supposed incidents of persecution of Americans in
Mexico mentioned by Carmody had nothing to do with the
religious situation.

Roosevelt replied that Welles was

correct to assume that Carmody would not be answered and
that he and Steve Early were treating the subject as "a
closed incident."

59

Roosevelt's trouble with the Knights of Columbus,
however, was only one aspect of the pressure exerted against
his administration in connection with Mexican anticlericalism.
Equally important were the feelings of members of the Cath
olic hierarchy.

While all of the bishops were not articulate

^Columbia,

January,

1935, p. 6 .

C Q

Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, December 21,
1935, Official File, Box 28, Roosevelt Papers.
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about the Mexican situation,

there was enough public criti

cism to cause some uneasiness in the administration.
Ambassador Daniels had been directly rebuked by Bishop
William J. Hafey of Raleigh, North Carolina, on October 6 ,
1934, when the latter publicly regretted the remarks the
former made about Mexican education and hoped they were unin
tentional.

Yet the Bishop felt this "serious error" deserved

a public refutation by Roosevelt,

so it would not appear

that his administration was endorsing Mexican atheism .6 0
Other members of the hierarchy seemed to be in
sympathy with Bishop Hafey.

At an annual meeting in Wash

ington, D . C . , November 14-17, 1934, some seventy-eight
members of the American Catholic hierarchy issued a statement
on the "anti-Christian Tyranny in Mexico."
deplore," read the statement,

"We cannot but

"the expressions, unwittingly

offered at times, of sympathy with and support of governments
and policies which are absolutely at variance with our own
American principles."

After this jibe at Daniels,

the

bishops went on to say that they did not "believe for a
moment" that the United States favored the actions of Mexico.
While the hierarchy praised American principles of toleration

60Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 209.
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and freedom, they did not wish "to impose those principles
as political principles upon any other nation," even though
they were "as true outside as inside the physical territory
of our country."

With this in mind they called for an end

to the indifference with which the United States viewed the
Mexican situation and urged citizens to press their repre
sentatives to "be guided by true American principles with
respect to Mexico."

61

In February, 1935,
coming.

further episcopal action was forth

An organization called "The Catholic Bishops Com

mission, Incorporated,

for Mexican Relief" was formed under

the leadership of such men as Archbishop Michael J. Curley
of Baltimore, Bishop Francis C. Kelley of Oklahoma City and
Tulsa, and Archbishop Arthur J. Crosserts of San Antonio,
Texas.

Other prominent prelates who lent their support to

the organization included Bishop John M. Gannon of Erie,
Pennsylvania, and Bishop James A. Griffin of Springfield,
Illinois.

This commission was not directed against the

administration, but was primarily concerned with soliciting
aid and assistance "for the relief and support" of Mexicans
suffering under the antireligious laws of their country.

61

"Statement of American Catholic Hierarchy," November
15, 1934, in Huber, Our Bishops Speak, pp. 205-208.
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Still, a campaign directed toward raising money "for the
defense of religious freedom in Mexico" was treading upon
international diplomacy and could not help but come under the
scrutiny of the United States State Department.
Other members of the hierarchy also spoke out.

In

February, Cardinal Dougherty of Philadelphia sponsored a
mass protest meeting in his diocese against the "anti-God"
actions of the Mexican government.

fi

*3

In

Springfield,

Illinois, Bishop James A. Griffin outlined four objectives
for American Catholics in the controversy.

One of these was

to awaken public opinion in the United States in favor of an
official investigation into Mexican actions.6^
Unquestionably the most outspoken member of the
American hierarchy on the Mexican question was Archbishop
Michael J. Curley of Baltimore.

In an open letter to the

Washington P o s t , Curley defended the Borah resolution as a
legitimate inquiry which deserved the sponsorship of the
Roosevelt administration.

A few weeks later, the Bishop,

62The Catholic W o r l d , CXLII (March,
Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 411.

1936), 747-48;

®^NCWC News Service, Philadelphia, February 19, 1935.
^ Commonweal, March 29, 1935, p. 625.
6 5 Ib i d . ,

March 1, 1935, p. 510.

addressing a public gathering in Washington, deplored the
attitude of the President toward the resolution.
resolution is killed," said Curley,

"If that

"it will be because the

Chief Executive of the nation has issued orders that it be
killed.". These were rather strong words, but Curley was not
finished.

In a statement which carried overtones of a

political threat, the clergyman remarked,

"twenty million

American Catholics are getting pretty tired of the indif
ference shown by the Administration."

Despite a further

reference to the "Catholic vote," Curley denied he was
threatening anyone.

He went on to criticize the President

for refusing to grant an interview to a delegation of Knights
of Columbus which had attempted to call upon him.

He casti

gated the foreign policy of Cordell Hull as being against
all American traditions.
naively,

Finally, he insisted,

somewhat

that a mere word from President Roosevelt would

suffice to relieve the anticlerical pressure in M e x i c o .6 6
Despite the prominence of the speaker and the proximity of
the speech, the Roosevelt administration took no official
notice.

66New York T i m e s , March 26, 1935, p. 1; Cronon,
"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 220; W. T. Walsh, "Some
Precedents for the Borah Resolution," The Catholic W o r l d ,
CXLI (August, 1935), 555.
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The significance of Curley's outburst was that it
represented a hardening of episcopal opinion toward the
Mexican question.

This shift was underlined by the May 1

public statement of the Administrative Committee of the NCWC.
These bishops, speaking for the American hierarchy,

requested

that Washington speak out on Mexican anticlericalism.

"The

traditional policy of our Government," read the Committee's
statement,

*

"does not permit it to remain silent at the

present moment.

..."

They admitted that we could not

"interfere with the internal affairs of another nation," but
pointed out that the United States had never been silent
regarding such a basic principle as religious freedom.

They

concluded by promising to continue to urge Catholics to
petition Congress and the President to use their influence
to restore religious liberty to Mexico.

7

In furtherance of

this attitude, Bishop Charles D. White of Spokane, Washington,
circulated a petition for signature among the laity of his
diocese requesting the President and the Secretary of State
"to exercise every personal and governmental power possible
to relieve the injustices and to avert the threatened dangers

67Huber, Our Bishops Speak, p. 307; The Catholic
World, CXLI (June, 1935), 363-64.
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of the present anti-religious policy of the Mexican Govern
ment. 1,68
To lend additional emphasis to the B i s h o p s ' statement
on May 1, Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, a
member of the Administrative Committee, wrote President
Roosevelt a personal letter on Mexico.

Noll reminded the

President that he had been informed by Reverend John B u r k e ,
General Secretary of the NCWC and liaison man to the
administration,

that "it would be difficult to keep the

Catholics quiet" if the Catholic hierarchy was "completely
ignored."

The Bishop recalled for Roosevelt that the state

ment by the American hierarchy had made no mention of the
Borah resolution or the petition by the Knights of Columbus.
The bishops,

said Noll, approved these statements but had

refrained from speaking out in order "to give your Excellency
an opportunity to do something with less embarrassment."

Now

Noll asked Roosevelt to make a statement "on the general
principles of the rights of all people to religious liberty."
Such a statement, he insisted, would be of great help to all
oppressed peoples and was certainly within the historical
precedents of the United States.

Finally, such a statement

60NCWC News Service, Spokane, Washington, May 6, 1935.
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would also end the rumors of FDR's growing sympathy for
communism .6 9
Roosevelt was obviously impressed with the earnestness
of Noll's letter.

When drafting a reply, he called in Father

John Burke for advice.

Burke composed a letter for the

President's examination and Roosevelt signed it virtually
unchanged.

In the letter Roosevelt once again asserted his

own "devotion" to religious liberty and promised that the
cause of the B i s h o p ’s letter would "receive our earnest,
thoughtful attention."

The President closed by promising to

do all he could "to promote the principle of freedom of
conscience and the exercise of religious liberty."

Signifi

cantly, Mexico was not mentioned once in the letter, but
Roosevelt did stress the complexity and delicacy of foreign
affairs .7 0
All members of the Catholic hierarchy, however, were
not so intent as Noll upon soliciting a statement from Presi
dent Roosevelt.

Indeed the clergyman closest to the scene of

conflict, Archbishop Pascual Diaz of Mexico City, expressed

^9Bishop John F. Noll to President Roosevelt, May 13,
1935, President's Personal Fire, No. 2406, Roosevelt Papers;
see also Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
^ P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt to Bishop John Noll, May 23,
1935, Reel 2, Sel. M a t .
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the opinion that nothing could be worse than for the Presi
dent of the United States to make a statement demanding an
investigation of Mexican affairs.
the Archbishop,

"Such an action," said

"would be very injurious to the interest of

the Church in Mexico" and he personally would never condone
such a step.

The Archbishop also expressed the personal

opinion that Secretary of State Hull was doing a great job
"and thoroughly approved of what he had and was doing to
prevent an investigation into Mexican affairs."

71

In the United States, Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland
was not so much interested in Roosevelt’s Mexican policy as
he was in the possibility that the President might consent
to appear before a Eucharistic Congress being held in his
diocese.

Representative Martin L. Sweeney of Cleveland,

Ohio, was asked by Schrembs to try to convince Roosevelt to
appear before the Congress.

Sweeney wrote to the President

that all Catholics were impressed by his July statement on
religious liberty, but the Eucharistic Congress would present
a perfect forum for a public address on the same topic.

72

^^Memorandum of private conversation between Mr.
Aguirre and Archbishop Pascual Diaz, Mexico City, April 13,
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
^ R e p . Martin L. Sweeney to President Roosevelt,
August 12, 1935, Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
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Roosevelt decided to limit his participation to a message of
greetings and good will, which was delivered by his delegate
to the Congress, Jim Farley.

This message was apparently

enough to satisfy Cardinal Hayes of New York, who, after
deploring the religious persecution occurring in other
countries, expressed delight over the President's greeting.
Hayes was moved to remark that, "we have a President who
believes in religion and wants his fellow citizens to do
likewise."

Farley himself remarked that the United States

had set an example of religious toleration, but that other
«

nations failed to appreciate this lesson.

71

Bishop Schrembs,

the host of the Congress, was also gratified by Roosevelt's
contribution and wrote to the President that his "appeal in
the cause of religion" had made a success of the entire
a f f a i r .7 4
As one observes over-all Catholic opinion at this time,
it appears that the good feeling manifest over the Eucharis
tic Congress was a mere lull in the criticism of the adminis
tration by Catholic spokesmen.

Most public spokesmen for the

Church remained angered by the President's failure to take

7^Quoted in New York T i m e s , September 24, 1935, p. 1.
74Most Rev. Joseph Schrembs to President Roosevelt,
October 2, 1935, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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more vigorous action toward Mexico.

Some expressed regret

that the statements of Hayes and Schrembs, and later the
criticism of the Knights by Archbishop McNicholas of Cincin
nati, represented a division in the force of Catholic
opinion.7**

Large elements of the Catholic press were

vitriolic in their criticism of the administration.7^
Prominent individual Catholics and Catholic organiza
tions also contributed to the rising clamor against the
administration.

Reverend James Gillis, editor of The

Catholic W o r l d , was disgusted with the procrastination of
Roosevelt.

Gillis felt that the United States had a mission

to "champion the cause of those who suffer persecution for
conscience sake."
Mexico.

77

He wanted full-fledged intervention in

Reverend William J. Kenealy,

S . J . , speaking on the

Catholic Truth Period over Boston Radio, also stressed the

75Catholic Transcript, December 19, 1935, p. 4; The
Brooklyn T a b l e t , November 23, 1935, p. 8 .
76

For evidence of the position of the Catholic press
see P a x , December, 1935, p. 81; Extension, December, 1935, p.
17; Columbia, May, 1935, p. 12; Commonweal, January 18, 1935,
p. 329; The Boston P i l o t , November 23, 1935, p. 4; The Cath
olic Transcript, May 2,.1935, p. 4; The New W o r l d , May 17,
1935, p. 4; The Catholic Messe n g e r , June 20, 1935, p. 2; and
The Brooklyn T a b l e t , July 13, 1935, p. 9, all of which attack
either Daniels' incompetence or Roosevelt's timidity.
7

77The Catholic World, CXLII (March, 1936), 641-46.
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United States' responsibility for anticlericalism in Mexico.
According to Kenealy,

the Roosevelt administration was keep

ing the Mexican "atheists" in power by virtue of diplomatic
recognition, and by financial and moral support.

78

Reverend

G. A. McDonald published an open letter to President Roose
velt in the pages of The Q u e e n 1s W o r k , in which he criticized
the administration's handling of Catholic protest over
79
Mexico.
A few individuals were especially extreme in their
criticism.

Father Kenealy, not satisfied with his radio

speech, wrote an article for The Catholic Mind in which he
proposed that the United States Government should "stop
preventing them [the Mexican people]
and political freedom ." 8 8

from securing religious

But perhaps the height of hysteria

was reached by Reverend Michael Kenny, S.J., author of No God
Next D o o r .

Kenny wrote that the Supreme Masonic Councils of

Mexico and the Supreme Council of the Scottish Rite 33rd
Degree in Washington were influential in the refusal of

^8The Boston Pilot, August 31, 1935.
79

Copy of The Q u e e n 1s W o r k , December 13, 1935,
Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers.
8 8 Rev.

in

William J. Kenealy, S.J., "The Mexican Reli
gious Persecution," The Catholic M i n d , XXXIII, No. 23
(December 8 , 1935), 453, 454, 457.
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President Roosevelt to intervene in Mexico.

It seems that

Roosevelt was a 32nd degree Mason and had just initiated his
two sons into masonry.

Father Kenny read conspiracy into

these events.®^Against this seemingly widespread Catholic disillu
sionment with Roosevelt's Mexican policy was arrayed a number
of individuals who attempted to defend both Ambassador
Daniels and the President.

There were some who sought to

counteract the charges made by the Knights of Columbus and
the diocesan press.

Foremost among these was Colonel P. H.

Callahan, an influential Catholic layman, and former execu
tive of the Knights of Columbus.

Callahan, a native of

Louisville, Kentucky, was a prohibitionist and, like Daniels,

®!Rev. Michael Kenny, S.J., to the Editor, Commonweal,
December 20, 1935, p. 213. These individual protest were
supplemented by appeals made by the following Catholic organ
izations who demanded everything from U.S. intervention to
the removal of Daniels:
The Ancient Order of Hibernians;
National Catholic Women's Union of Hudson County, New Jersey;
The Supreme Board of the Catholic Daughters of America; St.
Louis Council of Catholic Women; and a number of others.
Lay
Catholics such as Joseph Gurn and Dr. Thomas E. Purcell,
President of the NCCM, spoke out against recognition of a
"communist-dominated" Mexican government and suggested that
the Good Neighbor policy be used as a pretext for interven
tion to help Mexican Catholics.
See the following:
New
York T i m e s , May 6 , 1935, p. 16; February 23, 1936, II, 1;
Box 777, Daniels Papers, NCWC News Service, St. Louis,
Missouri, May 11, 1935; Washington, D. C., March 8 , 1935;
Union City, New Jersey, April 5, 1935.
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an old supporter of William Jennings Bryan.

He quickly

became convinced that the efforts by American Catholics to
have Daniels removed and to have Roosevelt intervene in
Mexico could only hurt tne Church's position in that country.
Furthermore, Callahan warned,

if Catholics succeeded in

removing Daniels it would*produce a reaction by American
Protestants, resentful of this show of political power,

that

would make the Smith campaign look insignificant .8 2
As soon as Daniels was attacked for his remarks on
Mexican education, Callahan began a campaign to defend the
Ambassador against the charges of the Catholic press.

He

wrote to such individuals as A. J. Beck, editor of The
Michigan Catholic; Patrick F. Scanlan, editor of The Brooklyn
T a b l e t ; Vincent de Paul Fitzpatrick, editor of The Baltimore
Catholic R e v i e w ; and Joseph M. Schifferli, editor of The
Buffalo Echo of New York.

Callahan pointed out that Josephus

Daniels had no religious prejudice.

In fact the Ambassador

had been extremely generous to Catholics durinc World War I ,
in the number of chaplains he allotted to each faith when he
was Secretary of the Navy.

Daniels had not, insisted

Callahan, endorsed pagan education.

82P

As for the Ambassador

. H. Callahan to H L. Mencken, December 21,
1934, Bux 778, Daniels Papers.
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shaking hands with Calles, what else could be expected from
*

a representative of the United States Government?
our co-religious," wrote Callahan,

"Some of

"expected the Ambassador

to conduct himself as if he were representing the Vatican at
Rome instead of the U.S.A."

83

The Colonel constantly sent copies of his correspond
ence to the White House and the State Department.

He also

wrote directly to the administration during the height of the
pressure campaign by the Knights of Columbus.

According to

Callahan, Carmody and the Supreme Council did not represent
a majority of the Knights in their opposition to Roosevelt.
He also indicated that Carmody and Luke Hart were life-long
Republicans.

Callahan suggested to Jim Farley that Carmody's

actions were probably connected with the "plans of A1
Smith."

84.

It is difficult to determine specifically how this

information was used by the administration, although Secre
tary of State Hull wrote to Callahan that he had "utilized

®3p. H. Callahan to Patrick F. Scanlan, February 27,
1935, for other letters see "Callahan Correspondence" in
Reel 2, Sel. M a t . Many of the Callahan letters were
published by the diocesan press.
84

P. H. Callahan to Stephen B. Gibbons, August 8 ,
1935; Callahan to James A. Farley, November 9, 1935;
Callahan to James McCaughey [n.d.]. Box 778, Daniels Papers.
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them [the letters]

to good advantage ."8 5

Another prominent Catholic layman who assisted the
administration in counteracting unfavorable opinion in the
Church was Michael Francis Doyle, a Philadelphia lawyer and
active Democratic politician.

Although in some respects

Doyle appears to have been a sycophant of the President, he
did strive to counteract Catholic criticism.

As soon as it

appeared that Daniels was in for a roasting by the Catholic
press, Doyle wrote to the administration seeking evidence of
the Ambassador's pro-Catholic attitude while Secretary of
the Navy.

86

He intended to see that this material was

placed in the press.

Doyle also wrote of having "conferences"

with the N C W C , and the Catholic Alumni Sodality, and of
stifling their criticism of the administration.

Roosevelt

and Daniels were both assured that the attitude of the
Knights of Columbus and of Archbishop Curley "did not reflect
the general attitude of American Catholics" who "fully
appreciated [Daniels] splendid qualities and . . . belief in
religious toleration."8^

The Philadelphian claimed to be

85Cordell Hull to P. H. Callahan, February 15, 1935,
Box 778, Daniels Papers.
86

Michael F. Doyle to Louis Howe, December 26, 1934,
Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
8^Michael F. Doyle to Josephus Daniels, January 24,
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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working within various Catholic groups, hoping to moderate
their demands for the Borah resolution.

One such group was

the Catholic Association for International Peace— Doyle
succeeded in removing a discussion of Mexico from the agenda
of their annual meeting for 1936.®®
Indeed, Doyle appears to have been more concerned over
the attitude of American Catholics toward the administration
than was Roosevelt himself.

After FDR had answered the

Knights of Columbus in his November letter, Doyle reported
the formation of the "Catholic Bishops Commission for Mexican
Relief."

89

Doyle wrote to Marvin McIntyre that "I fully

understand the Administration's attitude and will do every
thing in my power to see that this movement is not used for
any political purpose . " 9 0

It should be noted, however, that

President Roosevelt did not appear unduly affected by the
letters Doyle wrote.

The President saw Doyle only once at

»

the beginning of the Daniels affair, despite the latter's
pleading for more audiences.

83

Michael F. Doyle to Josephus Daniels, March 6 ,
1935; April 17, 1936, Box 778, Daniels Papers.
® 9See p. 281.
90

Michael F. Doyle to Marvin McIntyre, November 27,
1935, Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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Of more importance to Roosevelt was the work done by
Reverend John J. Burke, General Secretary of the NCWC. Burke
was respected at the White House; Roosevelt often called
upon him to interpret and even answer letters from the hier
archy.

Throughout the Mexican crisis this priest was

sympathetic to both Roosevelt and Daniels .9 1

One typical

example of his help came when Cardinal Hayes of New York, in
mid-1935, expressed his disappointment that the President
had not asserted himself in favor of religious freedom in
Mexico.

Burke immediately set the record straight and told

Hayes all that Roosevelt had done and was attempting to do
within the bounds of diplomatic protocol.
have been impressed,

The Cardinal must

for he wrote to Burke apologizing for

his ignorance and expressing appreciation for Roosevelt's
efforts.

Although Burke seems to have had little control

over the Knights of Columbus, he continually criticized their
actions toward the President.
There were other Catholics who braved the apparent
mainstream of Catholic feeling on Mexico to defend the

Q 1

Cronon,
92

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 226.

Sumner Welles, Asst. Secretary of State, to Presi
dent Roosevelt, June 25, 1935, President's Secretary Pile I,
Diplomatic Correspondence, Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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administration and Ambassador Daniels.
Manton of New York City was one.
March,

Judge Martin T.

Manton spoke out at the

1935, annual convention of the Catholic Association

for International Peace held in Washington.

In his speech

he deprecated the Borah resolution as a violation of the
Montevideo Convention of 1934 and suggested that the ChurchState dispute in Mexico be handled by the Permanent Court of
International Justice.

For implying that American Catholics

should stop attacking the administration, Manton was soundly
rebuked by such leading prelates as Reverend John LaFarge,
Reverend J. F. Thorning, and Archbishop Curley.

Thorning

insisted that Mexico was attacking United States citizens,
but the administration was keeping this news from the people.
Curley simply called Manton ignorant of both the Mexican
situation and of the position of American Catholics.

One

Catholic editor not only applauded Curley's attack but sug
gested that Manton get permission of his bishop before making
any more public pronouncements on the situation.

To some,

seems, the affair had entered the realm of faith and
QO
morals.
Reverend John F. O'Hara, president of Notre Dame

^ Commonweal, May 10, 1937, p. 44; The Catholic
Transcript, May 9, 1935, p. 4.

it
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University, was another prominent Catholic leader who refused
to follow the line laid down by Bishop Curley and the Knights
of Columbus.
said:

In a public interview in December, 1934, O'Hara

"Anything like an attempt at intervention by the U.S.

in the internal affairs of Mexico would be distasteful to all
Latin American countries, and would result in more harm than
good."

94

He also wrote Daniels of the "cherished and affec

tionate regard" he had for him.

Secretary Hull received

word from O'Hara on how much the latter regretted "the mis
understanding" between Daniels and American Catholics.
same thoughts O'Hara conveyed to Daniels

h

i

m

s

e

l

f

These

.

Some elements of the Catholic press actually took a
pro-Roosevelt stand.

In Chicago, Cardinal Mundelein's The

N e w World admitted that Daniels was not qualified for his
post but also stressed that Catholics had no right to demand
his resignation.

Indeed,

those who did so only succeeded in

making themselves appear "rather ridiculous."

Daniels was

"in no sense anti-Catholic," but the current actions by some
misguided souls might turn h i m against the Church.

Daniels

was in Mexico to represent the United States, insisted this

94
95

Quoted in Cronon,

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 227.

Rev. John P. O'Hara to Josephus Daniels, December
19, 1934; January 4, 1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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editor, not the Catholic Church, and his mistakes should be
attributed "to ignorance rather than malice."
A significant step toward enlightening public opinion
was taken when William Franklin Sands, professor at George
town University,
anticlericalism.

toured Mexico to investigate the supposed
Sands reported to the American press that

Ambassador Daniels was being unjustly maligned.

Daniels had,

said the professor, gone out of his way to try to resolve the
religious strife in Mexico.

97

There is still more evidence that the Knights of
Columbus did not represent all American Catholics in their
approach to Mexican anticlericalism.

Father John A. Ryan,

96The New W o r l d , October 12, 1934, p. 4; January 18,
1935, p. 4.
The Michigan Catholic attempted to explain the
faux pas committed by Daniels by attributing it to his lack
of Spanish which led him to misinterpret Calles ’ remarks as
simply praising popular education (December 6 , 1934, p. 1);
Commonweal pointed out that the ambassador did have an
excellent record of religious tolerance, and supported A1
Smith in 1928, against the opposition of many of his North
Carolina neighbors (February 15, 1935, p. 441); the Louis
ville paper, The R e c o r d , proclaimed:
"we stand with Presi
dent Roosevelt in his commitment . . . of the United States
to non-interference in the affairs of Mexico" (clipping,
November 21, 1935, Box 778, Daniels Papers); Central-Blatt
and Social Justice Review insisted that the entire problem
was inherited, not caused, by Roosevelt (XXVII, March, 1935,
389) .
9^Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, August 2,
1935, President's Secretary File I, Diplomatic Correspon
dence, Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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for example, rejected the overtures of Maurice A. Tobin to
become involved in a campaign to pressure President Roosevelt
into intervening in Mexico.

Ryan felt that the Borah resolu

tion would certainly fail because it was "an undue interQQ

ference in Mexican affairs." °
Tumulty,

Then there was Joseph P.

former secretary to the late President Wilson, who

was barely persuaded by friends not to publicly answer the
charges Father Coughlin was making against Ambassador
Daniels.

99

Ralph Adams Cram audaciously suggested in the

pages of Commonweal that American Catholics place faith in
the good intentions of President Cardenas.

During a personal

visit to Mexico, Cram found Cardenas to be a reasonable man.
Cram felt that the Mexican Church could only benefit under
his rule .1 0 0
The most evident sign that Catholic opinion on the
United States' role in Mexico was divided was the decision
by the University of Notre Dame to present President Roose
velt with an honorary degree in the midst of his dispute with

Q Q

Rev. John A. Ryan to Maurice A. Tobin, February 19,
1935, Ryan Papers.
99

Joseph P. Tumulty to Josephus Daniels, January 5,
1935, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
100Ralph Adams Cram, "A Note on Mexico," Commonweal,
May 22, 1936, pp. 91-92.
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Martin Carmody.

It is not clear who initiated the idea of

presenting the degree to the President, but Frank C. Walker,
a close advisor of Roosevelt and a graduate of Notre Dame,
was deeply involved in the preliminaries for the ceremony.
Reverend John F. O'Hara, president of the university, was
elated over the idea and telegraphed to FDR on November 6 ,
1935,

formally inviting him to receive an honorary Doctor of

Laws and to speak at a special convocation honoring the
Philippine Commonwealth, recently made independent.

A week

later, O'Hara traveled to Washington for a personal meeting
with the President to iron out all the details.

The priest

even submitted to Marvin McIntyre a draft of his welcoming
speech, asking for any suggestions on its contents.

Quite

clearly the university was anxious to have the President
a p p e a r .1 0 1
Notre Dame officials were not the only ones elated at
the news.

Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University,

a close friend of the administration, expressed delight to
Marguerite LeHand that Notre Dame was granting the President
a degree.

Recalling that Catholic University had acted

3-03-Steve Early to Frank Waler, telegram, November 5,
1935; Rev. John F. O'Hara to President Roosevelt, November 6 ,
1935; November 18, 1935; Rev. John O'Hara to Marvin McIntyre,
December 5, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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similarly in 1933, Sheehy said:

"When we gave him an honorary

degree we made an act of faith in him.
tainly been justified."

That faith has cer

Sheehy pictured Roosevelt as the man

who had saved the country from economic collapse.

In an

obvious reference to the Mexican situation, the priest
regretted the unfortunate "campaign" currently being waged
against the President.

He hoped that Miss LeHand could keep

these attacks from the President’s view and he urged her to
ignore them herself .-*-02
On December 9, 1935, before a large audience at South
Bend, Notre Dame presented honorary degrees to President
Roosevelt and to Senor
and educator.

Carlos

P. Romulo, Philippine editor

Presiding at the ceremony was George Cardinal

Mundelein of Chicago.

Mundelein, an enthusiastic supporter

of Roosevelt, used his opening remarks to make his current
position clear.

The Cardinal explained his presence at Notre

Dame as a guarantee that Roosevelt would be among friends.
He praised the New Deal and FDR's "indominatable perserving
courage."

As for the current quarrel between the President

and the Knights of Columbus, the Cardinal made
neither he nor the Church

102

it clear that

were in politics and that no one

Rev. Maurice S.
Sheehy to Marguerite LeHand,
December 2, 1935, Reel 2, Sel. Mat.
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had a right to speak for the political allegiance of American
Catholics.

Despite this disclaimer,

politics whether he liked it or not.

tJie Cardinal was in
The fact that he

publicly lavished praise on the President at the same time
that the Knights, Bishop Curley, Coughlin, and others were
sharply criticizing him was of political significance.
Harold Ickes was not alone in interpreting the speech as "a
pretty complete endorsement of the President."

When informed

by reporters on the scene that he had virtually given a
nominating speech for the President,
remarked:

the Cardinal merely

"I always go all the way for a friend."

101

Roosevelt, who had hardly expected such an endorse
ment, was especially pleased with the Cardinal's remarks .1 ®4
He prefaced his own speech with an emotional thanks to
Mundelein for his praise.

The President then went on to

speak of the necessity in any "true national life" for the
recognition of the "right of man."

"Supreme among these

rights," said P D R , "we . . . hold to be the rights of freedom
of education and freedom of religious worship."

1 0 3 Gannon,

This was a

Spellman. p. 156; Ickes, D i a r y . I, 479-80;
New York T i m e s , December 10, 1935, pp. 12, 13; Commonweal,
December 20, 1935, p. 216.

104Ickes, Diary, I, 479.

304
clear enough endorsement of religious freedom.'*'®^
Arthur Krock, political editor of the New York T i m e s ,
interpreted the entire affair as a Catholic endorsement of
President Roosevelt and a repudiation of the Carmody and
Curley campaign.

According to Krock, Roosevelt and the New

Dealers were especially pleased by the endorsement of
Cardinal Mundelein, who usually kept out of politics.

His

statement had added meaning because, according to Krock,
"literally millions look for sociological appraisal as well
as spiritual guidance" from the Cardinal.

There were,

thought Krock, three reasons for the Cardinal’s statement.
First, Mundelein wanted to publicly rebuke political clergy
men like Coughlin who had been attacking the New Deal.
Second, he wanted to reprimand laymen like Carmody who had
criticized Roosevelt and usurped the prerogative of the
bishops to speak for the Church.

Finally, he wished "to

endorse his conception of the President's efforts to spread
the blessing of American prosperity."

Krock saw real sig

nificance in the fact that a leader in a conservative force
like the Church should endorse the New Deal at a time when
other so-called conservatives were speaking of communist

■L0^Rosenman, Public Papers, XV, 493-96.
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influence in government.

He concluded:

"the unscheduled,

fervent praise of the Cardinal made the journey far more
notable than any of the White House entourage expected when
the trip was arranged."1^
Other sources did not react as favorably to events at
Notre Dame.

For certain elements in the Church,

it was dis

tinctly embarrassing to have the President granted an honorary
degree from the foremost Catholic university in the land and
be praised by a leading churchman such as Mundelein.

The

editor of the Baltimore Catholic Review, Bishop Curley's
organ,

insisted that Catholics were expressing "deep regret"

over the entire affair.

Monsignor Albert Smith insisted that

the honorary degree was only "in gratitude for the independ
ence of the Philippine Islands, a Catholic country . " ^ ® 7

The

Brooklyn Tablet insisted that Notre Dame would "be years
regaining respect" due to its decision to honor Roosevelt.
As for the President, he should not expect the Catholic voter
to be deceived by his "walking on both sides of the
street."

1 Oft

Finally, the Commonweal insisted that Catholic

IQ^New York T i m e s . December 13, 1935, p. 24.
107c iipping of New York Herald Tri b u n e , December 5,
1935, Reel 1, Sel. M a t .? New York T i m e s , December 5, 1935,
p. 29.

^®November 23, 1935, p. 9; December 21, 1935, p. 11.
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opinion of Roosevelt was not significantly "affected" by the
Notre Dame affair.

As a matter of record, the Catholic

press did not play up the ceremony.
It is difficult to determine what effect all these
Catholic comments had on the internal workings of the Roose
velt administration.

It is clear that the President was

concerned over the pressure being exerted from various
Catholic sources.

When Ambassador Daniels first made his

remark on the Mexican educational system, the storm of pro
test which broke loose was enough to cause Under Secretary of
State Phillips to ask Daniels for an explanation.

"In view

of the political strength of all combined . . .," Phillips
wanted to quote D a n i e l s ' explanation that he was only
praising education in general and that he did not realize
there was anything in the Calles speech dealing with reli
gious matters .^-1 0
The President himself soon felt the pressure of
Catholic protest.

At his press conference of October 17,

1934, he was asked if Daniels was going to be recalled

109December 27, 1935, p. 241.
^ ° M e m o r a n d u m of telephone conversation between
Ambassador Daniels and Under Secretary Phillips, October 14,
1934, Box 777, Daniels Papers.
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because of the recent criticism leveled at him by Catholic
groups.

Roosevelt displayed some irritation and pointed

out that most of these charges sounded " fishy. " H I
When it was rumored that Roosevelt intended to visit
Mexico in the summer of 1935, some Catholic sources became
especially irritated.

Daniels was so afraid of the political

implications of the Catholic criticism being directed at him
that he wanted to avoid having the President involved.
Accordingly he suggested to the President that he put off his
Mexican trip at this time.
Daniels' analysis,

Roosevelt apparently agreed with

for he wrote,

"from present indications

. . . the Borah resolution has not served to quiet things
down and my one great regret is that it may keep me from
Ti n

visiting you . . . this year."

The trip was never made.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Daniels did his best to clear
up the controversy.

He issued a statement through the State

Department reaffirming his dedication to "the principles of
our country with reference to public schools,

lllCronon,

the freedom of

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 210.

112Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, February
1, 1935; Roosevelt to Daniels, February 9, 1935, President's
Personal File, 8 6 , Roosevelt Papers.
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religion and the freedom of the press. " H 3

Privately he

wrote to Roosevelt expressing bitterness over the criticism
being leveled at him.

He pointed out that he had supported

Smith for the presidency in 1928 and had fought the bigots.
His record as Secretary of the Navy was also evident of his
"disregard of a man's church affiliation in public affairs."
In view of this, Daniels said,

"it seems strange that they

could forget my lifetime devotion to freedom of religion and
my freedom from discrimination against Catholics.

. . .

In a letter to the Catholic Columbian Daniels pre
sented a detailed defense of his behavior as Ambassador.
Here he pointed out that he was a Christian,

that he had no

sympathy for atheism, and that he felt the American public
school system was the best in the world.

As for the incident

which precipitated Catholic criticism, Daniels insisted
that, as he understood it, Calles had "simply made a declara
tion for universal education."

Admitting that he had not

seen the entire text of Calles' speech,

the Ambassador could

not understand how anyone could interpret his comments as
being against religion.

This was he wrote, especially

l*3Quoted in Cronon,

"Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 210.

l ^ J o s e p h u s Daniels to President Roosevelt, December
6 , 1934, President's Personal File 8 6 , Roosevelt Papers.
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surprising,

in view of his "lifelong devotior to the pre

cepts of the Christian religion," and his "unbroken opposition
to intolerance in any shape or form .

5

Behind the scenes, Roosevelt did his best to amelio
rate Catholic criticism.

He was greatly assisted by Reverend

John Burke, and to a lesser extent by Judge Martin T. Manton
and Bishop Francis Spellman.

When a particular bishop

requested the President's opinion on the Mexican situation,
Roosevelt generally discussed the reply with Burke, who also
kept Roosevelt up to date on developments in Mexico's atti
tude toward the Church and served as a liaison man to the
Vatican.

116

Burke personally favored a settlement which

would involve only the Mexican Church and government.

He

often expressed embarrassnfent over the political antics of
the Knights of Columbus.

At the same time,

in hopes of

reaching a settlement, Judge Manton sought to arrange a
meeting between Bishop Spellman, another supporter of the

H 5 j osephus Daniels to Catholic Columbian, January 3,
1935, in clipping of January 25, 1935 issue, Reel 1, Sel. M a t .
^-^Confidential memorandum from Marvin McIntyre to
President Roosevelt, May 27, 1935, Official File 146, Mexico
1933-40, Box 1, Roosevelt Papers.
l^Siunner Welles to President Roosevelt, June 25,
1935, President's Secretary File, Diplomatic Correspondence,
Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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administration, and President Cardenas of Mexico.

Roosevelt

was advised of this move and agreed to arrange such a meeting,
provided it was cleared with the Vatican.

Spellman was

personally willing to undertake the job, but the Apostolic
Delegate to the United States, Archbishop Cicognani, pre
ferred that all negotiations between the Church, Roosevelt,
and Mexico be handled by Father Burke.
ing ended with this rebuttal.
to Spellman,

All hopes of a meet

Judge Manton felt, according

that the Church was "missing a good oppor

tunity. 1,118
Besides these maneuvers, Roosevelt himself publicly
made statements favoring religious freedom on at least three
different occasions in 1935.

These included his reply to

the Congressional petition of July 18, his speech at San
Diego on October 2, and his remarks at Notre Dame.
As the election year of 1936 approached,

it was only

natural that the administration should hope that Catholic
criticism would abate.

Certain elements in the Church, how

ever, were interested in keeping the issue alive.

The

Knights of Columbus refused to accept Roosevelt's letter of

1 1 8 Gannon,

Spellman, cites diary, July 10, 1935, p.
118; Judge Martin T. Manton to President Roosevelt, July 11,
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers.
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November 13 as the last word on the subject of Mexico.
Indeed, one Catholic priest called the letter "an affront to
the sense of equity of the multitude of American Catholics."

119

Martin Carmody continued to take his case to the

public over the radio and in public appearances.

Over the

Boston air waves he insisted that the Knights had never
called for intervention in Mexico and that the President had
brought this up to confuse the i s s u e . I n

Philadelphia

Carmody spoke publicly against the administration.

Here,

however, he was confronted with a counterattack by Michael
Francis Doyle who had a rebuttal published in the local news
paper.

Roosevelt was so impressed with Doyle's defense that

he sent it to Father Burke "with the thought that it might
be extensively used."

121

The Catholic press also did a good job of keeping the
Mexican issue alive in 1936.

Columbia naturally reported

faithfully the speeches of Carmody.
national Catholic monthly,

The editor of The S i g n ,

felt that the Mexican government

H ^ R e v . George J. Reid to Editor, Commonwea1 , January
3, 1936, p. 274.
^ ^The Boston P i l o t . February 29, 1936, p. 1.
^ l w i c h a e l p f Doyle to Marvin McIntyre, March 2, 1936;
Roosevelt Memorandum, March 14, 1936, Reel 2, Sel. M a t .
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was not acting as if President Roosevelt had given his
blessing to its anticlericalism.

These critical ideas were

shared by Reverend Theophane Magu i r e , a contributer to The
S i g n , who warned that Roosevelt's "nice but innocuous" words
did not confuse American Catholics about the extent of his
sympathy.

122
*

As evidence of the United St a t e s ' responsibility

for the chaos in Mexico, America pointed to the fact that
Daniels, who had demonstrated his incompetence, was still in
office.

123

In another Catholic periodical, L i g h t , Frederick

V. Williams sought to answer the pro-Calles views presented
by Cram in Commonweal.

Williams felt that Cram had been

influenced by the propaganda put out by Washington, which
was aimed at saving the Catholic vote.

But Williams was sure

that Roosevelt and the Democratic party had "no doubt lost
this election year by the refusal of the President to check
our Ambassador . . .

in his flagrant support of the Communist

persecution of the Church,"124

1 2 ^Columbia, May, 1936, p. 3; Clipping of The S i g n ,
April, 1936, p. 523, Box 777, Daniels Papers.

123ciipping of A m e r i c a , February 29, 1936, p. 487,
Box 777, Daniels Papers.
1 2 4 F.

V. Williams, "An Answer to Cram," L i g h t , July,
1936, clipping in Box 777, Daniels Papers.
This magazine
was the official organ of the International Catholic Truth
Society.
Other evidence of continued disenchantment with
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There were certain signs developing, however,

to

indicate that this belligerent attitude by the Knights of
Columbus and others had in reality antagonized more people
than it had converted.

The Knights were accused of having

political motives behind their campaign against Roosevelt.
Frank Picard of Saginaw, Michigan, wrote to Martin Carmody
to express disappointment over the campaign against the
first President to have given Catholics "a fair deal."

He

further accused the Supreme Knights of attempting to split
the northern Catholic vote in order to throw the 1936
election to the Republicans.

"I do resent,"

said Picard,

"this damned Republican propaganda under the guise of
religion."125

This same charge was made by Joseph Leib of

South Bend, Indiana.

To both men Carmody gave assurance

that "there has been nothing political, partisan, or per
sonal in the position of the Knights of Columbus."

Further

more, he would not permit such an issue to be made a political
football.

the Roosevelt foreign policy appeared, meanwhile, in many
diocesan papers.
See also The Catholic W o r l d , CXLIII
(August, 1936), 620-21; Commonweal, August 14, 1936, p. 388;
The Boston P i l o t , September 12, 1936, p. 1, and The Catholic
Transcript, March 12, 1936, p. 4.
125Frank Picard to Martin Carmody, April 12, 1935,
Official File, 28, Roosevelt Papers.
126joseph Leib to President Roosevelt, December 16,
1935, Official File 28, Roosevelt Papers; New York T i m e s ,
December 13, 1935, p. 14.
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Despite these comments bv Carmody, many individuals
still feared that the Mexican controversy was going to hurt
Roosevelt with Catholic voters at the polls in 1936.
Josephus Daniels,

for one, was not worried about his own

reputation among Catholics, but was chiefly concerned "lest
some politicians might seek to arouse Church opposition to
Roosevelt in the next presidential election."

Daniels,

who expressed this opinion to President Roosevelt as early
as August,

1935, was not alone in this estimation.

Frank

Tannenbaum, a noted Columbia University economist who was an
authority on Latin America, also feared Catholic political
reprisal.

With these fears in mind, he had even attempted

to convince Mexican officials to grant more religious free
dom to Catholics.

The professor reported to Ambassador

Daniels that he had a verbal assurance from President
Cardenas that Mexico would conduct its religious policy in
such a way that it could not be used to hurt Roosevelt
politically.

Daniels himself suggested that Catholic opinion

be soothed by "liberal dosages of patronage."

1 2 ft

127j0 sephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, 1947), p. 179.
12®Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, August
26, 1935, President's Secretary File I, Diplomatic Corr.,
Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
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At first, the Roosevelt administration was divided
over how to combat the political problems raised by the
Mexican affair.

Jim Farley wanted Daniels to take an active

part in the campaign, because he thought the Ambassador's
influence would help the ticket in certain sections of the
country.

Secretary Hull and others, however,

felt it would

be best to keep Daniels out of the campaign and attempt to
ignore the entire issue.

129

While division of Catholic opinion no doubt had some
effect on Roosevelt's method of handling this politically
sensitive issue, it does not entirely explain his actions.
Roosevelt was primarily interested in domestic issues in
1935 and 1936 and wanted to avoid any foreign squabbles.
But the President also was firmly convinced that any action
similar to that requested by the Knights of Columbus could
only hurt both the Catholic Church and United States-Mexican
relations.

Consummate politician that he was, Roosevelt

l ^ c r o n o n , Josephus Daniels in M e x i c o , p. 109.
■*-3^Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 219, advances
this view, but it could be argued that the difficulties
Roosevelt was having with domestic issues would make him more
prone to placate Catholic criticism at home.
He would sacri
fice a foreign policy, one not considered of prime importance
at the time, to insure Catholic support for his New Deal
legislation.
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correctly calculated that American Catholic opposition was
divided and, therefore, unlikely to be of significance in
the 1936 election.

Indeed, his public statements and private

actions, although undoubtedly quite sincere, were phrased in
such a way as to retain the sympathy of many Catholics.
Of course, the overwhelming victory of 1936 clearly indicates
that no large minority group, Catholic or otherwise, deserted
Roosevelt at the polls.
Roosevelt's political acumen and actions, however,
were only one reason why the Mexican issue was not signifi
cant in November, 1936.
ism came in 1935.

The height of Mexican anticlerical

By 1936, some improvements in Mexican

Church-State relations had been made.

One student of the

period believes that "had the elections taken place some
eighteen months earlier . . . Roosevelt would have lost some
votes.',3-32

As it was, the divided opinion of American Cath

olics gave the administration tactical room to maneuver, and
the solid cooperation of such men as Burke, Mundelein, Calla
han, and Doyle was a valuable asset.
If the Mexican episode did not have political

^■■^Cronon, "Mexican Anticlericalism," p. 219.
132Ibid., p. 224.
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repercussions in 1936, it was still important for a number
of reasons.

The entire affair demonstrated the difficulties

the Church experienced when it attempted to exert political
leverage.

It is true that Roosevelt was sympathetic to the

Church and gave Catholics extensive recognition, but this
did not mean that he could be pressured into actions that he
considered contrary to the best interest of the country.
Finally,

the Mexican affair demonstrated a number of things

about the American Catholic Church.

Obviously this was no

monolithic institution which could demand unity of thought
and action by its members concerning a largely secular topic.
Furthermore, when voting time arrived in 1936, Catholics
reacted in much the same way as their fellow citizens; they
agreed that foreign affairs were not the most pressing
problem facing America.

CHAPTER XI

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1936

If Mexican anticlericalism was not to be a significant
issue in the campaign of 1936, there were still many other
topics which made both Roosevelt and the Catholic Church
especially conscious of each other's existence and power.
While Ambassador Daniels persisted in emphasizing that Mexico
might still be an issue, Jim Farley was warning the President
that the charge of communism in the administration was begin
ning to evoke sympathetic audiences, especially among
Catholics.

Father Charles Coughlin, an old supporter of the

New Deal, had by this time become totally disenchanted and
was sponsoring a third-party movement behind the political
figurehead of William Lemke.

A1 Smith and the American

Liberty League were pushing hard the theme of constitutional
government, a phenomenon that they insisted had disappeared
under FDR.

On the bright side, however, the President could

count on the support of such prominent prelates as Cardinal
Mundelein of Chicago, Father John Ryan of Washington, and a
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number of influential Catholic laymen.

The election results

of 1936 showed clearly that fears of American Catholics
defecting from the Democratic party were unfounded.
The administration, however, had no way of foreseeing
this in early 1936.

Furthermore,

there were numerous signs

on the horizon which pointed to disenchantment of Catholics
with the New Deal.

Already some of them had tried to

capitalize on dissatisfaction over the Mexican anticleri
calism.

Now,

from Mexico, Ambassador Daniels wrote to the

President that he should make sure that "there is a Catholic
in your cabinet."

Without one the administration would

leave itself wide open for charges of religious discrimina
tion.

In addition, Daniels remarked that he was advised

that Bishop Kelley of Oklahoma was actively campaigning for
Landon and would be "an advisor" for him.

"If the Republi

can Catholics are going to be active for Landon," said
Daniels,

"I am sure you will do as you have been doing to

show such recognition as their long devotion to the party
deserves to able Democrats of that faith."^

Specifically,

^■Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, June 22,
1936, President's Personal File, 86, Roosevelt Papers.
P. H.
Callahan wrote Daniels frequently during 1936 expressing
fear that Mexico would be used to win Catholics away from
FDR.
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Daniels felt that Michael Francis Doyle deserved recognition
for the splendid work he was doing in combating the criti
cism of the Knights of Columbus regarding the Mexican ques
tion.

The Ambassador enthusiastically endorsed Doyle for

the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy.^
Daniels was not the only one to be concerned with the
allegiance of American Catholics to the Democratic party
during 1936.

His concern was now reinforced by Mary W.

Dewson, Democratic National Committeewoman.

Miss Dewson had

received letters from other politically active women which
indicated that Ambassador Daniels ' indifference toward
Mexico's anticlericalism was hurting the party's image among
Catholics.

She expressed the wish to Eleanor Roosevelt that

the President might make Daniels "Secretary of War, or someth ing."^
Roosevelt himself had occasion to be reminded of the
sensitivity of the Catholic vote when he received warning
from Reverend H. J. Watterson of Westfield, New Jersey, that
the administration's attitude toward Mexico was going to cost

^Josephus Daniels to President Roosevelt, March 30,
1936, Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
^Miss Mary W. Dewson to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
October 19, 1936, Official File 237, Roosevelt Papers.
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the party votes in November.

The President replied by

expressing appreciation for the priest's frank expression
and personally regretting that it was not within his power
to solve this question.^
There were a number of other issues raised during the
course of the 1936 campaign which provoked strong interest
among American Catholics.

One of the most important was the

defection from the Democratic party of Alfred E. Smith.

The

ex-Governor had been moving away from the Roosevelt adminis
tration ever since the very beginnings of the New Deal.

His

discontent rested on the argument that it was necessary to
fight for the preservation of states-rights against the ever
growing power of the central government.

Smith's criticism

reached its apogee on January 25, 1936, when he addressed a
star-studded meeting of the American Liberty League at the
Mayflower Hotel in Washington.

In a speech that was praised

by Pierre S. duPont and other leaders of American capitalism,
Smith attacked the New Deal and Roosevelt as being communistoriented.

^Rev. H. J. Watterson to President Roosevelt, July 5,
1936, Official File 146-A, Mexico miscellaneous, Box 4,
Roosevelt Papers.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval
(Boston, 1960), p. 519.

322
Joseph T. Robinson, who ran on Smith's ticket for
vice-president in 1928, was designated as the administra
tion's spokesman to reply to Smith.

The main theme of

Robinson's rebuttal was the fact that Smith had deserted the
cause of progressivism,

for which he had fought in New York

state, to take the side of the barons of wealth.

Roosevelt

himself never once publicly attacked Smith and even tried to
regain his friendship after the Liberty League speech.**
The actual political effect of S m i t h ’s defection and
his subsequent support of Governor Landon is difficult to
assess.

Rexford Tugwell has stated that Smith probably did

not hurt Roosevelt among Catholic voters in 1936.
biographer, Oscar Handlin,

S m i t h ’s

is careful to point out that

Smith chose to leave the New Deal at a time when the National
Catholic Welfare Conference was praising Roosevelt's efforts,
and that few people followed him.

Q

There are other indica

tions that most Catholics were embarrassed by the New
Yorker's rebellion from the party.

It is true that C. W.

Thompson, political analyst for Commonweal, hailed the

6I b i d ., pp. 519, 520.
7
Tugwell, Democratic Roosevelt, pp. 172-73.
8Handlin, A1 Smith. p. 181.
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Liberty League speech by Smith as being significant because
it started a movement away from Roosevelt among prominent
Southern and New England Democrats.^
was not shared by others.

Yet Thompson's analysis

In Chicago, a meeting of the

Catholic Conference on Social Problems was the occasion for
strong criticism of A1 Smith's speech.
Of more significance, because of its greater depth,
was the criticism of Smith made by Reverend Ignatius W. Cox,
who gave a radio address called "The American Liberty League
and Our Immoral Economic Order" on February 7, 1936, in New
York City.

Basing his remarks on the Papal encyclicals, Cox

asked the rhetorical question:

"In reacting so strongly

against the danger of collectivism, has the American Liberty
League fallen into the lap of the opposite danger, branded by
Pius XI as Individualism?"

The League,

said Cox, seemed to

be primarily interested in the welfare of the individual,
while Catholic social thought placed emphasis on the common
welfare.

The emphasis on rugged individualism, espoused by

the League and by Smith, was an aspect of modern thought
which "no Catholic who knows Catholic social doctrine can
approve."

As for Governor Smith, he had grossly over-

9C. W. Thompson,
March 6, 1936, p. 509.

"As the Primaries Begin," Commonweal,
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simplified the issue by saying that the present struggle was
between communism and constitutional government.
plutocracy was just as dangerous as communism.

To Cox,
He pointed

out that "not all regimentation is communistic," and that
too long had economic forces been unregulated in the United
States.

The priest chided Smith for pointing to communism

as the main danger facing America.

In fact communism was

only a symptom of the economic liberalism favored by the
Liberty League.

This latter force was the real danger to

America, and he suggested that Smith direct his efforts
against it rather than sponsor it.10

These remarks by

Father Cox were widely publicized as evidence that neither
Smith nor the American Liberty League spoke for the Church
on social issues.11
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University
also took exception to the speech by ex-Governor Smith.
Writing to Miss Margaret LeHand, Sheehy said that he had
"given considerable thought to the possible effect of

1(^Rev. Ignatius W. Cox, "The American Liberty League
and Our Immoral Economic Order," The Catholic M i n d , XXIV
(March 8, 1936), 113-21; "Constitutional Liberty and Our
Immoral Economic Order," The Catholic M i n d , XXXIV (March 8,
1936), 105-13.

1]~New York Times, February 8, 1936, p. 2; Commonweal.
March 20, 1936, p. 577.
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Governor Smith's speech on the Catholic following of Presi
dent Roosevelt."

The President might not consider it of any

significance, remarked the priest, but it "has been a major
heartache to those who expected nobler things of Governor
Smith."

After all, Smith was not only condemning the Presi

dent in his speech; he was indirectly criticizing "the
leaders of his Church, including Cardinal Hayes."

This

followed because Hayes and others had forthrightedly
endorsed the aims of the New Deal on many occasions.

It was

this same philosophy of the common good which Smith now
labeled "socialism."

Clearly,

said Sheehy,

"Governor Smith

perhaps forgets that the greatest foe of Communism was the
Catholic Church, and the most earnest champions of President
Roosevelt's social policies have been the Catholic bishops."
As to the political implications of Smith's defection,
Sheehy was sure, on the basis of his talks with three
bishops,
dent.

12

that Catholics were more than ever behind the PresiOthers felt the same way.

In the East, Ed Flynn,

Senator Robert Wagner, and other New York politicos reported
that Smith's decision would have little impact on the
voters.

l2Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Miss Margaret LeHand,
January 30, 1936, Reel 2, Sel. M a t .
13Ickes, D i a r y , I, 687, 698-99.
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Still, as the campaign progressed,

it became clear

that the major charges made by Smith— the disappearance of
constitutional government and communist influence in the
administration— struck a sympathetic chord with some Catholic
leaders.

Certain elements in the Church were beginning to

express dissatisfaction with the course of the New Deal.

F.

P. Kenkel, editor of the Central-Blatt and Social Justice
R e v i e w , directed his attack more at Roosevelt's advisors than
at the President himself.

Kenkel felt the Brain Trust was

attempting to foster a planned economy on the people,
spite the Constitution."

"de

Applauding the decisions of the

Supreme Court on NRA and AAA,

this editor felt that the New

Deal was doomed to failure from the start "because its
provisions were incompatible, not alone with the organic law
of the land,

. . . but with the traditions and the very

spirit of the American people."

Some relief was given to

the people, but it was incorporated in a scheme of economic
nationalism and state-socialism.

The main culprits in this

scheme were not the elected officials but rather people like
Hugh Johnson and James Warburg, who, Kenkel felt, aimed at
the destruction of the middle class in America.

As for the

assertion that their ideas resembled the Papal encyclicals,
Kenkel insisted that this was a mere "enchanting fancy,
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which the men chiefly responsible for Mr. Roosevelt's planned
economy . . . were at no pains to destroy."

The Pope's plan

envisioned no such large exercise of state power, but rather
would have the state "discharge its obligations . . . through
the professional organizations, accepting all the tasks they
are able to fulfill.
A number of other Catholic editors were also breaking
away from the Roosevelt consensus.

Patrick Scanlan of The

Brooklyn T a b l e t , one of the President's strongest Mexican
critics, wrote that Roosevelt's popularity was slipping.

He

attributed this decline to such things as continued high
unemployment, prolific government spending, and poorly
designed laws.

The planned economy was an obvious fraud, so

why not admit it, felt Scanlan,

instead of preaching class

hatred and insinuating that it was a crime to make more
money than one's n e i g h b o r . ^

In New England, The Boston

Pilot was crying out against what it considered another
attempt by the government to over-regulate the private lives
of its citizens, an idea which had recently proved futile in

^ F . P. Kenkel, "New Deals," Central-Blatt and Social
Justice Re v i e w , XXVIII (March, 1936), 381-83; (July-August,
1936), 115-18..
1 5The Brooklyn T a b l e t , April 6, 1935, p. 9; July 4,
1936, p. 9.
i

prohibition.

The editor insisted that the same tendency was

present in the “twenty thousand regulations . . . enacted
since 1933."

This constant growth of bureaucratic govern

ment should be checked for it tended toward one-man rule.
Indeed, remarked the editor,

"it is possible that the country

is somewhat nearer dictatorship than the average citizen
realizes."16

Reverend James Gillis, editor of The Catholic

W o r l d , lamented the defection of A1 Smith from the Roosevelt
cause but could sympathize with him.

Excessive government

spending, continued unemployment, and the disrespect for the
Constitution which seemed to be characteristics of the New
Deal were causing Gillis himself to have second thoughts
*

about the President.

17

'

Even Commonweal, a pro-Roosevelt

publication, was concerned enough to question the President's
"strength as a candidate for re-election."

The editor

remarked that "the essential dissatisfaction was . . . less
with

‘planned government* as such than with the evidence to

show that the planning hadn't actually been planned."1®
Reverend Edward Lodge Curran, president of the International

16The Boston P i l o t . February 1, 1936, p. 4.
17The Catholic W o r l d . CXLIII (April,
18

Commonweal, April 17, 1936, p. 674.

1936), 1-9.
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Catholic Truth Society, was so disturbed about the course of
New Deal legislation in 1936 that he suggested that Cath
olics ought to band together as a group to fight to preserve
the Constitution.

1Q

The most dangerous indication of Catholic dissatis
faction, however, was seen in the political activities of
#

Father Charles Coughlin, the radio priest from Detroit.
Coughlin was especially effective among people who feared
communist influence in government, because red infiltration
of the New Deal was one of his favorite themes.

Before

1936, Coughlin was not significant in the story of Catholic
relations with the New Deal.

He represented primarily a

personal movement which, while perhaps revealing certain
aspects of Catholic thought, was not entirely within the
mainstream of the Catholic Church.^®

Yet in 1935 and 1936

he entered the political scene in such direct fashion that
he prompted many members of the Catholic Church to take a
more direct role in the presidential election.

19Ibid., October 30, 1936, p. 3.
^ C h a r l e s J. Tull, "Father Coughlin, The New Deal,
and The Election of 1936" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Notre Dame, 1962), p. 217, writes that it is
perfectly clear that the radio priest did not represent a
concerted political effort on the part of the Catholic
Church in America.
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A history of Father Coughlin's relations with the New
Deal is not at issue here.

It is clear that in the early

stages of the Roosevelt administration, he was an enthusias
tic backer of the President, and that his support was wel
comed.

The break in this relationship seems to have

developed partially over the fight to have the United States
join the World Court in January,

1935.

Roosevelt favored

this move, but Coughlin is attributed with helping to defeat
it in Congress.

One should not, however, place too much

emphasis on any one event, but rather consider the growing
estrangement as inevitable in view of the strong personalities involved.

21

It might be well here to sketch the course of this
estrangement.

As early as February,

1935, Coughlin was

charging that the administration had communist tendencies.
In the same speech, however, he paradoxically insisted that
Roosevelt was also a tool of capitalism.22

On November 17,

1935, the priest seemed to take an irrevocable step when he

21

Dyson, "The Quest for Power," p. 29, points to two
factors leading to the break:
Coughlin favored inflation to
cure the depression while FDR had already tried this and
found it wanting; Coughlin wanted to be an intimate advisor
and public spokesman for the New Deal, but FDR was not
interested.

^Tull,

"Father Coughlin," p. 107.
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publicly announced that the principles of his movement for
social justice and the aims of the Roosevelt administration
were “unalterably opposed."

As long as the President

entertained both communistic schemes and the support of the
plutocrats

(an unwitting compliment to Roosevelt's political

dexterity)r he would be unable to effectively bring relief
to the American people.

Later, on June 5, 1936, Coughlin

retreated some by asserting that the President was probably
not personally conscious of the communistic tendencies
within some of his new schemes, but was "being driven by
sinister influences he does not fully comprehend."

23

This

was only a momentary lapse, however, and as the campaign got
under way, Coughlin, who was leading the support for William
Lemke and his Union Party, became even more vitriolic.
New Bedford, Massachusetts,

In

the priest reached a high point

of inanity when he publicly declared:

"As I was instrumental

in removing Herbert Hoover from the White House,

so help me

God, I will be instrumental in taking a Communist out of the
chair once occupied by Washington. "^4

Later in the campaign,

Coughlin was guilty of such indiscretions as calling the

23t u 11, "Father Coughlin," pp. 140, 167.
24I b i d . , p. 187.
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President a liar and a "scab."
The main significance of this performance is not the
neurosis which gripped this particular priest, but rather
the reaction his performance prompted from both the Catholic
Church and from the administration.

This reaction resulted

not so much from concern with Coughlin the individual as
with concern over his role as a Catholic priest and the
impact he was having upon the Catholic image in the United
States.

It is from this point of view that Coughlin should

be viewed here, without reference to the merits or demerits
of his philosophy and personality.

He was an irritant, and

as such both the Church and the administration had to come
to grips with him.
The outbursts of Smith and Coughlin were not isolated
phenomena.

Both men had an effect on the Catholic populace

of the nation.

Perhaps not all priests were so influenced

by Coughlin as was Reverend James A. Smith, pastor of a
Catholic Church in Long Island, who urged his congregation
not to vote for Roosevelt because of his "red" affiliations,
but there is evidence of growing concern among Catholics
with this charge.25

In 1936 it appeared that the Church was

^ New York T i m e s , November 2, 1936, p. 2; Dyson,
"The Quest for Power," p. 57, says that the priest's
concentration on communism was especially attractive to
Catholic voters.
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in the midst of a crusade against communism.

Lay organiza

tions such as the Catholic Daughters of America, Notre Dame
Alumni, and the Holy Name Society were all active in this
denunciation of the "Red Menace."26
So popular was the charge that even Roosevelt was
becoming concerned with its effect on his public image.

On

September 29, 1936, in Syracuse, New York, he publicly dis
associated himself from the Marxist movement.

He said:

Here and now, once and for all, let us bury that
red hearing and destroy that false issue. . .
I
have not sought, I do not seek, I repudiate the
support of any advocate of Communism or of any
other alien "ism" which would by fair means or foul
change our American democracy.
That is my position.
It has always been my position.
It always will be
my position.2?
There was a prelude to this strong statement by the President
which is worth mentioning here.

Sumner Welles had reported

to Roosevelt the substance of a conversation he had with
Charles Taussig of New York.

Taussig had called Welles to

report that he and Adolph Berle had dined with Bishop Molloy
of Brooklyn and "certain other prominent Catholics."

The

clerics had expressed sincere concern about the communism

26Darrow,

"Catholic Political Power," p. 60.

2^Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of
Upheaval, p. 620.
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charges being labeled against the administration.

Both

Taussig and Berle were now "deeply disturbed and worried" by
the effect that Coughlin, with his wild accusations about
Roosevelt's leftist proclivities, was producing among Roman
Catholics.

Welles suggested to Roosevelt that Berle might

write a speech dealing with this question for delivery by
the President on Columbus Day.

Apparently the administration

was well aware of this situation because Secretary Hull
replied to Welles that the President had decided to deal with
this charge of communism in his address to the Democratic
State convention of New York at Syracuse on September 29.

28

The speech that Roosevelt gave on September 29 should
have satisfactorily ended the matter.
was not to be the case.

Unfortunately,

this

Despite Roosevelt's forthrightness,

Father Gillis of The Catholic World complained that the
speech lacked precision in its condemnation of communism.
Gillis attributed this lack of precision to "a want of com
plete intellectual honesty."

The priest also pinpointed the

issues of the campaign as "the decline of democracy,

the

increase in centralization of governmental powers, and the

^®Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, September 25,
1936, President's Personal File 182, Roosevelt Papers.
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possible emergence of the absolute state."*29

Jim Parley was

still so concerned over the effect of the communist charges
that he „jked Roosevelt to consider "calling Cardinal
Mundelein in Chicago and asking if he would be willing to
make a statement."

While Farley did not expect the Cardinal

to come out publicly for Roosevelt, he did feel that Munde
lein would announce that there were no communists connected
with the administration.

Roosevelt, however, demurred on

this suggestion, although he remained well aware oi' the
importance of Cardinal Mundelein's support.
Still,

w

the administration had to evolve skillful

tactics to deal with Coughlin ai.d his charge

^f communism.

Because of his unique scaJ us as a Roman Catholic priest in
politics and becaur * of his fanatical appeal, Coughlin pre
sented specia

problems."*1

Roosevelt himself was certainly

Catholic W o r l d , CXLIV (November,

1936),

129, 132.

30

Farley to Roosevelt, October 23, 1936, President's
Personal Iile 321, Roose\ -It Papers.
Roosevelt felt that
Welter Cummings was a better man for the job suggested by
Farley.
■^Scholars have pointed out another reason why Roose
velt took notice of Father Coug h l i n ’s political activity:
the possibility that he mighu be able to "bridge the gulf
between t.io rur^.l fundamentalist Protestants and the urban
Irish Catholics."
James Shenton, "The Coughlin Movement,"
p. ”'54 and Peter Morris, "Father Coughlin," p. 22 fn. ,
accept this, out Morris substitutes "old Populist agrarians"
for "rural fundamentalist."
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aware of the difficulties Coughlin could cause.
debate on the Bonus bill in January,

During the

1936, a measure which

Coughlin vigorously supported and which Congress passed over
Roosevelt's veto, the two men came into direct conflict.
Roosevelt was reported to have been so upset over the
priest's antics that he threatened to release incriminating
material on Coughlin's financial dealings.

The President

also played around with the idea of conferring with Cardinals
Hayes, O'Connell, and Mundelein "to show them the attacks a
priest had made on the President and ask them how this jibed
with their theory that the Catholic Church should have an
ambassador in each country.
Roosevelt's political acumen, however, was too sharp
to allow him to carry out this threat.

He continued a policy

of active silence which had earlier caused him to send Frank
Murphy,

just returned from his post as Governor of the

Philippines to run for Governor of Michigan, to see Coughlin,
an old friend of the Irishman.

Murphy's mission was to try

to dissuade Coughlin from engaging in political debate during
1936.

Several long talks between Murphy and the priest

followed.

The former even went on the radio to try to

^Blum,

From the Morqenthau D i a r i e s , p. 255.
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counteract some of Coughlin's charges against the President.
All of this had little effect, however, as Coughlin continued
his barrage.

The extent to which Murphy and Coughlin fell

out over Roosevelt is indicated by the fact that the priest
eventually supported the Republican candidate for Governor
O "I

of Michigan against Murphy. J
The official strategy of the administration throughout
1936, however, was to avoid public condemnation of the priest.
When this rule was broken by Secretary Ickes, who gave a
speech criticizing Coughlin, Roosevelt expressed displeasure
over it: at a cabinet meeting.

34

The President preferred to

ignore the priest publicly but to exploit the sympathy among
Catholics which his attacks produced.

Ickes and Farley

informally sounded out such political figures as Senator
Robert Wagner and Ed Flynn on the effect of Coughlin and
OC

Smith's attacks among Catholics.

The President was well-

advised not to publicly attack Coughlin, but to let him
continue on his way until he had irritated his fellow

^ L u n t , "Prank Murphy,” p. 137; Tull,
Coughlin," p. 124.
^Dyson,

"Father

"The Quest for Power," p. 70.

^Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 222; Ickes, Diary, I,
686.
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Catholics with his tactics.

This is precisely what happened

in Catholic circles which controlled most of the Church's
public expression.

Although there was never any official

condemnation of Coughlin by a joint meeting of the American
bishops, as we shall see, most bishops, priests,

and laymen

grew more and more disillusioned as his tactics increased in
vehemence.
While it is difficult to abstract the motives which
caused the Church to be critical of Coughlin, certain tend
encies are evident.

One central fact is that many of the

clergy were avid supporters of Franklin Roosevelt.

They

recognized the President's contributions in attacking the
depression and appreciated his liberal approach toward the
Church.

To hear Coughlin call the President a liar and a

communist was enough to cause this element intense embarrass
ment.

Secondly, a number of Catholics expressed dismay that

Coughlin's efforts were destroying the good relations which
the Church had developed with the Roosevelt administration.
This was the argument advanced by Reverend Maurice Sheehy of
Catholic University.
In confronting the Coughlin movement the Church faced
a dilemma.

It was clear that the priest's attacks were

alienating many non-Catholics and that many were looking upon
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him as the official spokesman of the Church.

Doctor Walter

Maier, professor at the Concordia Lutheran Theological Semi
nary of St. Louis, expressed a popular idea when he publicly
stated that Coughlin had not been repudiated by his Church,
but rather that he "talks personally with Rome by radio
phone," and "if ever Coughlinism should triumph . . . his
church would capitalize the triumph,

for the voice behind

that radio priest is the voice of his church."

This was

announced to a crowd of 4,500 at an annual Lutheran Day
ceremony.

36

Maier's outburst was supplemented by a more rational
approach from the editor of the New Republic, who,

in an

article on the political significance of the Coughlin move
ment, judged it to mean the entrance of the Catholic Church
into American politics.
claiming,

This evaluation he defended by

first, that Coughlin was the best man to organize

Christian socialism in this country.

Second, the Inter

national influence of the Vatican was slipping in Europe,
which made the conquest of the United States imperative.
Third, Coughlin's attacks on Roosevelt had attracted Cath
olics, many of whom, on religious grounds, opposed the

^ New York Times, August 2, 1936, p. 12.
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President because of his s o n ’s divorce, Eleanor's support of
birth control, and the condoning of anticlericalism in Mexico
07

by Josephus Daniels.

'

It seemed that a growing number of Americans were
beginning to equate Coughlin's remarks with the official
position of the Catholic Church.

Yet the Church could not

officially silence the radio priest.

A number of difficul

ties stood in the way of such an action.

As long as Coughlin

had the support of his bishop, Michael Gallagher of Detroit,
he could not be touched short of Papal intervention.
Secondly, many priests were conscious of the fact that
Coughlin had such a hold on his followers that many of them
would desert the Church if he should be attacked.

Finally,

there was also the problem of publicity which would arise if
the Church did silence Coughlin.

Liberals would take this

as proof of the Church's basic antipathy toward civil rights
as expressed in the Constitution.^8

Altogether,

the

Coughlin movement presented a rather delicate situation to
the Church.
Despite the lack of an official position,

there is

37t u 11, "Father Coughlin," pp. 178-79.
3®Dyson,

"The Quest for Power," pp. 71, 80, 81.
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abundant evidence of the Church's displeasure with Coughlin's
political activities and with his attacks on the Roosevelt
administration.

This displeasure was expressed by a process

of disassociation of elements of the Church from the Coughlin
movement, by public deploring of the priest's tactics, and by
public and private support for the President.
Expressions by Catholic hierarchy seemed to indicate
that a large number of disenchanted bishops privately de
plored Coughlin's activities.

Among the three Cardinals in

America there was unanimity regarding the radio priest.
Cardinal O'Connell of Boston, an old foe of Coughlin, spoke
of "hysterical voices among the clergy" which were out of
keeping with the priestly vocation.39

Cardinal Hayes also

privately resented Coughlin's attacks on Roosevelt.

Most

significant, however, was the role played by Cardinal
Mundelein of Chicago.

Mundelein was an old supporter of the

President and was eager to help erase the impression that
the Catholic Church was speaking through the voice of Father
Coughlin.

40

Publicly, Mundelein stated that Father Coughlin

39Quoted by Tull,

"Father Coughlin," p. 132.

4 ^Later the President was to write Josephus Daniels
that Mundelein had been "perfectly magnificent all through
the campaign."
See President Roosevelt to Josephus Daniels,
November 9, 1936, President’s Secretary File, Diplomatic
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had a right to his own political view, by virtue of his
American citizenship,

"but he is not authorized to speak for

the Catholic Church, nor does he represent the doctrine or
sentiments of the Church."41

In September,

1936, Mundelein

publicly expressed his support for the Roosevelt administra
tion and praised the prosperity which it had returned to the
United States.4 ^
These public remarks and private actions were not
without their effect.

Arthur Krock of the New York Times

commented on the great reception given Roosevelt in Chicago
during the campaign.

Searching for reasons for this support,

Krock pointed to "the sympathetic attitude toward him [FDR]
of the eminent Catholic hierarchy in this city and State,
chief of whom is Cardinal Mundelein."

According to Krock,

Mundelein felt that FDR's re-election was "necessary

C o r r . , Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt Papers.
In this same letter
FDR suggested to Daniels that he look into the feasibility
of opening a Catholic seminary in Mexico City to train
natives for the priesthood.
Mundelein had suggested such a
seminary for Texas, but FDR felt it should be located in
Mexico itself and suggested to Daniels that "the germ of the
idea might be planted with good effect."
These remarks are
cited only to illustrate the close relationship which existed
between Mundelein and FDR.
41

Quoted in Shannon, American Irish, p. 317.

J A

Clipping of Chicago Daily T i m e s , September 15, 1936,
in Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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definitely to rout the forces of social radicalism.
Edward J. Kelly, Mayor of Chicago, placed great emphasis
upon the Cardinal's support when analyzing FDR's political
fortunes in Illinois.

After the Cardinal had publicly

praised the New Deal, Kelly wrote to the President and
stressed the fact that Mundelein was held in high esteem by
millions of Catholics and non-Catholics in the area.
the slightest comment," said the mayor,
indirect,
admirers."

"Even

"either direct or

is accepted as a standard by his followers and
Mundelein's words of praise would "therefore be

highly productive in [FDR'sJ favor at the proper time."

AA

Other elements of the hierarchy were also sympathetic
with the Roosevelt cause.

Of significance in measuring this

sympathy are the remarks of Reverend Maurice Sheehy.

As

early as July 18, 1936, Sheehy was writing to the administra
tion on the political implications of the Coughlin movement.
At this time Sheehy described a meeting at the WaldorfAstoria of four bishops, three monsignori, and himself.
They discussed Coughlin's personal attacks on FDR.
decided," said Sheehy,

"We

"how this action might be handled most

^ New York Times, October 20, 1936, p. 24.
^Ed w a r d J. Kelly to Roosevelt, September 16, 1936,
Reel 1, Sel. Mat.
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effectively.

We have taken action."

Sheehy insisted that

his group wanted nothing to do with the political, but simply
wanted "to tell the President his friends are not ignoring
the calumnies of Father Coughlin."4 '*
What actions were contemplated at the Waldorf-Astoria
meeting is difficult to discern.

Two of the biships there,

Thomas O'Reilly of Scranton, Pennsylvania, and James H. Ryan
of Omaha, Nebraska, began a campaign along with Sheehy to
seek statements by American bishops defending President
Roosevelt against Coughlin's charges that he was a communist.
In September, 1936, Sheehy again wrote to Steve Early that
he could expect a number of letters from American bishops
"affirming their faith in [FDR] despite the communist
charges of Coughlin.

Sheehy admitted thav the charges did

not deserve a reply but added that "in as much as the Catholic
Church is the great foe of communism,

these letters will be

worthwhile.

45Quoted in Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 216. When
asked about this meeting, Father Sheehy could not recall any
specifics but indicated that "some of the bishops individ
ually wrote the President saying that Father Coughlin did
not represent the Catholic Church."
Sheehy, letter to
author, June 21, 1965.
46

Rev. Maurrce S. Sheehy to Steve Early, September 29,
1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Roosevelt had already received such a telegram from
Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney of Sioux Palls, South Dakota in
July,

1936.

Mahoney spoke "in the name of the priests and

people of the diocese," and protested "against references to
you [FDR] by clerical vulgarian."47

In September, Mahoney

telegraphed to Sheehy asking him to inform the President
that he considered Coughlin's charges of communism in the
administration "most unjust."

AQ

Bishop James H. Ryan of

Omaha, Nebraska, also wrote to the President in the same
vein.

Ryan spoke of his astonishment at the statements

linking FDR with communism.
unjust and untrue."

He called these charges "unfair,

"To affirm," said Ryan,

"that the

President of the U.S. is linked with communism is to speak
irresponsibly and without knowledge of your true opinions."
Ryan's telegram was supplemented by an editorial he wrote
for The True V o i c e , the official organ of his diocese.

In

this article of October 2, 1936, Ryan condemned certain

47Quoted by Tull,

"Father Coughlin," p. 215.

AQ

^Bishop Bernard J. Mahoney to Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy,
telegram, September 26, 1936, Reel 3, Sel. M a t .
49

Most Rev. James H. Ryan to President Roosevelt,
September 25, 1936, Reel 3, Sel. M a t . This letter was for
warded to Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney by Early with a note
that "none of the other letters from the Bishops has been
received as yet, but copies will be sent to you as they
come i n ."
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parties who had forgotten ethical principles in their poli
tical attacks on the President.
evidence," read the editorial,

"There is not one shred of
"direct or indirect, to con

nect the name of President Roosevelt, with Communism,
principles, and its propaganda."

its

Ryan concluded that FDR

was always an enemy of c o m m u n i s m . ^
Other members of the hierarchy also expressed disap
proval of Coughlin's attack on FDR.

In Cincinnati, Arch

bishop John T. McNicholas reacted violently to Coughlin's
assertion that Roosevelt was "anti-God."

While he made

clear that he was not making a political speech for or
against the Democratic party and its candidate,

the Arch

bishop did insist that Coughlin "transcends bounds" of
decent morality by making such an accusation against the
President.

"There can be no objections to expressing con

demnation of the acts of the administration in destroying
crops and food," said the Archoishop, but this did not
justify Coughlin's conclusion that Roosevelt was "anti-God,"

50Clipping of The True V o i c e , October 2, 1936, Reel
3, Sel. M a t . Roosevelt, in reply to Ryan's telegram,
expressed deep appreciation for having "so valiant a vindi
cator as yourself."
FDR to Bishop Ryan, October 6, 1936,
Reel 3, Sel. M a t . It should be noted, however, that there
is no evidence that any more letters from American bishops
were forthcoming to the administration.
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or that bullets should be used if the election did not turn
out the way he wanted.
Nicholas,

"The mere suggestion,"

"of advocating a revolution even in the heat of

oratory is most dangerous.

Father Coughlin gives the impres

sion that he appeals to force.
C1
error."“'-L

said Mc-

In doing so he is morally in

Bishop Schrembs of Cleveland was equally upset

about Coughlin's criticism of Roosevelt.

While defending

the priest's right to speak, he deplored his tactics.

c9

Bishop Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, reacted with irritation
when the press linked him with the Coughlin cause.

Noll

pointed out that no one had criticized the radio priest more
than he had.5'*
Bishop Gallagher of Detroit took a rather ambiguous
position toward Coughlin in 1936.

Without Gallagher's tacit

approval, Coughlin could never have continued his public
campaign.

Furthermore, Gallagher for sometime had approved

of Coughlin's interpretation of the Papal encyclicals.
as the political campaign of 1936 developed,
position was somewhat confused.

Yet,

the Bishop's

True, he repeatedly defended

^ Q u o t e d in New York T i m e s , September 27, 1936, p. 28;
Commonweal, October 9, 1936, p. 543.
52Tull,

"Father Coughlin," p. 214.

53Ibid., p. 215.
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Coughlin's right to freedom of speech, and even his state
ment on using bullets instead of ballots.

Furthermore, on

returning from Rome, a journey the American press insisted
was taken because the Vatican wanted Coughlin silent, Bishop
Gallagher remarked that his famous priest was "just fighting
communism."

The Bishop also denied that the Vatican wanted

Coughlin silenced.

He always insisted that "there is nothing

in Church doctrine to prevent a priest from taking part in
public affairs."

54

Yet there were other signs which indicated that even
Gallagher was getting a little upset about Coughlin's politi
cal activities.

Upon returning from Rome, Gallagher was

asked his opinion on the merits of the three Presidential
candidates.

He replied:

"As far as my present knowledge of

the candidates goes, Roosevelt is the best of them."55

In

September, Gallagher went into more detail in a public broad
cast.

He attacked the money plank in the Lemke platform5^

5^New York T i m e s , September 6, 1936, p. 19; Common
w e a l , July 31, 1936, p. 344.
55

Quoted in New York T i m e s , September 6, 1936, p. 19.

Lemke, a Republican Representative from
North Dakota, ran as the Union Party's candidate on a
ticket which incorporated many of Coughlin's principles.
^ W i l l i a m
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as being unsound.

He felt that Roosevelt was a better man

to have in the White House because he "has a much better
background to work out these monetary problems than this man
from the Dakotas."

This was a remarkable statement in view

of the fact that the money plank in the Union Party program
was one of the main contributions of Father Coughlin.
Gallagher ended his statement by insisting that the Union
Party was not the Catholic party and that there would never
be such a Church party in A m e r i c a . ^
Apparently Gallagher was trying to make clear that
while he might defend Coughlin's right to freedom of speech,
this did not mean that he agreed with his platform, or that
the priest spoke for the Church.

It was suggested by one

news source that Gallagher had even forced Coughlin to
moderate his tone.

When Coughlin publicly apoligized for

calling FDR a "scab President," some saw the Bishop's hand
at work.

Gallagher, however, denied forcing any action, but

subtly suggested that force was not the only way of achieving
results.**®

Whatever his motives, many people were not

surprised to see Gallagher join the Roosevelt campaign train

5?Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 202; Dyson,
for Power," p. 78.
^ N e w York Times, November 1, 1936, p. 48.
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when it stopped in Detroit during October.

He joined the

President for lunch and, according to one source, discussed
the activities of the radio priest.

Unfortunately,

the

details of the conversation are not available, but it is con
jectured that Roosevelt warned Gallagher that Coughlin was in
a position to bring discredit upon the Church not only by
his political activities but by the financial dealings of
some of his close associates.
There was also a persistent rumor during 1936 that
the Vatican was on the verge of censoring Father Coughlin
for his political attacks on FDR.

Gallagher’s visit to Rome

was looked upon as the beginning of this action.

Roosevelt

received word from Charlton Ogburn, a prominent New York
0

attorney and close friend,

that the Vatican was being informed

"of the harm which Father Coughlin was doing to the Catholic
Church in America by attacking you."

A few days later

Osservatore R o m a n o , the Vatican newspaper, came out with a
story criticizing Coughlin for his attacks on Roosevelt.
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S^New York T i m e s . October 16, 1936, p. 1; Grace Tully,
interview with author, June 2, 1965, Washington, D. C.
^°Charlton Ogburn to Roosevelt, September 10, 1936,
President's Personal File, 3794, Roosevelt Papers; Ogburn
spoke of having briefed Count Fumasoni Biodi, a powerful
Italian nobleman, of the situation.
Biodi promised to "trans
mit these views to the Vatican."
Shenton, "The Coughlin
Movement," p. 363 fn.
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On October 8, 1936, Cardinal Pacelli (the future Pope
Pius XII),

the Vatican Secretary of State, arrived in the

United States for a month's vacation and tour.

This visit

by such a high ranking Vatican official in the midst of a
presidential election was the source of countless rumors.
The New York Times insisted that he had come over to reassure
Roosevelt of the Church's support despite the attacks by
Coughlin.

Others felt that his presence was to prevent

Coughlin from making any more critical remarks about the
President.

Some students have even traced to Pacelli's

arrival the starting point in the decline of Coughlin's
fortunes.

Unfortunately, Pacelli made no public statement

regarding Father Coughlin or the election.

Furthermore,

Coughlin seemed to take little notice of the Cardinal and
continued his campaign unabated.
Speculation grew intense when Pacelli paid a social
call on President Roosevelt in November,

1936.

The press had

to guess at what was discussed, because Bishop Spellman, who
was acting as Pacelli's official guide while he was in the

^ D y s o n , "The Quest for Power," p. 79; Darrow,
"Catholic Power," p. 61, says the Cardinal was primarily
concerned with communism and the Spanish Civil War.
Farley
says the trip was made because of Coughlin but did not
relate to politics.
Farley, interview with author, March 20,
1965, Washington, D. C.
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the United States, refused to let reporters question him on
the subject of the t a l k . ^

It seems unlikely that Coughlin

was the main topic of conversation,

since Roosevelt had

already won a smashing victory at the polls.

It is more

likely that there were some cursory remarks made about the
feasibility of sending an ambassador from the United States
to the V a t i c a n . ^
While the Vatican failed to take an official position
toward Coughlin,

such was not the case with significant

elements of the American Catholic press.
long-time supporter of the administration.

Commonweal was a
When the charge

of communism first arose in the 1936 campaign,

this magazine

^2New York T i m e s , November 6, 1936, p. 1.
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Grace Tully, who was at Hyde Park at the time but
not present for the interview, insists it was a mere social
call.
Interview with author, June 2, 1965, Washington, D. C.
A n interesting aspect of Cardinal Pacelli's visit to the U. S.
was the reaction it produced in the Nazi press.
General Erich
von Ludendorff, leading a neo-pagan movement in Germany,
issued a statement, "Let us not forget that Brother Roosevelt
is not only the representative of the Jews and Masons; he is
also Cardinal Pacelli's man of confidence and will do every
thing possible to increase R o m e 1s influence in the great
democracy and to prepare for the conquest of the United States
by Rome."- The National Socialist A n g r i f f , the German Labor
Front's organ, published an article saying that FDR had made
political commitments to Pacelli for which the Cardinal
promised to deliver the Catholic vote to the Democrats.
New
York T i m e s , November 4, 1936, p. 27; December 6, 1936, p. 42.

immediately denied such an influence in the Roosevelt govern
ment.

The editor considered it a special burden of the

Catholic press to refute such accusations because they
emanated from two notable Catholics— Father Coughlin and A1
Smith.

Besides branding the charge false, the editor warned

Smith and Coughlin of the danger of falling prey to their
own rhetoric.

According to Coughlin and Smith's definition

of communism, much of the Church's social teaching would
fail to pass the test of purity.
wrote the editor,

"Yet it remains true,"

"that the highest teaching authority in

the Catholic Church, the Pope, has declared that the main
evils of modern society in the sphere of economics are
precisely those evils denounced by President Roosevelt."
Now Smith and Coughlin had accused him to being a communist
because of his stand.

Actually, the New Deal was,

in the

Commonweal1s estimation, a rather conservative movement in
that it sought to reform institutions of capital "which
greed, and private and corporate dictatorship . . . have
almost shattered."

Only the emotionally disturbed could

believe the charge that President Roosevelt was planning
a red d i c t a t o r s h i p . ^

^ Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 395; May 4, 1934,
p. 2; July 10, 1936, p. 274; October 9, 1936, pp. 541-42.
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The Denver Catholic Register, one of the more influ
ential diocesan papers, was also at odds with Coughlin's
criticism of Roosevelt.
FDR a communist,

Indeed, while Coughlin was calling

this paper's editor was praising him as a

statesman of the highest order.

To the charge that Catholics

were antagonized by the way FDR handled the Mexican affair,
the editor claimed that no Catholic leader of significance
"doubted the sincerity of the Roosevelt administration in
its handling of this vicious problem."
supporting either candidate,

While not officially

the paper made clear that it

could not stand silent but must call for a leader "who was
in spirit with the Papal encyclicals."

This did not mean

that one should vote for Roosevelt, but it did mean that
everyone should be aware that if the relief program insti
tuted by the New Deal were cut off "this country would be in
the hands of revolutionists in less than a year."

Catholics

and others should recognize that laissez-faire capitalism
was dead and that it was proper for the government to inter
fere in business. Quadraaesimo Anno called for "precisely
such a program . " ^ 5

^ D e n v e r Catholic Register, January 19, 1936, p. 4;
January 26, 1936, p. 4; July 19, 1936, p. 1? September 10,
1936, p. 4; November 15, 1936, p. 4.
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The editor of Extension magazine,
spoke out in defense of the President.

S. A. Baldus, also
Baldus labeled those

elements which were preaching contempt against the President
"demagogs" and dangerous "crackpots."

As for the claim by

the American Liberty League and others that the Constitution
was in danger,

this was "a lot of hokum," and political

rabble-rousing at its lowest level.
said the editor,

"Our Constitution,"

"is in no danger— certainly not at the hands

of President Roosevelt."

Those politicians who felt they

could capitalize on this fear as an issue in 1935 were in
for a surprise because they would find that "the multitude
will be more interested in getting jobs and something to eat,
than in

’saving' the Constitution."

A person might be too

blind to give Roosevelt credit for the obvious improvement
in America's economic situation over the last four years,
but this should not blind anyone to the fact that there had
been such an improvement.
Besides these comments from £he press, Roosevelt and
the administration had other reasons for believing that
Coughlin's efforts were not affecting the Democrats' hold on

6 6 Bxtension.

July, 1965, p. 17; September, 1936, p.
19; Commonweal, February 7, 1936, p. 412; The Catholic
Messenger of Davenport, October 29, 1936, p. 4, also
expressed similar sentiments.
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American Catholics.

All during the campaign,

letters and

resolutions poured into the White House from various Catholic
ethnic groups who expressed support for the New Deal.

The

Catholic Workman, a Bohemian Fraternal Mutual Benefit Asso
ciation of St. Paul, Minnesota, wired its loyalty to the
President.

John Straka, President of the National Alliance

of Bohemian Catholics,

from the national convention in Chicago,

sent a similar message.

The chairman of the Lithuanian Roman

Catholic Alliance of America sent greetings on the part of
that organization and p l e d g e d '"loyal support to his construc
tive program which is successfully rebuilding economic
structure of this country."

Elements of the Polish National

Catholic Church, meeting in Scranton, Pennsylvania, wired
sentiments of "encouragement in your work for the good of
the working man through the New Deal."

The Slovak Catholic

Sokol of New Jersey adopted a resolution at its annual con
vention endorsing the New Deal and especially the CCC and
NYA.

The Croatian Catholic Union of America,

greetings.

Reverend E. J. Higgins,

the Catholic War Veterans,
over the New York radio.

sent similar

the National Chaplain of

read an open letter to Roosevelt
Higgins praised Roosevelt for

"opening the treasure vaults of Uncle Sam, " by which he had
"killed communism with one stroke," and restored faith in
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the underprivileged.

He concluded by saying that "no poli

tical force will be able to destroy this image
the poor]
communism,

in the hearts of humanity."

[as friend of

On the subject of

the Board of Directors of the National Alliance

of Bohemian Czeck Catholics of America congratulated FDR on
his October speech in which he repudiated left-wing political
support.

One of the remarkable things about this rather

diversified outpouring of support is that Roosevelt saw fit
to acknowledge almost all of them.

Busy as he was, he often

wrote the acknowledgment from his campaign train and in one
case had the Department of Commerce trace the Catholic
Workman of St. Paul so he could send a note of thanks to the
proper people.

67

More important was the public and private support for
Roosevelt which was expressed by many individual Catholics,
both priest and layman.

Some of this support was prompted

by what Catholics considered an unjust campaign by Coughlin.
Others were honestly convinced that Roosevelt had helped the
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All of these letters, and more, can be found in
Reel 3, Sel. M a t . John Straka to Roosevelt, June 10, 1936;
The Catholic Workman to Roosevelt, May 28, 1936; Alexander
Aleksis to Roosevelt, July 1, 1936; Mrs. Emily Sznyter to
Roosevelt, August 10, 1936; Roosevelt to Joseph G. Prusa,
September 14, 1936; The Croatian Catholic Union to Roosevelt,
October 11, 1936; Rev. E. J. Higgins to Roosevelt, October
26, 1936.
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country out of the depression.

John B. Kelly, a millionaire

and leader of the Democratic machine in Philadelphia, was
dismayed over the political antics of Father Coughlin.

Kelly

felt that the priest was disgracing his vocation by his
attacks on the President.

Joseph P. Kennedy, Boston million

aire and loyal supporter of FDR, was a close friend of
Coughlin, but he could not stand by and see the priest brand
the President a communist.

In a speech to the Democratic

Businessmen's League of Massachusetts in October, Kennedy
called FDR "a God-fearing ruler who has given his people an
increased measure of social justice."

Kennedy criticized

those who sought to confuse the public into believing that
the social justice of the Roosevelt administration was
communism.

He pointed to two facts.

First,

FDR had insisted

upon religious freedom when granting diplomatic recognition
to Russia.

Second, and more decisive, Kennedy reminded his

audience that Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago had praised
Roosevelt for his work.

"Who in the face of the eloquent

testimony of Cardinal Mundelein," asked Kennedy,

"can doubt

the President's stand on the great issues between man and
his Maker?"

Kennedy concluded by sardonically pointing out

that if Roosevelt was the dictator some claimed, he would
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long ago have silenced the radio priest.6®
A third layman who was active in the Roosevelt cause
during 1936 was Frank P. Walsh of New York.

Walsh was a

long-time friend and supporter of the President and was
active in the Catholic promotion of the Child Labor amend
ment.

He was dismayed at the sympathy which the Coughlin

charges of communism in the administration were receiving in
Catholic circles.

Walsh was interested in trying to stop

what appeared as a move to set up the Catholic Church as the
special institutional foe of international communism.

As a

member of the Executive Committee of the Progressive
National Committee, he supported Roosevelt for re-election
£ Q

and publicly decried the smear tactics of his opponents.
Among priests there was also a sizable segment ready
to defend the President.

Reverend Bryan J. McEntegart, a

Director of the Catholic Charities of New York, expressed
enthusiasm for the social security act and for the NFA at the
annual meeting of the National Conference of Catholic

6®Quoted in New York T i m e s . October 25, 1936, p. 33;
Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 213; Shenton, "The Coughlin
Movement," p. 367 fn.
Kennedy also cited the speech of
Father John A. Ryan to prove Roosevelt was not a communist.
C. Walsh to F. P. Walsh, October 5, 1936, Box
95, and Scrapbook No. 27, F. P. Walsh Papers; Leuchtenburg,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 182.
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Charities held in Seattle, Washington.

"Planning has re

placed the laissez-faire idea," said McEntegart, and "this
is good as long as it follows the mean suggested by Leo XIII
[of] acting for the common good."7^

Reverend Wilfrid Parsons,

who had earlier attacked the idea that Father Coughlin was
speaking for the Church in economic matters, went to great
lengths in America in 1935 to emphasize this point and to
7*1

show that Coughlin's ideas were loosely constructed.

As

for Coughlin's assertion that the Roosevelt administration
was filled with communists, Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen of New
York and Reverend Francis J. Haas agreed with Frank Walsh
that the Catholic Church should not be set up as a sort of
anticommunist front.

Sheen declared that rather than

attacking communists, Catholics should "go out and find
what is good in them."

72

Haas wrote to Father John J. Burke,

Secretary of the NCWC, expressing concern that the denuncia
tions of communism being made by certain Catholics created
the impression that the Church's own program was a negative

^ R e v . Bryan J. McEntegart, "Catholicism and Social
Welfare," NCCC Proceedings. August 2-5, 1936, Seattle,
Washington.
71

Rev. Wilfrid Parsons to Rev. John A. Ryan, May 14,
1935, Ryan Papers; Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 132.

7^Quoted in Commonweal, March 20, 1936, p. 576.
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one.

"It is my judgment," wrote Haas,
. . . that the cause of religion is hurt in our
country by the fact that the secular press fea
tures only the condemnation of Communists and
neglects reference to the paramount fact that the
Church has an affirmative, constructive program
for social justice .7 3

Father Sheehy of Catholic University, at the suggestion of
Senator 0 'Mahoney, toured the West, visiting a number of
bishops and priests.

Upon his return, he reported that

"some extraordinary things" were underway to counteract
Coughlin's efforts in the campaign .7 4
Equally robust were the efforts of Reverend John A.
Ryan.

Indeed,

this priest played the most active role of

any during the campaign.
public form.

His support took both private and

In his private correspondence Ryan tried to

allay the suspicions aroused by Coughlin and other opponents
of the administration.

On the charge that the administra

tion favored communism and had demonstrated this in its
dealings with Russia and Mexico, Ryan was quick to reply.
"The Mexican Bishops," he pointed out, did not want any
interference by the United States "as that would hurt the

7 3 Rev.

Francis J. Haas to Rev. John J. Burke, June 3,
1936, Haas Correspondence.

74Quoted in Lunt, "Frank Murphy," p. 151.
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Catholic in Mexico."

Moreover, Roosevelt was President of

the United States, not of Mexico,

"and a Catholic's attitude

toward him ought to be determined by the kind of administra
tion he has given to our own country.”7'*

All this hysteria

about communists in government confirmed R y a n 's suspicion
that most Catholics were "extremely gullible in their re
actions to professional hunters of alleged Reds."

He

wondered how anyone who knew "anything about Catholic social
teaching" could accept the charges being leveled against
Roosevelt.

The only "Reds" in the Roosevelt administration

were those "who are sufficiently

'red* to believe in social

justice . " 7 6
Ryan also supported Roosevelt among the Catholic
press.

When it appeared that Father James Gillis, editor of

The Catholic W o r l d , was becoming disenchanted with the
administration because of its fiscal policies, Ryan promptly
wrote a letter to the editor.

Using economic statistics,

Ryan argued to Gillis that the current national debt was not
dangerous;

that in fact,

it could go much higher.

As for
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Rev. John Ryan to Miss Kathryn Gazda, October 28,
1936, Ryan Papers.
76

Rev. John Ryan to R. F. McAuley, May 21, 1934, and
to Mrs. Roy E. Grimmer, April 2, 1935, Ryan Papers,
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the constitutional integrity of the New Deal/ Ryan argued
that the Court had precedent on both sides of the issue and
that the President had to take into consideration the needs
of the people more than the subtle meanings of the Constitu
tion.

Furthermore,

the Popes were more radical than the New

Deal.

If Roosevelt was defeated, wrote Ryan, the victors

would not be men with either "the desire or competence to
provide a more perfect program of social justice."

If

Roosevelt lost, it would be "the Burbons" who triumphed.

77

Ryan had less success when dealing with Patrick
Scanlan, editor of The Brooklyn T a b l e t , who violently opposed
the administration during the 1936 campaign.

Scanlan's

major charges were over the recognition of Russia and
relations with Mexico.

He filled his paper with anti-Roose

velt material during 1936, and he usually played up the
comments of Father Coughlin.

Ryan did not attempt to dis

suade Scanlan from this course but rather sought to make
public the unreasonable bias of the editor.

This led him

into a personal feud with Scanlan which took the form of
letter and counterletter published in the pages of The
Brooklyn T a b l e t .
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Scanlan called Ryan a blind supporter of

Rev. John Ryan, "Open Letter to the Editor," The
Catholic W o r l d , CXLIII (April, 1936), 22-26.
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the President.

Ryan replied that Scanlan was a professional

"Roosevelt hater."7®
While this dialogue was confined to the readers of
the diocesan press

(a rather select audience) Ryan did not

restrict his activities to this narrow field.

As early as

February, 1936, he publicly called for a program of social
justice which would institutionalize many of the advances
made under the New Deal.

He dismissed as "silly" A1 Smith's

charge that the New Deal was communistic.

In his peroration

the priest remarked:
If the present administration is not continued
in office, there will follow another orgy of exces
sive capital investment, excessive plant capacity
and soon thereafter another depression.
And that
depression will be incomparably more devastating
than the one from which we have now partially
emerged .79
Ryan's most valuable service, however, was played
later in the campaign as a semiofficial apologist for the
administration against the attack by Father Coughlin.

From

an early position of sympathy for the radio priest, Ryan had
come to view him as loose in his thinking and dangerous in

78
Papers,

Rev. John A. Ryan to Patrick F. Scanlan [n.d.], Ryan
1936-1937; The Brooklyn Ta b l e t , May 29, 1937, p. 11.

79

Quoted in New York Times, February 16, 1936, II, 1.
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his speech.

In May, 1936, he privately characterized

Coughlin's economic program as being poorly put together.
"It contains," wrote Ryan,

"no definite proposals for prac

tical and beneficial action in the field of social or
economic reforms."

The idea of a central banking scheme,

which was the only definite part of Coughlin's program, Ryan
termed "all wrong and futile."®^
As the campaign of 1936 drew to a climax, more and
more friends of the administration grew concerned over
Father Coughlin's effectiveness with the voters.

Even Jim

Farley, who later predicted that FDR would carry all but two
states, was apprehensive over the attractiveness of the
communist charge made by Coughlin.

Tn September,

1936, Ryan

received word from James J. Hoey, a New York politician and
friend of Roosevelt,

that he had attended a political con

ference at Hyde Park during which word was passed about that
the President faced a greater danger from Coughlin than from
Landon.

This was obviously an exaggeration, but when Senator

Joseph 0 'Mahoney of Wyoming also supported H o e y ’s contention,
Father Ryan grew worried.

Hoey and 0 'Mahoney's great fear

was that Coughlin's charges of communism would stick in the

®^Rev. John A. Ryan to Richard A. Froehlinger, May 22,
1935, Ryan Papers.
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Catholic mind.

They pointed out that the radio priest had

been received enthusiastically by Holy Name organizations
when he made these accusations.

They called on Ryan to speak

out publicly against Coughlin.®^
It is difficult to explain why Ryan did accept this
role of public defender of the administration.

Although an

admirer of the New Deal, he had never been an intimate of
the President, nor had he contributed anything directly to
the social reforms passed during the first administration.
Some months after the 1936 election,

Ryan explained his

decision to take on the role suggested by Hoey.

The priest

insisted that someone had to prevent the imminent "diversion
of millions of votes from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Lemke."

While

the election results hardly substantiate this contention,
Ryan pointed out that "the managers of the national Demo
cratic campaign were unanimous in the belief that this
diversion of votes might defeat Roosevelt."

Furthermore,

if

this defeat could be traced to the political activities of a
Catholic priest,

the consequences in terms of public resent

ment against the Church would be substantial.

As Ryan saw

the situation, many thousands of Catholics felt that Lemke's

®ljames J. Hoey to Rev. John Ryan, September 23,
1936, Ryan Papers.
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views, drawn from Coughlin, had the approval of the Catholic
Church.

Someone had to erase this impression and Ryan did

not regret for a minute that he had adopted this role.
concluded,

"I am glad I made that radio speech.

He

I regard it

as one of the most effective and beneficial acts that I have
ever performed in the interest of my religion and my
country ."8 2
After making his decision to speak for the adminis
tration, Ryan discovered that Hoey and others had certain
definite ideas on what should be mentioned.

Hoey suggested

that Coughlin's name be mentioned in the speech, as the
President was expecting this.

Hoey, 0 'Mahoney and Charles

E. Michelson, Democratic publicity chairman, had a hand in
revising Ryan's original draft.

On October 8 , 1936, Ryan

went on a national radio hookup to speak on the subject,
"Roosevelt Safeguards A m e r i c a . 1

oq

Ryan offered two major themes:

that there was no

basis for the charge that Roosevelt was under communist
influence, and that Father Coughlin's economic thought was

82

Letter to editor, The Catholic Transcript. June 17,
1937, p. 4; Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 229.
83

Rev. John A. Ryan to James J. Hoey, October 27,
1936, Ryan Papers; Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 225.
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outdated and in no way connected with the Papal encyclicals.
In the first place, Ryan emphatically denied that Roosevelt
or his advisors, such as Tugwell, Frankfurter, and Sidney
Hillman, were under communist influence.

People who made

such an accusation were breaking the eighth commandment.
the contrary,

On

it was the work of the New Deal which had

frustrated the growth of communism in the United States.
for Coughlin's economic theory, Ryan insisted that,
his experience,

As

from all

the radio priest's proposals were all wrong.

"If . . . enacted," said Ryan,

"they would prove disastrous

to the great majority of the American people, particularly
to the wage earners."

Ryan insisted that these proposals

found "no support in the encyclicals of either Pope Leo XIII
or Pope Pius XI."

He closed his address with an appeal that

his listeners not vote "against the man who has shown a
deeper and more sympathetic understanding of your needs and
who h a 3 brought about more fundamental legislation for labor
and for social justice than any other President in American
h i s t o r y ."8 4
The reaction to Ryan's speech was rapid in developing.

8 4 Pamphlet,

"Roosevelt Safeguards America," October
8 , 1936, published by Democratic National Committee, Ryan
Papers.
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Members of the administration were swift to forward their
approval.

James Parley wrote to Ryan that the speech had a

"real effect in every section of the country."

Farley, who

did not "know of any address made during the campaign [that
was] more effective," immediately had the Democratic party
reproduce copies of the speech for distribution.®^

Josephus

Daniels wrote from Mexico City that the speech had "heartened"
him and that he was sure it "had a great effect with the
voters."

Homer S. Cummings, Attorney General,

remarks "admirable in every way."

called Ryan's

President Roosevelt sent

a telegram of appreciation.®®
While the remarks of Parley and Daniels can be
attributed to the generous nature of these men,
some evidence that Ryan's speech was,
tively during the campaign.

there is

in fact, used effec

In Washington, Joseph R. Burko,

student director of the Roosevelt University Clubs, reported
having distributed many copies.

John W. Chase of New York

wrote to Ryan requesting copies of his speech to use in
swinging Catholic voters behind Congressman Sisson, a

®®James A. Parley to Rev. John Ryan, October 31,
1936, Ryan Papers.
®®Josephus Daniels to Ryan, November 9, 1936, Ryan
Papers; Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 228-29.

370
Roosevelt supporter who was having difficulty.®^
Meanwhile,

the Catholic press displayed an ambivalent

attitude toward the entire affair.

The Pittsburg Catholic

mirrored the opinion of Bishop Hugh C. Boyle when it wrote
that the speech would probably be beneficial.

88

The Omaha

True Voice and America both agreed that Coughlin's economic
thought was outdated and that Father Ryan was the most
authoritative Catholic voice in this field.®^

The Baltimore

Catholic Review and The Brooklyn Tablet agreed that neither
Coughlin nor Ryan had any business in the political arena,
although the Baltimore paper was not convinced by R y a n 1s
claim that communism had not found a home in the Roosevelt
administration.
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The Catholic Transcript editorialized on

the possibility of having a bishop come out for Landon so
that all candidates would have a prominent prelate backing
them.

Yet the editor admitted that Coughlin had instigated

Ryan's speech by his own continued intemperance of speech.

®^John W. Case to Elizabeth Sweeney,
13, 1936, Ryan Papers.

telegram, October

®®Broderick, Right Reverend, p. 228.
8 9 I b i d .,

pp. 227-28.

9QNew York T i m e s , October 16, 1936, p. 21.

^October 22, 1936, p. 4.
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The Davenport Catholic Messenger pointed out that Ryan was
teaching economics before Coughlin was born.

The editor gave

no credence to the charge by Coughlin that Ryan was a paid
politxcal spokesman for the New Deal.

go

The Catholic Tele

g r a p h , while taking no editorial position, did display
numerous political advertisements which used R y a n 1s address
as a keynote to exhort the reader to vote D e m o c r a t i c . ^
Commonweal, on the other hand,

looked upon the entire

affair as evidence that there w a s .no "Catholic vote."

If

such prominent Catholics as Father Coughlin, A1 Smith, and
Father Ryan could all find themselves on different sides of
the political fence, surely there was no "Catholic political
solidarity," as the myth would have it.

In any case, the

editor was convinced that Ryan's remarks would have little
effect upon Coughlin's followers, who had to recourse to
emotion rather than reason.

94

Finally, in further estimation of Ryan's effort,
mention should be made of the volume of personal mail he
received soon after October 8 .

The priest admitted to a

920ctober 15, 1936, p. 1.
930ctober 29, 1936, p. 7.
9^Commonweal, October 23, 1936, pp. 597-98.
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correspondent that he had received "at least 1 2 0 0 letters"
from Coughlin's supporters and that most of them were filled
with derogatory remarks.

In contrast he could point to only

200 letters favoring his speech.

Yet Ryan felt that even

this small amount of approval justified his making the
speech.

Significantly, he mentioned that he had not received

more than three or four letters of approval from priests.

A

closer examination of these pro-Ryan letters reveals a number
of interesting characteristics.

A few expressed sympathy for

Roosevelt because he appointed Catholics to his Cabinet.
Others insisted that Coughlin was distorting the social mes
sage of the Church and should be silenced.

Such letters were

generally from a better educated audience.

In contrast, the

anti-Ryan mail revealed a poorly educated group.

Some of the

themes which dominated this correspondence were fear that
communism was taking over the Roosevelt administration, dis
taste of recognition of Russia, criticism of the manner in
which Roosevelt treated anticlericalism in Mexico, and the
fact that the President was a member of the Masonic order.
The tone of these letters revealed extreme class bitterness
and a note of anticlericalism.

QC

95

See Ryan Papers where these items are all grouped
together in 1936 file.
Shenton, "Coughlin Movement," p. 366,
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The smashing victory that Roosevelt achieved in 1936
made all the dire predictions appear chimerical.

The Presi

dent amassed over twenty-seven million popular votes compared
to Landon's sixteen million and Leirike's 900,000.

Even more

impressive was the electoral vote with FDR capturing all but
two states for a grand total of 523.

American Catholics

voted overwhelmingly for Roosevelt in 1936.

In this they

simply followed the current of the times which affected
their fellow citizens in like manner.
The evidence that Catholics supported the President
is impressive.
individuals.

On one level is the testimony of numerous
Father Ryan, working on the basis of his own

circle, estimated that at least seventy per cent of the
Catholic clergy in the country voted for Roosevelt.

He knew

personally that a great number of his fellow professors at
Catholic University supported the Democratic ticket .^ 6
Sheehy corroborated this estimate.

Father

Sheehy was proud of his

own role in swinging an estimated seventy-six per cent of

points to the fact that most of the letters attacking Ryan
were from Irish and German writers.
Too much should not be
made of this, however, because Roosevelt received mail
critical of Coughlin from the same ethnic group.
Q£

Broderick, Right Reverend, pp. 231-32; Ryan to
Henry G. Leach, March 19, 1937, Ryan Papers.
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the Catholic vote behind Roosevelt.

In a letter to the

President some years later, he outlined his role as threefold;
(1) contacting personally many bishops;

(2) supplying Demo

cratic campaign material to the Catholic press; and (3)
sending the Ryan speech to 11,000 Catholic pastors.

Q7

Before the election results were in, Sheehy reported to
Margaret LeHand that his visits with numerous bishops and
priests revealed a strong sentiment for the President.
"There is a feeling prevalent among the priests," said Sheehy,
"that the priesthood,

through Father Coughlin, has betrayed

the President, and some extraordinary things are being
attempted to offset this betrayal."®®
From Kentucky came the observations of P. H. Callahan,
another friend of the administration.
detailed vote analysis.

Callahan presented a

He examined areas in his own state

where large religious congregations were located and found
that in most cases these areas supported Roosevelt by large
margins.

On a nation-wide basis, he delineated the voting

of seven states which he characterized as having the largest

®7 Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Roosevelt, May 13, 1940,
Reel 3, Sel. Mat.

®®Rev. Maurice S. Sheehy to Margaret LeHand, October
5, 1336, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Catholic population:

New Mexico, Arizona, Rhode Island,

Massachusetts, Maryland, California, and Connecticut.

By

contrasting the voting record of these states in 1932 and
1936, Callahan demonstrated that all had given Roosevelt a
larger majority in 1936 than in 1 9 3 2 . "
Monsignor Robert F. Keegan, Cardinal Hayes' assistant,
wrote to the President after the election expressing con
gratulations.

Keegan called Coughlin's activities "grossly

intemperate" and concluded:
I am proud and happy that my vote and the vote
of every friend whom I could influence, went to
swell the magnificent total. . . . You are an
answer to prayer— the prayer of all of us close to
the man in the street, the factory, on the farm,
and for whom any other result would have been the
worst calamity that could have befallen America.
There is also more scientific evidence of Catholic

" p . H. Callahan to Joseph Polin [n.d.], Ryan Papers,
1936r P. H. Callahan to Edward Keating [n.d.], Box 95,
Frank Walsh Papers. The Callahan figures are as follows:
1932
1936
N.M.----------40,772
47,380
Ariz. --------36,860
51,930
R.I. ---------31,338
41,851
Mass. --------63,189
172,417
Md. ----------- 130,130
148,000
Calif. -------- 476,255
735,825
Conn. --------6,788(Hoover)103,264
^■^Msgr. Robert Keegan to Roosevelt, November 5, 1936,
President's Personal File, 628, Roosevelt Papers.
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support for FDR in 1936.

Various public opinion polls

indicated that the President received a large share of the
ethnic and religious vote.

One study concluded that eighty-

one per cent of all Catholics who voted supported Roose
v e l t .'1"0 1

Both the Gallup and Roper polls indicated that

Roosevelt had received substantial support from Catholics,
Gallup estimating it at over seventy per cent.10^

The vote

of the large urban centers in the United States, where most
Catholic votes were congregated, went to Roosevelt, who won
with smashing majorities in Chicago, Detroit, New Orleans,
St. Louis, New York, Philadelphia, and Milwaukee.

Roosevelt

won every one of the twelve cities in the United States
with a population of over 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 .10^

lO^Darrow,

"Catholic Political Power," p. 35 fn.

102QOSneu / champion Campaigner, p. 166, who also says
that FDR got only a bare majority of the Protestant vote in
1936.
A Good Neighbor League was set up by the Democratic
National Committee under the leadership of prominent Protes
tants such as Dr. Stanley High and Methodist Bishop Edgar
Blake to offset the pro-Catholic image of the party.
See
Gosnell, p. 159.
lO^Robinson, They Voted for Roosevelt, pp. 82, 103,
110, 120, 130, 149, 180.
The following figures are indicative:
City
Demo.
Rep.
Chicago (Cook County)
1,253,164
701,206
New Orleans
108,012
10,254
Detroit
404,055
190,732
St. Louis
260,063
127,887
New York
1,454,590
480,302
Philadelphia
539,757
329,881
Milwaukee
221,512
54,811
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Lemke and Coughlin were buried in this avalanche of
votes.

Yet some discussion of their support is relevant

because of its special characteristics.

Lemke received only

two per cent of all votes cast, but he was not on the ballot
in every state.

Samuel Lubell has analyzed Lemke's support

and concluded that outside of his home state, he carried
over ten per cent in only thirty-nine counties in the United
States.

Of these counties,

cent Catholic."

twenty-one were "more than 50 per

Furthermore,

predominantly German.

twenty-eight of them were

Lubell has concluded:

"Drawn pri

marily from Irish and German Catholics, L e m k e 1s following
represented the most belligerently isolationist voters in
the country ."'1'04
Explaining why Catholics voted for Roosevelt is
another matter.

Some scholars attribute this support to

gratitude for the welfare measures of the New Deal.
seems, however,

that more than welfare was at stake.

It
As one

lO^Lubell, Future of American Politics, p. 152.
Lubell's findings have been challenged, however, by William
Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt, pp. 195 fn., 183 fn . , who
feels it was "unlikely that foreign affairs were that com
pelling in 1936."
One might ask how compelling an issue is
required to be to sway two per cent of the voters.
Tull,
"Father Coughlin," also challenges Lubell's interpretation,
attributing Lemke's vote to support for Coughlin's ideas and
disenchantment with the progress made under the New Deal.
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historian has remarked,

"the newer ethnic groups in the

cities swung to Roosevelt, mostly out of gratitude for the
New Deal welfare measures, but partly out of delight with
being granted

'recognition . ' " 1 0 5

judicious interpretation.

This seems a balanced and

If this analysis has shown any

thing it is that Roosevelt was solicitious of the Catholic
Church.

He never failed to respond to a note of gratitude

or encouragement from Catholics.

His appointment policy

was enough to make anyone forget the bigotry of the past.
There were a myriad of reactions to the Roosevelt
victory.

Certainly the contention by Commonweal, that

Roosevelt might be "in trouble among Catholic voters in the
industrial states," and that L e m k e 1s vote "will be a large
one," seems ridiculous in retrospect .1 0 6

When the votes

were counted it was time for a reappraisal.

Cardinal Hayes

in New York wired his congratulations and thanked the Presi
dent for receiving Cardinal Pacelli.10^

In Detroit, Father

1 0 5 Leuchtenburg,

also points out
every four to a
and Hoover, was
Roosevelt swept
of 104 to 2.

Franklin Roosevelt, pp. 184-85, who
that FDR made one judicial appointment in
Catholic.
The ratio under Harding, Coolidge,
one of every twenty-five.
On election day
the urban areas of over 100,000 by a count

106July 3, 1936, p. 254.
107pa trick Cardinal Hayes to Roosevelt, November 6 ,
1936, Reel 3, Sel. Mat.
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Coughlin announced on the radio that the election had con
vinced him to withdraw "from all radio activity in the best
interest of all the p e o p l e . " 1 0 8

Naturally Father Ryan

rejoiced at the results and accepted the invitation of the
President to render the benediction at the inauguration.
Elements of the Catholic press varied in their re
action to the election.

Commonweal dwelt at length upon

the "truly representative" vote the President received.

He

had support from virtually every section of the United
States and from every class and interest.

109

Father Gillis,

editor of The Catholic W o r l d , admitted that he voted for
Roosevelt but was disturbed because he feared the President
would use his victory to embark upon adventures such as
taking the United States into the World Court.

Remarkably,

Gillis insisted that the President did not have a mandate
for great change in the election of 1936.110

The Brooklyn

Tablet admitted that the people of the United States had
expressed a "desire to allow the government to develop along

108commonweal, November 20, 1936, p. 100; in fact,
Coughlin was shortly back on the air and remained active on
the side of isolationism until the early 1940's.
1 0 0 Ibid.,

November 13, 1936, p. 59.

110The Catholic World, CXLIV (December, 1936), 258-60.
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new and modern ideas rather than according to the ideas of
those who hold to the traditional constitutional form."

The

editor warned that now more than ever was it necessary to
remain vigilant "to safeguard this nation against the dangers
of an organized, militant Communism."

111

It should be made clear that Coughlin's personal
attacks against the President boomeranged.

Roosevelt was a

popular figure, and the intemperate language used against
h i m by Coughlin only served to alienate many Catholics from
the priest's cause.

Others, perhaps neutral about the entire

affair, became greatly embarrassed by the spectacle of a
Catholic priest attacking the President of the United States.
There is little question that this embarrassment was instru
mental in causing Ryan and other members of the hierarchy to
take a more active pro-Roosevelt position in the campaign
than had originally been anticipated.

112

Coughlin's political

^ N o v e m b e r 7, 1936, p. 10.
112Josephus Daniels was so impressed "because the
great loyalty to their party and their principles caused the
large body of Catholic voters to turn a deaf ear to the
pleas of Mr. Carmody, Fr. Coughlin and A1 Smith . .
that
he suggested to Roosevelt that either Cardinal Mundelein or
Cardinal Hayes offer prayer before the inaugural address as
a reward.
He pointed to Mundelein's role as pivotal.
Josephus Daniels to Roosevelt, December 4, 1936, President's
Secretary File, I, Diplomatic Co r r . , Mexico, Box 2, Roosevelt
Papers.
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activities contributed to this shift.

Of course, there were

other major factors in Roosevelt's triumph which operated
upon the Catholic voter in the same way they operated on all.
These included the indisputable fact that economic improve
ment had been made, that Roosevelt was a better campaigner
than his opponents, and that the Democrats had large shares
of patronage with which to operate .1 1 3

11^

JOther reasons have been suggested as to why
Coughlin failed to win large Catholic backing for his candi
date.
Tull, "Father Coughlin," p. 224, emphasizes that many
Catholics did not want to throw away their vote on a hopeless
cause.
This reason does not really seem justified.
Has
anyone ever investigated how much of a motivational factor
"winning" is in an election?
Shannon, American Iris h , p.
313, has an interesting passage in which he points out that
Coughlin lost his support when he threw off the special
demeanor of a Catholic priest and engaged in bitter political
diatrabe.
His followers were ambiguous in their feelings.
"They wanted to be respectable and proper but they also
wanted to rebel and protest.
A priest who voiced radical,
rebellious sentiments in dignified . . . tones and by use of
religious imagery was uniquely positioned to heal this
division. . . . When he abandoned his dignity and priestly
manner, Father Coughlin lowered himself in the eyes of many
to just another cheap, shouting politician."

CONCLUSION

In attempting to draw certain conclusions from the
foregoing material,

it might be wise to re-emphasize the

limitation of this study.

As was mentioned earlier, most

of the papers of prominent churchmen of this period are
still closed to historians.

This meant that much of the

material on the Church had to be obtained from public
sources.

Such a limitation, however, need not be harmful

unless one feels that there was a wide divergency in the
1930's between the public and private thoughts of prominent
Catholics.

From what private sources are available,

divergence does not appear.

Further,

such a

it might be argued

that only by beginning the dialogue on the basis of public
statements can it be hoped that future historians will be
given an opportunity to examine private collections to "set
the record straight."
If we attempt to analyze some of the salient features
in the relationship between Roosevelt and American Catholics
during the period from 1932 to 1936, we must begin by dis
cussing the sympathy which the Church exhibited for Roosevelt'
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candidacy in 1932.

This sympathy seems to have been the

result of a number of factors.

First, Catholics remembered

Roosevelt as the man who had campaigned for A1 Smith in 1928
and who had spoken out against religious bigotry.

Second,

Roosevelt was on close terms with many members of the hier*

archy in New York and had exhibited considerable finesse when
acting as Governor.

Finally, A1 Smith's campaign in New

England for the Democratic ticket put the final imprimatur
on the Roosevelt ticket.
The public reaction of many prominent Catholics to
the depression revealed a radicalisr, which was surprising to
many observers.

Catholic social spokesmen such as Father

Ryan, Father Gillis, and members of the hierarchy, stressed
the need for Federal action to combat the ravages of the
depression.

They felt that national planning was a logical

step to take during the crisis.

Such an attitude made for a

receptive state of mind toward the innovations which Roose
velt brought to Washington.
The advanced state of Catholic social thought was
seen in the generally favorable reaction with which Catholics
greeted the New Deal measures.

Such measures as NRA, AAA,

and the labor policies of the New Deal, were lauded by Cath
olics as being in complete accord with the Papal encyclicals.
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Although the congruency between the Pope's ideas and the New
Deal was never so close as some would imagine, the Papal
encyclicals were couched in such general terms that much was
left to the imagination.

Many Catholics wanted to see the

New Deal as being in the same tradition as the Popes and this
made their reaction favorable.
But the general terms of Catholic social principles
also produced some rather disturbing features when indi
viduals attempted to express concrete analogies between the
Pope's intention and the measures of the New Deal.
produced a startling variety of thought.

Catholics

A prominent Church

man such as Father John Ryan saw the New Deal as only a
beginning and wanted more national planning.

Another looked

upon Roosevelt's election as an indication that the power of
the Federal government would be curtailed.

There was often

direct contradiction over the interpretation of the C h u r c h 's
social teaching.

Some said that the Pope wanted all laborers

to join a union.

Others insisted that forcing a man to join

a union in order to get a job was against Catholic teaching.
There was also an ambiguity in Catholic reaction to child
labor and the role of the rural dweller in our society.
While large segments of the Catholic hierarchy and many
prominent prelates argued vigorously for the passage of the
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Wagner Labor Act, another element of the Church publicly
lobbied against the child labor amendment.

This latter

group argued that the amendment would lead to Federal con
trol of children.

Apparently the connection between the

strengthening of American labor and the ending of exploit
ation of child lc.bor was not readily apparent.

Yet it

should be emphasized that in this area, as in most, a large
segment of Catholic thought was consistently progressive in
outlook.

Father Haas and Father Ryan both recognized the

need of protesting exploitation at all stages.
The most vivid example of contradictory philosophies
in Catholic thought at this time was between Father Ryan
and Father Luiggiti.

Luiggiti was a Jeffersonian agrarian

who felt that the only hope for society was to return to a
nation of small family-owned farms.

While admitting and

accepting the need for Federal assistance in his agricul
tural endeavors, Luiggiti frowned upon any plan to combine
farming operations into giant combines.

Father Ryan, on the

other hand, worked more in the industrial field and felt
that if small businesses could not compete with large ones
in wages they should be allowed to die out.
Despite the fact that Roosevelt was aware of the
political strength of American Catholics and was sympathetic

to their needs, he seldom let their advocacy of a particular
line of action influence his own decision when it seemed
against the best interest of the country.

Whenever Roose

velt and the Church came into direct conflict, such as on
the recognition of Russia, and dealing with anticlericalism
in Mexico,

it was the Church which gave way.

But by simply

listening to their grievances Roosevelt often took the sting
out of much of the Catholic attack.

He opened the door of

communication and made a point of considering Catholic
sensibilities on an issue.

In short, he was a master of

tact when dealing with the Church.
to satisfy most Catholic critics.

This was usually enough
In fact, Roosevelt's

attentiveness to Catholic bishops occasionally paid off in
terms of political reality.

The one instance that stands

out is his appearance at Catholic University.

This appear

ance gained him valuable allies in the future debate over
the recognition of Russia.

His handling of Father Walsh in

connection with this priest's protest over Russian recog
nition is another example of the fruitfulness of his tact
and accessibility.
After four years of the New Deal American Catholics
could look back upon a period which saw them make impres
sive gains politically, socially, and intellectually.

Catholics were now permanent fixtures in the national
government and in the group surrounding the President. Many
Church leaders were in close personal contact with the
President.

Catholic educators and reformers such as Father

Ryan and Father McGowan could look back upon the welfare
measure of the New Deal as being in close harmony with the
social encyclicals of the Popes.

By 1936,

it appeared that

American Catholics had reached a position of respect and
integration into public life in the United States.

They

had come a long way from the alienation which they sensed
after the 1928 election.

Father Coughlin was a disturbing

note in this harmony, but it might be argued that only
after the Church had gained sufficient respect under
Roosevelt could such a phenomenon as the radio priest have
been possible in the 1936 election.
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